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The published works submitted for this PhD demonstrate that attention to the 
practice of performative rhetoric can produce deep insights into the operation of 
persuasive arts in society, law courts and the Shakespearean playhouse. The main 
plank of my submission comprises chapters selected from my book Shakespeare’s 
Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance (Bloomsbury Arden 
Shakespeare, 2016). In that book, I demonstrate that since Roman times legal 
testamentary processes have been theatrically performative and that then, as now, 
and as in Shakespeare’s day, the testamentary process serves as a productive analogy 
for theatrical performance. This is because legal processes of testament, executorship 
and probate have their counterparts in the practices by which theatrical performance 
engages actors to execute the dramatist’s will and playgoers to witness it, to test it, 
and hopefully to approve it. Words uttered at thresholds between states of being have 
a quality that is called in various contexts ‘ceremonial’, ‘ritual’, and even ‘magical’. 
All liminal language is potent, but none more so than words spoken at the threshold 
between life and death. Shakespeare acknowledges that ‘the tongues of dying men / 
Enforce attention like deep harmony’ (RII, 2.1.5-6). In theatre, the language of the 
play performs a sort of magic as it passes from the world of the stage to the world of 
the playgoers. In law, so-called ‘operative words’ (such as ‘I agree’, ‘I declare’ and 
‘I swear’) have a comparable capacity to move people from one state of social being 
to another. The words of a last will and testament have a distinctive liminal power to 
cross the threshold of death itself. Through words of will and the performance of the 
testamentary document, one acts now to expresses one’s will over the properties of a 
future world.  
Pursuing the testamentary trope through Shakespeare’s Elizabethan plays, I 
argue that the performance of will can supply a definitional distinction between 
tragedy and comedy in human drama. Namely, that tragedy follows where the 
enactment of free will is frustrated or overborne and comedy flows where will breaks 
free of traditional hierarchical bonds only to resubmit itself voluntarily to new 
subjection in an endless cycle of unlearning. 
I contend that Shakespeare’s dramatic works are especially apt to shed light 
upon the theatricality of performing testamentary will. This is in part down to 
Shakespeare’s dramatic genius, flourishing out of an intensely rhetorical school 
education and playhouse practice, and in part down to the peculiar socio-legal 
context in which Shakespeare worked as regards the emergence of modern free will. 
I demonstrate that Shakespeare was born into a new age of will, in which individual 
intent had the potential to overcome dynastic expectation. Special significance is 
attached to the 1540 Statute of Wills, which liberated testamentary disposition of 
land and thus marked a turning point from hierarchical feudal tradition to the 
modernity of horizontal free trade and democratic self-determination. 
The other published chapters that complete my submission are taken from 
books written or co-edited by me. They focus on material aspects of rhetorical 
performance (synecdoche of material things in The Merchant of Venice and the 
relationship between dress and proof in Twelfth Night and Othello) they advance my 
thesis that the meaning and persuasive effects of the play text can only be 
appreciated in the context of performance, and that this requires us to attend to 
prosody (including the sound, metre and rhythm of speech) as well as to the 
performed relationship between words, silence, gesture and movement through 
space. Speech, silence and movement must also be appreciated in their physical 
context, which in the playhouse includes the material environment formed of stage 
structures, fixtures, costume and moveable props.  
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A. Supporting statement 
Setting out the relationship between the Works presented and the significance of the 




My submission for a PhD by publications in the Department of English and 
Comparative Literary Studies is the culmination of many years of collaboration in 
The University of Warwick’s interdisciplinary efforts at the intersection of law and 
literature, with a particular focus on Shakespeare and performance. In 2005, the 
CAPITAL Centre was launched as a partnership between the Royal Shakespeare 
Company (‘RSC’) and The University of Warwick. It was with support from the 
CAPITAL Centre colleagues, including Jonathan Bate, Susan Brock and Carol 
Rutter that in 2007 I convened, with my colleague Paul Raffield, the Warwick 
international conference on ‘Shakespeare and the Law’. I began to teach my module 
‘Law and literature’ in CAPITAL Centre spaces in 2009 and I continue to teach it 
today. In 2010, at the invitation of Peter Kirwan of the Department of English and 
Comparative Literature, I was the first ever speaker in the interdisciplinary series 
Sidelights on Shakespeare. From the outset of my interdisciplinary efforts, I have 
received generous encouragement and support from colleagues in the Department of 
English and Comparative Literature. Starting with Carol Rutter, Jonathan Bate, 
Susan Brock and Peter Kirwan and, more recently, Paul Prescott (who has kindly 
acted as the supervisor of this submission). I am grateful to them all for their 
invaluable comments on drafts of various publications and I take this chance to 
acknowledge and thank them for their support, as I also acknowledge and thank 
colleagues from further afield. I hope it is clear from the works submitted in this 
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application that I have benefitted from the generous input of these and other 
colleagues and have developed as a literary scholar over the years. 
It was through the CAPITAL Centre that I was put in touch with the RSC 
and given the opportunity to deliver workshops in Shakespeare’s rhetoric. These I 
have continued to develop and present in various forms over the years, including for 
the London Academy of Music and Dramatic Arts (‘LAMDA’), for Australia’s 
National Institute of Dramatic Arts (‘NIDA’) in Sydney, The Friends of the RSC, 
and for groups of RSC donors. I have occasionally led rhetoric workshops with RSC 
actors, including, most recently, the ensemble for Julius Caesar and Antony and 
Cleopatra. My latest monograph, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and 
Properties of Performance (London, Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare) (‘Acts of 
Will’), chapters of which make up the bulk of this PhD submission, grows in large 
part out of those workshops. As it says in the blurb, the book seeks to demonstrate 
Shakespeare’s appreciation of testamentary tensions and his ability to exploit the 
inherent drama of performing will. Focusing on Shakespeare’s late Elizabethan 
plays, it shows that Shakespeare is playful with legal technicality rather than 
obedient to it, and it illustrates how Shakespeare transformed lawyers’ manual book 
rhetoric into powerful drama through a stirring combination of word, metre, 
movement and physical stage material. ‘Stirring’ may be considered the essential 
aim of rhetoric for dramatists and lawyers alike, and for that reason the word appears 
in the title of my 2009 monograph on rhetoric Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice 
Beyond Law. (‘Equity stirring’ is a quote from Shakespeare’s Henry IV Part I, 





The relationship between the works presented 
The publications in the present submission have been selected because they 
demonstrate the candidate’s belief that attention to the rhetorical aspects of 
Shakespeare’s works will deepen our appreciation of Shakespeare’s language and 
stage-craft. Reference is made to rhetorical components of Shakespeare’s education 
and reading, including his possible familiarity with popular rhetoric manuals and 
legal texts. My particular focus is upon the relationship between the linguistic 
rhetoric of the page and embodied and material aspects of performance on stage. 
Following in the tradition of the late Professor John Barton, co-founder of the Royal 
Shakespeare Company, I seek to enhance stage practice, and to enhance critical 
appreciation of stage practice, by attending to the ways in which Shakespeare’s 
linguistic rhetoric can be combined with gestures, movements, props and staging to 
produce persuasive effects upon theatregoers. This requires attention to such factors 
as the embodied sound effects that Shakespeare’s language engenders when spoken, 
and the wide range of subconscious influences that Shakespeare’s word sounds and 
word senses engender when performed physically and through sensory stimulation 
of the playgoers’ imagination.  
The main plank of my submission comprises four chapters (1, 2, 4 and 6) 
from my 2016 monograph Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and 
Properties of Performance (London, Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare). These 
chapters have been selected because of their particular focus on material aspects of 
rhetorical stage performance. Chapter 5 of that book, on Hamlet, extends to 24,000 
words and for that reason is not included in the present submission. Nevertheless, 
brief reference to the contents of that chapter will be made in this statement by way 
of providing context for the submitted works. For instance, it is worth saying from 
the outset that despite Hamlet’s bookish preoccupation with ‘words, words, words’ 
	 9	
(2.2.189), his advice to the travelling troupe of theatrical players who visit Elsinore 
comes straight out of the rhetoric manual: ‘suit the action to the word’ (3.2.17).1 
Actio originally described the gestural action of orators and ‘action’ described legal 
proceedings long before ‘acting’ became a byword for playing in the public 
playhouses.2 
In addition to the four chapters from Acts of Will, two chapters from earlier 
works are included. One is a chapter from my 2013 monograph Dress, Law and 
Naked Truth: A Cultural Study of Fashion and Form (London, Bloomsbury) (‘Dress, 
Law’). The other is the chapter ‘The Law of Dramatic Properties in The Merchant of 
Venice’ from the 2008 collection Shakespeare and the Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing) which I co-edited with Paul Raffield and which carried the proceedings 
of the 2007 conference mentioned earlier.   
The argument of each of the six submitted chapters is summarized next. 
Through this summary it is intended to outline the relationship between the works 
submitted in terms of their shared concern for performative rhetoric.  Having a legal 
background, I first came to Shakespearean scholarship with an enthusiasm to explore 
some of the thematic concerns that the law shares with Shakespeare’s dramatic 
works, but I quickly found it more fruitful to focus upon the practical methodologies 
                                               
1 Ann Thomson and Neil Taylor (eds), Hamlet The Arden Shakespeare, third series 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2006). Quotations from Shakespeare’s works are from the 
most recent edition published by Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare unless otherwise 
stated. 
2 The earliest theatrical usage cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is Robert 
Green’s Green’s Neuer too Late (1590): ‘Men greedie of gaines did fall to practise 
the acting of such Playes’ (ii. sig. B4v).  
	 10	
that legal performance and Shakespearean drama have in common. It is this focus on 
the craft of performance that leads me to attend to rhetorical performance as the 
tradition that connects argument, persuasion and critical judgment in both 
Shakespeare and the law. Accordingly, I hope it is evident from the development of 
my interdisciplinary writing from the earliest submitted work (2008) to the most 
recent (2016) that I have become increasingly attuned to the need to resist an overly 
technical law-centric approach to the appreciation of Shakespeare’s works and to 
become increasingly circumspect in the claims that I make for Shakespeare’s 
technical legal knowledge. 
Before turning to my individual publications, it seems appropriate to 
commence this rhetorical study with a brief exordium on the significance to both 
Shakespeare and the law of attracting an attentive audience and a fair hearing. A 
significant part of my appreciation of Shakespeare’s dramatic texts is the desire to 
appreciate the poetic and rhetorical sound effects that are produced when text is 
performed. I take seriously Harley Granville-Barker’s observation in the 
Introduction to his Prefaces to Shakespeare that ‘The text of a play is a score waiting 
performance’.3 The actor Kevin Kline might have had this in mind when he said that 
‘Shakespeare didn’t write this stuff to be read. It’s like sheet music. You don’t just 
look at it; it’s just a bunch of notes on a page. This was meant to be played’.4 
To attend and to be attentive one must first be called to attention. In English 
courts, it was traditional to commence hearings with the call ‘Oyez, oyez, oyez’ 
(‘hear ye, hear ye, hear ye’) which is still used to open proceedings of the United 
States Supreme Court today. The three-fold call to hear might also have been 
                                               
3 (London: Batsford, 1930, p.5 
4 John Barton’s The Shakespeare Sessions (Storyville Films, Dir: Jacoby, 2003). 
	 11	
familiar to Shakespeare from the sessions of the consistory court (the so-called 
‘bawdy court’) that was convened in local churches in Early modern England, 
including in the parish church of Stratford-Upon-Avon.5 In Shakespeare and the 
Bawdy Court of Stratford, Brinkworth writes that ‘If the accused does not obey the 
summons (‘citation’) and appear in court on the specified date he was called three 
times in a loud voice’.6 There is an auditory and rhetorical counterpart here in the 
three trumpet blasts by which it is thought that the start of the play was signalled in 
early modern playhouses.7   
In playhouse, as in court, the ear must be excited if it is to hear and to judge 
the fairness of the poetry and the pleadings that are to come. A clamour (the original 
sense of the legal word ‘claim’) awakens the ear as a prelude to attentive hearing. 
Rhetoricians have long appreciated this need to excite auditory engagement, thus the 
rhetorician Thomas Wilson lauded the ‘plaine beginning’ wherein ‘the hearer is 
made apt to giue good eare out of hande’.8 Shakespeare was probably familiar with 
Wilson’s work,9 and this passage from Wilson might have inspired Mark Antony’s 
famous plain beginning to his speech in Caesar’s funeral where he expressly invites 
                                               
5 Jonathan Bate, ‘The Bawdy Court’ in P. Raffield and G. Watt (eds), Shakespeare 
and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 41-50. 
6 E. R. C. Brinkworth, Shakespeare and the Bawdy Court of Stratford (London and 
Chichester: Phillimore, 1972),16. 
7 G. H. Cowling, Music on the Shakespearian Stage (Cambridge: CUP, 1913), 83. 
8Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560), G. H. Mair (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909), 99. 
9 Hardin Craig, ‘Shakespeare and Wilson’s “Arte of Rhetorique,” an Inquiry into the 
Criteria for Determining Sources’ (1931) 28 (4) Studies in Philology 618-630. 
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his ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen’ to lend their ears. (3.2.74). That said, the call to 
give or to lend the ear had long been a staple of theatrical practice just as it had long 
been a staple of the rhetorical tradition. In fact, the earliest surviving play script in 
the canon of English theatrical drama – The Castle of Perseverance (c. 1420) – 
begins with a call to friends to lend their hearing (‘Farewel, fayre frendys, / That 
lofly wyl lystyn and lendys’)10 that closely resembles Mark Antony’s. In another 
example of the tradition, at the start of Henry IV, Part II Shakespeare has the Vice 
figure, Rumour, call upon the audience to engage their acoustic sense: ‘Open your 
ears; for which of you will stop / The vent of hearing when loud Rumour speaks?’ 
(The Induction). Thus the call to hear operates in a curiously oxymoronic way by 
calling a listener to listen. The effect of this, I would argue, is to make the audience 
reflexively self-aware of its own auditory engagement with the words of the script. It 
invites an acute and critical engagement with the sense of the words – thus hearing 
becomes a hearing. The Chorus’s invitation to the playgoers at the start of 
Shakespeare’s Henry V – the invitation ‘gently to hear, kindly to judge our play’ 
(1.prologue.34) – more expressly and directly than any other of Shakespeare’s plays 
invites the audience to engage in a critical hearing of the ensuing drama. Hamlet 
alludes to something like it, for Hamlet contrasts ‘judicious’ (3.2.26) playgoers with 
those ‘barren spectators’ (3.2.41) who neglect the ear and judge only by sight. The 
latter, he calls ‘the distracted multitude’ that ‘like not in their judgement but their 
eyes’ (Hamlet 4.3.4-5). With the ears of our mind engaged by this short exordium, I 
will turn now to a summary of the submitted works. 
 
                                               
10 F. J. Furnivall and A.W. Pollard (eds), The Macro Plays (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1904), 75–188, lines 153–4. 
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‘Performance is a kind of will or testament’, Chapter 1 in Shakespeare’s Acts of 
Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance (London: Bloomsbury 
Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 
My book Shakespeare’s Acts of Will is about the way words work. It is about words 
written and words spoken and how they relate to the speaker’s silence, gesture and 
movement through space. It is concerned with the metre and rhythm of spoken and 
written lines, which is a sort of movement through time. It is about the relation of 
words to their physical context, which in the playhouse includes the materials of 
stage structures, fixtures, costume and moveable props. Above all it is about the 
capacity of words to affect those who speak them and those who hear them. An 
appreciation of the audible quality of Shakespeare and law in performance will bring 
us closer to a sense of sound justice than can be achieved by a silent appreciation of 
the logic – the logos – of the written word alone.  
Chapter one of ‘Acts of Will’ demonstrates that since Roman times legal 
testamentary processes have been theatrically performative and that then, as now, 
and as in Shakespeare’s day, the testamentary process serves as a productive analogy 
for theatrical performance.  This is because, to put it briefly, theatrical performance 
engages actors to execute the dramatist’s will and playgoers to witness it, to test it 
and hopefully to approve it. The first thing we learn from the statement ‘performance 
is a kind of will or testament’ (the quote from Timon of Athens that supplies the title 
to the first chapter of the book) is that Shakespeare appreciated the drama inherent in 
the performance of a last will and the drama of legal testamentary language. Words 
uttered at thresholds between states of being have a quality that is called in various 
contexts ‘ceremonial’, ‘ritual’, and even ‘magical’. All liminal language is potent, 
but none more so than words spoken at the threshold between life and death. 
Shakespeare acknowledges elsewhere that ‘the tongues of dying men / Enforce 
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attention like deep harmony’ (RII, 2.1.5-6).11 In theatre, the language of the play 
performs a sort of magic as it passes from the world of the stage to the world of the 
playgoers. In law, so-called ‘operative words’ (such as ‘I agree’, ‘I declare’ and ‘I 
swear’) have a comparable capacity to move people from one state of social being to 
another. The words of a last will and testament have a distinctive liminal power to 
cross the threshold of death itself. Through words of will and the performance of the 
testamentary document, one acts now to expresses one’s will over the properties of a 
future world. The performance of will is not complete in the form of the words 
alone, but requires the complicity of witnesses, the agency of executors and the 
confirmation of probate.  
It is notable that John Austin’s theory of the ‘speech act’ or ‘performative 
utterance’ – the theory that certain forms of words enact changes in the world – was 
premised on the example of legal language, and specifically upon testamentary 
language: 
 
Lawyers when talking about legal instruments will distinguish between the 
preamble, which recites the circumstances in which a transaction is effected, 
and on the other hand the operative part – the part of it which actually 
performs the legal act which it is the purpose of the instrument to perform ... 
‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ would be an operative clause 
and is a performative utterance.12  
 
                                               
11 Compare Pericles 4.2.90-91. 
12 J. L. Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’, in J L Austin: Philosophical Papers, J.O. 
Urmson and G.J. Warnock eds, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 233, 236.  
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The word ‘bequeath’ is perfectly suited to Austin’s argument. To bequeath connotes 
the sense of attempted authority over the material world that we still use when we 
say that something is ‘spoken for’. Staying with etymology, we find that the word 
‘testament’ is a clue to the fact that since ancient, even prehistoric, times testaments 
have acquired their legitimacy as performances played out before witnesses. The 
English word derives from the Latin testamentum, which connotes a witness (testa-) 
to the mind (‘mentum’). A great deal of the language of Roman Law was derived 
from very ancient roots,13 and the ‘testa-’ of testament is a case in point. The sense 
of ‘witness’ originates in the idea of a third person standing by, which in the 
reconstructed Proto-Indo-European lexicon approximates to *tri-st- (‘third’-
‘standing’). As a result of a ‘sound change’, this became ters(t) and tes(t).14 In 
Roman law, witnesses gave the testament its ‘testamentary’ quality. They were the 
spectators and audience to a ceremonial performance that had a director, a script, 
props, and actors with allocated parts to play.  
It is not a primary aim of this book, or my wider work on Shakespeare and 
the law, to establish that Shakespeare had knowledge of particular laws or that legal 
matters directly influenced his work. Causal inquiries of this kind are fascinating, but 
their results are always highly contestable. We can, however, occasionally identify 
similarities between Shakespeare’s texts and contemporary legal treatises. On the 
                                               
13 Michael Weiss, ‘Indo-European Languages’ in M. Gagarin and E. Fantham eds 
The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece & Rome (Oxford, OUP, 2010), 61-63, 
63. 
14 Benjamin W. Fortson, Indo-European Language and Culture: An Introduction, 
2nd edn (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 303. 
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subject of testaments, Henry Swinburne’s Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes15 
and William West’s Symbolæography,16 both appearing as first editions in 1590, are 
especially noteworthy. Although whether, and in what ways, they might have 
contributed to the content of the plays is hard to say. There is also compelling 
correspondence between some of Shakespeare’s lines and the content of the English 
language rhetoric manuals, including Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique.17 As 
mentioned earlier, Shakespeare was almost certainly familiar with Wilson, and with 
other contemporary rhetoric manuals in English (such as George Puttenham’s The 
Arte of English Poesie), but surface similarities between English expressions used in 
the manuals and the plays might obscure the possibility that Shakespeare was more 
deeply ‘influenced’ by the Latin originals that he had used during his Grammar 
School days?18 
What can be said with some confidence is that Shakespeare was influenced 
by the legal and political conditions that produced, in the early modern period, a 
general historical move from medieval to modern modes of thought. Consider the 
words of Mark Antony which appear at the climax of the central (funeral or forum) 
scene of Julius Caesar: ‘Let but the commons hear this testament…’ (3.2.131). The 
phrase indicates a conflict that was central to early modern life: the conflict between 
                                               
15 Henry Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes (London: John 
Windet, 1590). 
16 William West, Symbolæography etc. (London: Totthill, 1590). 
17 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560), G. H. Mair ed (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909). 
18 Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 
80-95. 
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medieval society structured vertically according to the hierarchy of feudalism and 
modern society expressed horizontally by commoners through the performance of 
self-will. Shakespeare was born into a new age of will, in which individual intent 
and emerging democracy had the potential to overcome dynastic expectation and the 
traditional scheme. The vulnerability of the vertical order was writ large in 
contemporary uncertainty surrounding the succession of the English Crown. It was 
also undergoing a revolution in the lives of private citizens. The Statute of Wills 
1540 (32 Hen. 8, c.1), by permitting unfettered testamentary disposition of freehold 
land, marked a turning point from the vertical structure of feudalism to the new 
horizontal plane of the democratic commons. Across his dramatic works, 
Shakespeare presents the act of making a formal will and other acts of testamentary 
intent as acts of self-determination that confront traditional, dynastic and hierarchical 
modes of social settlement. 
 
‘Handling Tradition: Testament as Trade in Richard II and King John’, 
Chapter 2 in Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of 
Performance (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 
The sense just outlined, of the performance of self through the execution of will 
upon the material world, brings us to chapter two of the book. This chapter develops 
my study of the hand as the rhetorical ‘actor’ that connects law, stage and society 
through its performative role as ‘executor’ of will. Through talk of handling I 
demonstrate the power of the hand to engage and take hold of the mind of the 
audience as actors’ hands are seen or imagined to grapple with such ‘properties of 
performance’ as gages, crowns and dust. Also significant are the physical and social 
hierarchies of the early modern playhouse in which executions under hand and hand-
to-hand (as well as feet treading dust) performed horizontal trading and enterprise in 
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contrast to royal and feudal hierarchies. In Richard II especially, and expressly, it is 
to the democratic common ground of the platea (Greek ‘street’) – identifiable with 
that part of the Early modern stage that was thrust out into the pit of groundlings – 
that the King descends to talk of testaments and wills (‘I’ll be buried in the king’s 
highway, / Some way of common trade’ (3.3.156)).  
The participation of the playgoers as third-party witnesses gives the 
performance a testamentary quality, but their participation is not passive. They are 
encouraged to subject the performance, and the will expressed in it, to a process of 
trial or testing. In legal testamentary terms they are invited to subject the will to 
‘probate’ or ‘probation’,19 which means that they are asked to approve what they 
have seen. To assist us in this task of sensing the full make-up of the play, 
Shakespeare presents on-stage witnesses, including manipulators and manual 
workers. They help the playgoers to handle the great questions raised by great 
events. In King John, the chief witness is Philip the Bastard; in Richard II it is the 
gardener.  
Let us suppose, as Andrew Gurr supposes, that Bolingbroke ‘sees the crown 
as the title to a property which can be bequeathed by will like the property of an 
ordinary title-holder’;20 still we never learn if Bolingbroke is right. The openness of 
such questions maintains the on-going life of the drama on the stage, and even in the 
study. We know that Bolingbroke took the crown into his own hands, but we are 
never sure if he stole it, or bargained for it, or merely picked up what had been 
dropped or thrown down. Richard II and King John can therefore be regarded as 
                                               
19 West describes probate as ‘probation of the testament’ (William West, 
Symbolæography etc. (London: Totthill, 1590), s.684). 
20	A. Gurr, (ed), King Richard II (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 20. 
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extended rhetorical arguments designed to persuade the playgoing witness, not to a 
particular verdict or point of view, but to an appreciation of what it feels like to 
handle the evidence and to participate in political discourse.  
In this chapter, I concentrate on two key episodes: Richard’s descent from the 
castle walls (3.3.178-182), followed by the narrated account of the citizens’ ascent to 
the ‘windows’ tops’ of London (5.2.1-6). (A comparable episode in King John is the 
scene where the citizens of Angiers, standing on their city wall, pass judgment down 
upon the competing kings of England and France). The gardener’s reference to the 
high crown ‘thrown down’ is one of many dynamic instances of the vertical vector in 
Richard II. Indeed, the word ‘thrown’, by punning on ‘throne’, concentrates the 
antithesis of high and low in a single word. The fact that the throne (more properly 
‘the state’) is a major stage property, but one that the actors cannot wield physically, 
means that it must be handled in the mind; as much by the playgoers as by the 
players. In contrast, the gages (gauntlets) are the hand prop par excellence. They 
move across the stage horizontally as well as moving up and down through the 
vertical axis. Gages are exchanged hand to hand by a kind of trade bargain that 
implies documentary performance made ‘under hand’. That is, with the signature or 
handwriting of the parties, hence Aumerle refers to his gage as a ‘manual seal’ 
(4.1.26).21 
Part of the appeal of Shakespeare’s Richard II resides in references to the 
performative rituals of everyday life and death in early modern England, many of 
which required the hands-on participation of ordinary folk. The testamentary sense is 
especially strong in those communal performances alluded to, or incorporated, in 
                                               
21 The word ‘gage’ continues to have commercial connotations to this day, notably in 
the form of real security that goes by the name of ‘mortgage’. 
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Shakespeare’s Richard II that specifically relate to death and burial. In this summary 
I will focus on a material correspondence between the documentary performance of 
a will and the physical performance of funeral rites. In Elizabethan times, both 
performances involved an express passing of the soul into the hands of God, and of 
the body to the earth.22 The words spoken at Shakespeare’s funeral (and at the 
funeral of his son, Hamnet, which was roughly contemporary with Richard II and 
King John) would have been the words ordained to be spoken by the priest ‘At the 
Burial of the Dead’ according to the 1552 Book of Common Prayer. This text had 
been significantly reformed from that of the 1549 first edition. The original had left 
the priest in his traditional position as mediator between God above and people 
below. He had uttered in the first person ‘I commende thy soule to God the father 
almighty, and thy body to the grounde’ (emphasis added). The second edition talks 
instead of ‘our dere brother here departed’ and uses the communal ‘we therefore 
commit his body to the ground’ (emphases added). Ritual power was taken not only 
from the mouth of the priest but also from his hands. The words of committal in the 
first edition are preceded by the direction: ‘Then the priest castyng earth upon the 
Corps, shall saye’. In the reformed (second) edition of 1552, that direction is altered 
in a small but important detail, for it is now the bystanders, not the priest, who 
perform the ritual act of casting dust upon the corpse: ‘Then whyle the earth shal be 
cast upon the body by some standing by, / the priest shall saye.’ The ritual of the 
Roman Catholic priest casting dust down from a position somewhere between man 
and God, with the hierarchy that implies, was replaced by the horizontal ritual of 
brothers, members of a common priesthood of believers, casting dust upon one of 
                                               
22 See David Cressy, Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life 
Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England (Oxford: OUP, 1997), ch.18. 
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their own. The dust becomes a prop in a protestant drama with protestant script and 
protestant stage directions. The bystanders in an Elizabethan burial service who 
threw dust upon the coffin had their counterparts in the commoners who cast dust on 
the head of Richard as he entered London trailing behind the triumphant 
Bolingbroke. The dust thrown down on Richard covers him in the shifting matter of 
the common highway and the platea that connects the low stage to the playgoers in 
the yard. 
In Richard II, feudal tradition loses its grip and the realm itself is handled as 
an object of commercial trade. The reason we can never decide if Richard’s hand 
gave or if Bolingbroke’s hand took is because they were both complicit in 
transferring the Crown. In the moment of their trade, in the joining of their hands 
either side of the physical crown, they shake hands upon a bargain. And yet not so, 
for there can be no true bargain with a hollow crown, and no true bargain without 
consent, and Shakespeare embeds the sense (as must be common sense) that Richard 
is not a free and fully willing party to the deal. One of Shakespeare’s most brilliant 
techniques for achieving this uncanny sense of unwilling volition is a method – a 
poetic sound effect – that I call ‘fractional inference’. What I mean by this is that 
Shakespeare omits a key word but amplifies our sense of its absence by scattering 
fractions of the word throughout the text. In the following passage, for example, he 
omits the word ‘will’, but the sound elements of ‘will’ are included in such words as 
‘well’ and ‘fill’ and ‘whilst’ and through the repeated sound of ‘w’. Shakespeare’s 
technique, which might have been subconsciously employed, prompts in the 
audience a subconscious search for the word ‘will’ which makes them feel its 




Now is this golden crown like a deep well 
That owes two buckets, filling one another, 
The emptier ever dancing in the air, 
The other down, unseen and full of water. 
That bucket down and full of tears am I, 
Drinking my griefs, whilst you mount up on high. (4.1.184-189) 
 
Bolingbroke’s very next line – ‘I thought you had been willing to resign’ – by 
expressly using the word ‘will’, joins together the elements of ‘will’ that had been 
present in fractured parts in Richard’s speech. We now sense more strongly than 
ever, if only subconsciously, that the word ‘will’ was absent from Richard’s speech 
and we perhaps begin to feel deep down that Richard could not bring himself to say 
the word ‘will’ because his mind was fundamentally unwilling.  
 
‘“Shall I descend?”: Rhetorical Stasis and Moving Will in Julius Caesar’, 
Chapter 4 in Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of 
Performance (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the centrality of ‘stasis’ as a theme and word-set in 
law, rhetoric and in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. I seek to show how Shakespeare’s 
Mark Antony succeeds in moving popular will by employing the props of Caesar’s 
bloodied corpse and Caesar’s red-sealed testament, and also by his clever physical 
and psychological inversion of the usual rhetorical rule that higher is superior. In 
addition to these physical persuasions that suit action to word, I offer another 
example of ‘fractional inference’ to demonstrate the way in which Shakespeare 
embeds the rhetorically powerful will to move by secreting or amplifying a sound 
sense of the word ‘stir’ at precisely that moment that Mark Antony is rhetorically 
	 23	
and disingenuously denying his rhetorical project of stirring hearts and minds. 
Moving and stirring has always been a central ambition of rhetorical art in the face 
of static and stubborn opposition. Thomas Wilson described rhetoric as the art of 
‘movyng pitie, and stirring men to mercie’ (The Art of Rhetoric, 1553).23 Thus in the 
following passage the reader (or hearer) will note that sound fragments of the word 
‘stir’ are scattered through the four lines and that on two occasions the sound sense 
(but not the dictionary sense) of the word appears homophonically in ‘ye-ster-day’ 
and ‘ma-ster-s’, thus the culminating appearance of the word ‘stir’ is the rhetorically 
satisfying third iteration in the tricolon ‘ster’ – ‘ster’ – ‘stir’. I have underlined and 
bracketed the relevant sound fragments to show how Shakespeare sometimes 
encloses one fractional version of the word within another to produce a layering or 
amplification of the sound effect: 
 
But yesterday the word of Caesar might 
Have [stood again{st the wor}rld. Now lies he there], 
And none [so poor to do him rever]ence. 
O masters! If I were disposed to stir 
Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage. (Julius Caesar 3.2.119-124) 
 
Brutus presents two key justifications for the assassination of Caesar. First, 
that Caesar was ambitious and for that reason deserved to die. Second, that he 
(Brutus) is honourable and for that reason deserves to be respected. The opening line 
of Antony’s forum speech contains his initial effort to undermine the first of Brutus’s 
claims. The line swells physically as ambition does – one syllable, two syllables, 
                                               
23 Wilson, Rhetorique, 133. 
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three syllables; and it swells conceptually as ambition does – from friends, to Rome, 
to the whole Country. An atmosphere of ambition having been thus established, it is 
swiftly undone by the two short pairs of syllables that express the friendly intimacy 
of ‘lend me your ears’. What gestural action might suit Antony’s words? Is there 
anything more fitting than for the actor to start with their hands held close to their 
chest; then to open them out a little on the monosyllabic ‘friends’; to open them still 
wider on the two syllables of ‘Romans’; to open them to their full lateral extent on 
the three syllables of ‘Countrymen’; and, finally, to draw the hands in again to the 
heart with the words ‘lend me your ears’? As the ambit of Antony’s arms and the 
sense of his words swell wider and wider, his initial gesture might seem to lend 
support to Brutus’s argument that Caesar was ambitious, but when Antony’s arms 
are drawn in again to the heart, the sense of ambition is replaced by a sense of 
humility and intimacy. The cumulative gestural effect of the outward expanse of the 
first six syllables and the inward gathering of the last four is to produce the action of 
an embrace. Thus Antony’s opening line preemptively answers with a subconscious 
‘no’ a question that he will pose later in his speech: ‘Was this ambition?’ (3.2.98). I 
go on to demonstrate in this chapter that Shakespeare’s ingenious use of short (that is 
‘unambitious’) lines every time the word ‘ambitious’ appears throughout the opening 
passage of Antony’s forum speech produces an embodied effect that will confirm the 
playgoers’ subconscious rejection of the charge of ambition.  
Of course, although Mark Antony wins his rhetorical contest with Brutus, the 
tragedy is that as ‘Antony wins…Rome loses’.24 He stirred up the hearts and minds 
                                               
24 Jennifer Richards, Rhetoric, The New Critical Idiom (Routledge, Abingdon 2008), 
93. 
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of the mob into a frenzy and the result was a riot and violent bloodshed. Even a poet 
is killed by mistake – a warning, from Shakespeare perhaps, that nobody is safe 
when rhetoric goes rogue.  
 
‘From dust to dust and sealing wax: the materials of testamentary 
performance’, Chapter 6 in Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and 
Properties of Performance (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 
In Chapter Two, we considered some of the methods employed in Richard II, King 
John and the prologues of Henry V by which Shakespeare sought to engage the 
hands of the playgoers’ minds to touch the play and to make the play more touching. 
One such technique was to place characters on stage to narrate first-hand witness 
accounts of materials being handled. All witness narratives turn sights into sounds 
and therefore have the merit of appealing to playgoers as spectators and as audience. 
Witness accounts of materials being handled are especially potent because they 
excite the playgoers’ senses of sight and sound and touch at the same time. Having 
been thus engaged to a more complete sensory imagination of the play, the playgoers 
are better able to get a feel for it and to weigh it up and to probe its forms and test its 
substance. 
This chapter includes a reading of two episodes of documentary performance 
that are narrated to an on-stage hearer, and thereby to the theatre audience. The first 
is Hamlet’s forgery of the warrant for the execution of Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern; the second is Lady Macbeth’s somnambulant letter writing. These two 
documentary episodes have a special relevance to my thesis that ‘performance is a 
kind of will or testament’, for both episodes resemble the legal process of 
‘attestation’, whereby a witness affirms the veracity of writing, signature and seal. 
The signal potency of a red seal on white paper or parchment evokes the sign of 
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blood and as such is arguably the original performative sign of changing states – 
from alive to dead, from boy to man, from girl to woman, from maid to married, 
from married to mother, from innocent to murderer. Anthropologists acknowledge 
the social significance of the mark of red on white,25 and the early modern period 
saw a particularly rich renaissance of the classical tragedian’s resort to the bloody 
sign.26 In this chapter I give a new account of the stage history of this semiotic 
current. I suggest, in particular, that Shakespeare uses rings to perform the seasonal 
and unlearning circles of comedy (especially marital comedy) and that he uses seals 
to perform the tragic downwards trajectory of tragedy, so that the material metaphor 
of the signet ring can be imagined to represent both sides of the drama of life. In the 
Macbeth episode, the doctor describes Lady Macbeth’s nocturnal writing as ‘actual 
performances’. The sealing of her letter is no less a performance to be witnessed than 
the bloody staining of her hand. 
Some wordless sights and objects have the quality that Shakespeare calls ‘a 
prone and speechless dialect / Such as move men’ (MM, 1.2.173-4). The word 
‘object’ denotes something that is conceptually ‘thrown against’ the senses, and I 
demonstrate through the course of Acts of Will that some of the most striking and 
significant stage objects are not only thrown conceptually, but are also thrown 
physically (including dust, gloves, warder, skulls). When an object is thrown against 
another thing it will move it, all other things being equal. As Newton’s laws explain 
                                               
25 Victor W. Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1967), 74. 
26 Gary Watt, ‘Le symbole du sang dans la performance légale et théâtrale de 
l’Angleterre du début de l'époque moderne’ in C. Biet and M.-M. Fragonard (eds.), 
Théâtre, Arts, Violence (2010) 73 Littératures Classiques 311-323. 
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material encounters in the physical world, so we can talk of dramatic laws through 
which stage properties have a metaphysical power to move people. There is 
something proto-Newtonian in the hope expressed by Claudius that a visit to 
England will move Hamlet to change: ‘Haply the seas and countries different / With 
variable objects shall expel / This something-settled matter in his heart’ (Ham, 
3.1.170-72). Newton’s language of ‘force’ and ‘gravity’ and ‘motion’ would not 
have existed without a rhetorical tradition that understood the matter of the mind to 
be moved by emotional force. Consider, for example, the proto-Newtonian quality of 
Thomas Wilson’s observation that ‘Affections therefore (called Passions) are none 
other thing, but a stirring or forsing of the minde’.27 
 
‘Shakespeare on Proof and Fabricated Truth’, Chapter 3 in Dress, Law and 
Naked Truth: A Cultural Study of Fashion and Form (London: WISH list, 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 
This chapter, like those of Acts of Will, arises out of my concern for the rhetorical 
performance of meaning through metaphor and physical material (what I call 
‘performative properties’, developing Austin’s idea of the ‘performative utterance’ 
or ‘speech act’). The chapter concerns the rhetorical fabrication of truth and what we 
learn about truth manufacture in law from Shakespeare’s use of ‘proof’ language in 
relation to both trial and dress in Othello and Twelfth Night. I argue against the usual 
discourse that describes legal trial as a process that aims at the discovery of 
underlying or ‘naked’ truth, arguing to the contrary that legal trial process is a 
process of fabrication that aims to cover the case with an appearance of proof that 
                                               
27 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560) G. H. Mair ed, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909), 130. 
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will be sufficient to deflect reasonable doubt.  The chapter demonstrates that the 
current common law culture of evidentiary probation developed out of an early 
modern culture of suspicion about external (including clothed and fabricated) 
appearance and in which the technical language of proof in law was closely related 
to that employed in the proof of armour.28 Focusing on Shakespeare’s Othello and 
Twelfth Night, the chapter demonstrates the close connection between legal and 
rhetorical modes of proof by trial and material cultures of dress, in particular military 
dress.  
In Othello, we find what is surely the most famous of Shakespeare’s 
references to proof. It occurs when Othello challenges Iago to provide 
incontrovertible evidence of Desdemona’s marital infidelity: ‘Be sure of it: give me 
the ocular proof... / Make me to see’t, or at the least so prove it / That the probation 
bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on, or woe upon thy life!’ (3.3.398, 403-
405). In the notes to his 2001 Arden edition of Othello, E A J Honigmann relies on 
the Oxford English Dictionary entries for ‘hinge’ and ‘hang’ to support the view that 
Othello is referring to something that swings or pivots, so that Othello is demanding 
proof so secure ‘that doubts will not move it’.29 As an explanation, this is 
insufficiently precise. In the 1958 Arden edition of the play, M R Ridley had 
observed that Othello’s metaphor of ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is very unusual in 
Shakespeare’s works, and that ‘we have therefore to start from scratch’ in discerning 
its meaning. Ridley continues: ‘it is not easy to see what the force of the figure is’, 
                                               
28	Consider, for example, the close linguistic correspondence between legal proof of 
the grade ‘semiplena probatio’ and armorial proof of the grade ‘à demi épreuve’.	
29 William Shakespeare, Othello (E A J Honigmann ed) (London: Arden 
Shakespeare, 2001) 232. 
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observing that it is not like Shakespeare ‘to combine in one picture incongruous 
specific concrete details’, and, significantly: 
 
This may all seem to be making a fuss about nothing, since the ‘general sense’ 
is clear; but with an artist of Shakespeare’s vivid pictorial imagination we 
should never, I think, be easily satisfied with ‘general sense’ and a 
consequently woolly apprehension when he himself is being concretely 
specific.30  
 
In this chapter I submit that the hitherto mysterious signification of Shakespeare’s 
supposedly mixed metaphor of ‘probation’, ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is to be found in the 
technical terminology of military dress. ‘Probation’ is an allusion to the process by 
which medieval and early modern armourers tested or ‘proved’ their finished work for 
weaknesses, a process which required the armour to be, quite literally, ‘probed’ by a 
range of weaponry. The ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ in Othello’s quote refer to the weak points 
in a suit of armour – these are, as Othello puts it, the main sites of ‘doubt’. No suit of 
armour could function without the loops or buckles by which it was strapped together, 
and in certain places sections of armour were joined by metal hinges.31  
 Thus Othello’s image of ‘probation’, ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is not an 
inconsistent mix of metaphors, but a single extended metaphor, and one that he, as a 
military general, would naturally employ. Armour that passed the process of probation 
(the process of being proved) was said to qualify as ‘proof’. This sequential process is 
                                               
30 William Shakespeare, Othello (M R Ridley ed) (London: Arden Shakespeare, 
1965), 115. 
31 Charles Ffoulkes, The Armourer and His Craft (London: Methuen, 1912), 54–5. 
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paralleled in an earlier part of Othello’s narrative, where he says: ‘I’ll see before I 
doubt; when I doubt, prove; /And on the proof, there is no more but this: / Away at 
once with love or jealousy’ (3.3.213-215). 
 Twelfth Night, or What You Will is the other play treated in this chapter. In 
Twelfth Night, Shakespeare makes express reference to proof by catechism and to the 
related legal notion of proof by constant question. On both occasions the process of 
producing proof appears, as my thesis anticipates, in the context of a related concern 
to probe through the external coverings of dress. It is significant that legal suspicion 
of mere words and legal insistence upon proper documentary form (that is, 
‘covering’ or ‘proof’) reached a peak (though by no means its only peak) at precisely 
the time that Shakespeare was writing and first staging Twelfth Night. The first 
known performance occurred on 2 February 1602 in the Hall of the Middle Temple 
(one of the ‘Inns of Court’), and the important litigation in Slade’s Case, which had 
been running since 1596, finally concluded in November 1602.32 The essential 
question in Slade’s Case was whether an action for debt had to be pursued by a 
formal documentary writ of debt in the Court of Common Pleas, or whether a claim 
in debt might be expedited by the less formal action of indebitatus assumpsit in the 
court of King’s Bench under which the plaintiff would put it to a jury that the 
debtor’s oral promise to pay amounted to a binding assumption of liability. The case 
concerned basic questions about the enforceability of contracts and it therefore 
became famous beyond the walls of the lawyers’ world.33 Eventually the judges 
decided that debt could be pursued on an oral assumpsit as an alternative to the old 
                                               
32 Slade’s Case (1602) 4 Co Rep 91 (Court of Exchequer Chamber). 
33 William J. Jones, Politics and the Bench: The Judges and the Origins of The 
English Civil War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971) 49-50. 
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form of action in debt, and thereby opened the way to a modern flexible law of 
contract. Twelfth Night was written during the period in which (as Professor Ibbetson 
notes) there was a ‘significant shift away from assumpsit’, so we should expect to 
find that if the play alludes to Slade’s Case, it will do so by casting doubt upon the 
reliability of mere words. We do indeed find such doubts expressed in the play, 
notably when Feste laments that ‘words are grown so false, I am loath to prove 
reason with them’ (3.1.17-18). For the lawyers in Middle Temple Hall who 
constituted the first known audience for the play, there could hardly have been an 
issue of greater topical interest than that of doubtful words. The historical evidence 
for the first performance on 2 February 1602 is an entry in the diary of John 
Manningham, a student barrister at the Middle Temple. It is notable that in 
Manningham’s brief review of the play he fixes foremost upon the counterfeit 
document by which Malvolio was gulled.34 
There is a lively academic debate concerning the nature of the early modern 
origins of the concept of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’.35 To that debate I have 
added an original and material layer. Barbara Shapiro has convincingly argued that 
the process of proof beyond reasonable doubt aimed to establish practical satisfaction 
or moral comfort as inquirers found it increasingly hard to discover the absolute truth 
                                               
34 ‘A good practice in it to make the steward beleeue his lady widdowe was in Love 
with him by counterfaiting a letter, as from his lady in general terms’ (Robert P. 
Sorlien (ed), The Diary of John Manningham of the Middle Temple 1602-1603 
(Hanover, NH: UP of New England, 1976). 
35 See, for example, Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘The Beyond Reasonable Doubt Doctrine: 
‘Moral Comfort’ or Standard of Proof?’ (2008) 2.2 Law and Humanities 149-173; 
James Q Whitman, Response to Shapiro (2008) 2.2 Law and Humanities 175-189.  
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of facts within the complexities of the early modern world.36 In this chapter, I 
demonstrate how closely this parallels early modern notions of proving armour. 
Armour was never required to be absolutely impenetrable. Proof of armour was not 
proof as an absolute truth; it was merely proof to the point of practical satisfaction. 
The same was true, and is true, of legal proof.  
 
‘The Law of Dramatic Properties in The Merchant of Venice’, Chapter Fifteen 
in P. Raffield and G. Watt (eds), Shakespeare and the Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008), page 237-251. 
In this chapter on The Merchant of Venice, the rhetorical figure of synecdoche – the 
representation of a whole by means of a part – is offered as a material bridge to 
connect legal and theatrical performance through the medium of stage properties. At 
the start of Shakespeare’s Henry V, the chorus invites the audience to imagine that 
the small stage and the small band of actors and the small span of the play can 
convey the full time and space and properties of France: ‘Into a thousand parts 
divide one man  / … Turning th’ accomplishment of many years / into an hourglass’. 
(Prologue 24–31). Parallel language (right down to the duplication of ‘hourglass’) is 
employed with parallel purpose at the very beginning of The Merchant of Venice. 
Salerio, imagining himself in Antonio’s place, muses: 
                                               
36 Barbara J. Shapiro: A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2000); Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: 
A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and 
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Doubt’ and ‘Probable Cause’: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law 
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I should not see the sandy hour-glass run, 
But I should think of shallows and of flats, 
And see my wealthy Andrew, docked in sand, 
Vailing her high-top lower than her ribs 
To kiss her burial … (1.1.26–30)  
 
Salerio’s musings imply an invitation to the audience to join him in imagining that a 
great matter, a shipwreck, may be figured in a thing as small as sands in an 
hourglass. They also introduce the significant metaphoric and allegorical use of the 
wrecked ship to indicate Antonio’s wrecked body (the wooden ‘ribs’ of the ship’s 
hull presage the ribs from which Shylock threatens to take the pound of flesh). As 
The Merchant of Venice begins with the warning that a small thing can portend the 
ruin of a man, so the play ends with the same warning. The final lines are Gratiano’s: 
‘while I live I’ll fear no other thing / So sore as keeping safe Nerissa’s ring’ 
(5.1.324). The final word is a prop, and its physicality serves to bring the play full 
circle. Portia’s ring also exemplifies the principle partem pro toto. Portia’s ring is 
nothing less than the symbolic representation of her whole person and of all of her 
property too. Portia expresses as much when she declares to Bassanio: ‘This house, 
these servants and this same myself / Are yours, my lord. I give them with this ring’ 
(3.2.173–4). The name Portia is loaded with playful signification, much of it 
etymological, but the most direct signification, and the most pertinent for present 
purposes, are the senses ‘portion’ and ‘porter’ which are evoked by the very sound of 
her name. These senses are pertinent because Portia is a whole transported as a part 
or ‘portion’ of the whole. The word-play culminates in the fact that Portia is 
represented as a ‘portrait’, and there may even be an oblique reference to the 
	 34	
financial ‘marriage portion’ that a wife brought to an Elizabethan marriage by way 
of dowry.   
Portia’s line, ‘[t]his house, these servants and this same myself / Are yours, 
my lord. I give them with this ring’ (3.2.173–4) appears in a passage containing the 
terms ‘in gross’ and ‘converted’, both of which carry technical significance in the 
law of property. It is from a legal perspective that Portia’s giving of the ring achieves 
its triumph over her father’s capricious casket test. When Shakespeare was writing, 
the public giving of a ring was a well-known method of transferring title to freehold 
land. It was a symbolic method, a piece of legal theatre, but its effect was real. It is, 
of course, physically impossible to transfer legal title to land or even to transport the 
land itself (even if all the soil were moved, the physical space that is the land would 
remain), so a ritual was devised (known as ‘livery of seisin’) by which title to land 
could be transferred by the public, symbolic delivery of a physical part: partem pro 
toto. Frequently the part was a sod or turf cut from the land with a knife (as one 
might cut a pound of flesh) or a twig was cut from a tree growing on the land. In the 
first part of his Institutes, Sir Edward Coke says that the feoffor may go on the land 
and take ‘the ring of the doore or turfe or twigge of the land and deliver the same 
upon the land to the feofee in name of seisin of the land’.37 A concern for on-stage 
equivalents to off-stage performance of dispositive will connects this chapter to 
those submitted from Acts of Will. 
 
 
                                               
37 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1628) 
59, 60.  
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Significance of each of the works submitted as a contribution to original 
knowledge. 
This section is offered by way of conclusion to this covering statement. 
A number of specific points of original contribution have been noted in the 
course of the preceding commentary. In relation to the proof chapter, for example, I 
have outlined how my reading of Othello’s concern with proof has solved the long-
standing challenge to know the image Shakespeare has in mind when Othello 
demands proof that will ‘bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on’ (3.3.404–5).  
The chapter on The Merchant of Venice likewise makes some original contributions 
of a quite narrow and technical nature – for example a new candidate for the type of 
bond (the bottomry bond) that might have inspired elements of the Shylock-Antonio 
bond – in the course of offering broader insights into the material relations between 
legal and literary rhetoric in performance. 
In the remainder of this section I will demonstrate the original contribution 
made by Acts of Will. I will do this in two stages. The first stage of the demonstration 
is to contrast my approach to a book published by a distinguished scholar in 2014 
that adopts a rather different way of approaching the role of rhetoric in 
Shakespearean drama. Of course, I did not have the benefit of certain books that 
were published the same year as mine or subsequently that would certainly also have 
warranted engagement in Acts of Will, including John Kerrigan, Shakespeare’s 
Binding Language (Oxford: OUP, 2016), Farah Karim Cooper, The Hand on the 
Shakespearean Stage (Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) and Kevin Curran 
(ed) Shakespeare and Judgment (Edinburgh University Press, 2016). The second 
stage of the demonstration is to set out extracts from a number of reviews of Acts of 
Will published by Shakespearean scholars worldwide. 
	 36	
As to the first stage, Quentin Skinner’s Forensic Shakespeare (Oxford: OUP, 
2014), which I reviewed for The Renaissance Quarterly ((2016) 69 (2) 812-814), 
will serve to illustrate the difference between my approach and other perfectly 
legitimate approaches to the role of rhetoric in Shakespeare’s plays. The book is a 
brilliant example of its kind and the contrast it provides to my approach is all the 
more bold for it. Professor Skinner’s main innovation is to argue that, within 
Shakespeare’s broad appreciation of rhetoric, he was ‘principally concerned with 
judicial rhetoric, and thus with the question of how to develop an argument in 
accusation or defence before a judge’ (48). He states that he does not intend to deny 
the significance of the plays as works on stage, but he nevertheless relegates voice 
and gesture to a side note on the ground that they do not figure prominently in the 
rhetorical treatises of Cicero and Quintilian (12, 13). I urge a quite different 
emphasis by contending that Shakespeare was not primarily concerned with rhetoric 
(even judicial rhetoric, even in the ‘forensic’ plays) as a structuring device to 
elucidate the interactions of his characters, but with rhetoric as a set of performance 
techniques for moving and persuading playgoers. Professor Skinner makes the 
important point that ‘Shakespeare is less interested in legal than in juridical issues’ 
(220), but the judgment that was of principal concern to Shakespeare was, I would 
suggest, that of his audience. In my argument, judgment does not rest solely upon the 
conceptual sense of words. Rather, the audience is invited to reach for a felt sense of 
justice. Accordingly, they are invited to weigh up the sensory merits of alternative 
words (‘Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well. / Weigh them, it is as heavy’ 
(Julius Caesar, 1.2.144-145)). Sound judgment of that sort helps us to appreciate 
when words are poetically ‘just’. Clothes and other material properties of stage 
performance are significant too. Despite Professor Skinner’s focus on the linguistic 
elements of classical rhetoric, it should be recalled that Cicero famously employed 
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the device of wearing the pure white toga candida, and Quintilian advised that 
passion might be demonstrated by vigorous gestures that cause the toga to fall off the 
shoulder. Cicero’s rhetoric, delivered in the court room and in the public forum, was 
intensely performative and theatrical. The distinctive argument of my work might be 
summarised in the claim that Shakespeare’s plays move us because they excite 
practices of critical judgment that playgoers exercise in the courts of everyday life. 




Turning to the second stage of my demonstration of the original contribution made 
by the submitted works, I set out next a number of reviews of my monograph 
Shakespeare’s Acts of Will that make the case for its originality more persuasively 
than my own testimony ever could. With these reviews I conclude this statement in 
support of my submission. 
 
(2018) 21(1) Early Theatre: A Journal associated with the Records of Early English 
Drama 173-176, 173 (reviewer Dr Subha Mukherji, University of Cambridge) 
Probing the analogy between the conditions of performance and the structure of 
testamentary action, Gary Watt’s book offers an original, minutely researched, and 
provocative thesis. Tracing ‘testament’ to its Latin etymology – suggesting the 
presence of a witness to the mind – Watt offers a new way of understanding the 
exchange between performers and audience that defines the theatrical event. What is 
more, he suggests that exchange leads to change — transformations of abiding social 
significance. In the process, Watt steers us into thinking about the affinity between 
law and theatre in a novel way: in terms of an expression of will that amounts to a 
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social contract. While readers and viewers of Shakespeare’s plays have affectively 
registered the notion of audience as witness for some time – often through 
meditations on the epilogues inviting audience judgement, approval or pardon, or on 
self-reflexive inset plays – Watt’s work is the first to connect this notion with such 
sustained rigour to theatre’s engagement of the imaginative work of law, and to the 
‘understood’ nature of this relation in early modern English culture which made the 
intimacy and impact of this dialogue possible. Watt delves deep into the rhetoricity 
of the law, at the heart of what he calls the ‘creative construct’ (2) of English 
common law – at once expressing and moving wills. 
(2017) 57(2) SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 427-474, 445 (reviewer 
Professor Kevin Curran, University of Lausanne in Switzerland.) 
Gary Watt’s Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament, and Properties of 
Performance shows how will – both the legal document and the volitional force – 
allows us to think about the conceptual and experiential links among theater, law, 
and public life. It’s a fiercely intelligent but nimbly written book that maintains a 
spirit of intellectual generosity throughout…. 
 
 (2017) 70(4) Renaissance Quarterly 2017 1661-1662 (reviewer Dr Elise Denbo, 
Assistant Professor, Queensborough Community College, CUNY) 
Given current trends in cognitive studies and literature, a book that explores 
testamentary ‘acts of will’ in Shakespeare’s Elizabethan plays is at once compelling 
and noteworthy – and I might add, surprisingly so. Through a strong analysis of six 
plays – Richard II, King John, As You Like It, The Merchant of Venice, Julius 
Caesar, and Hamlet — Watt extends the definition of legal terms (‘will,’ 
‘testament,’ ‘executor,’ ‘probate,’ ‘witness’) to highlight the rhetorical and 
	 39	
performative crossover between law and theater, or the ways in which words 
‘express’ and ‘move’ will. … Watt, a professor of law at the University of Warwick, 
presents a careful and caring study of will in Shakespeare’s plays. Watt’s thorough 




























Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance 




‘Performance is a kind of will or testament’ 
 
 
This book is about the way words work. It is about words written and words spoken 
and how they relate to the speaker’s silence, gesture and movement through space. 
We are concerned with the metre and rhythm of spoken and written lines, which is a 
sort of movement through time. It is about the relation of words to their physical 
context, which in the playhouse includes the materials of stage structures, fixtures, 
costume and moveable props. Above all it is about the capacity of words to affect 
those who speak them and those who hear them. The words of Shakespeare’s 
dramatic works exemplify this capacity and it will be our happy task to unfold them 
and to get a feel for them and to find some of their hidden ways of working. To be 
concerned with the ways that words touch people, move people and change people is 
to be concerned with the art of rhetoric. The Greek adjective rhetorikos denoted the 
profession of the rhetor or orator.1 These were the public speakers and legal 
advocates of ancient Greece. The word ultimately derives from Proto-Indo-European 
                                               
1 Etymologies are from Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, R K Barnhart, ed 
(London: H Wilson and Company, 1988) unless otherwise stated. 
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for the spoken word (*wretor). The related Greek word rhetra, which over time 
denoted a ceremonial or authoritative utterance, an agreement, a contract or a legal 
resolution, reminds us that rhetoric is especially concerned with the power of words 
to express will to bring about changes of social state. This brings us to the word 
‘will’ appearing in the title to this book. The pun on Shakespeare’s name is fortunate 
(or unfortunate),2 but the word figures in this study for the more substantial reason 
that we are concerned with the way words express will and move wills. We will see 
that the related idea of ‘testament’ denotes the expression of will before witnesses 
and for this reason can reveal a great deal about the nature of dramatic performance 
in law, theatre and the rest of social life. Testament performs the work of will in the 
world and in the world we leave behind.  
This is not, primarily, a book about the technical minutiae of testamentary 
law; although we will occasionally find it helpful to consider the details of statutes, 
case reports and legal treatises. This book is more concerned with the cultural 
practices, and specifically the creative practices, that connect theatre to law and 
connect both theatre and law to the wider world of the witnessing public. It might 
seem strange to an outsider to think of the law as a creative practice. If so, this might 
be due in part to the fact that insiders seem dead-set in their denial of law’s 
imaginative dimension. Since the enlightenment lawyers have looked to the new 
professional paradigms of empirical and medical science to dignify the common law 
with a doctrinal sense of schematic structure and a reputation for laboratory 
predictability from case to case.  Anybody with intimate familiarity with the progress 
of the common law at its cutting edge in the highest courts will see that this scientist 
                                               
2 An internet search will quickly reveal that the pun is a common one in the titles to 
books about Shakespeare. 
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fiction is a myth.3 It is a creative construct, and an example of the most ancient 
rhetorical profession playing with language in the creative way that it has always 
done best. Part of the lawyers’ rhetorical pretence is to deny that rhetoric or creative 
fiction is at work in their professional practices. Even legal scholars routinely 
contrast rhetoric with reality with no acknowledgment that rhetoric is what lawyers 
really do.4 In one recent case heard in the highest court in the land, one of the 
Justices of the United Kingdom Supreme Court went out of his way to say that there 
is no place for ‘fairy tales’ in the law.5 My own opinion is that the law is deeply 
committed to the fairy-tale business of moving property and people from one state to 
another by means of magic words. The irony is that the same senior judge in the very 
same case had opened his speech with a line of exemplary rhetoric in which he 
likened the tension between the legal and equitable aspects of the common law to a 
                                               
3 I discuss the ‘science fiction’ of law in Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009), 10-14. 
4 Almost one third of academic articles on the legal database Westlaw UK that 
contain ‘rhetoric’ in their title also contain the word ‘reality’ (31 of the 100 most 
recent articles as at 26 April 2015). Disjunction between the words is always 
implied, and is usually expressed - as in the phrases ‘rhetoric or reality?’ and ‘from 
rhetoric to reality’. 
5 ‘There is something wrong with a state of the law which makes it necessary to 
create fairy tales’ (AIB Group (UK) plc v. Mark Redler and Co Solicitors [2014] 
UKSC 58, [2014] 3 WLR 1367, per Lord Toulson at para [69]). 
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garment being pulled apart at the seams.6 The ubiquitous and necessary presence of 
metaphoric language ensures that the law continues to spin a good yarn.7  
The major part of this book is focused upon a group of Shakespeare’s 
Elizabethan plays that can be dated (with all the usual caveats) to the period 1595-
1603. In fact, three of them fall in 1599 (As You Like It, Julius Caesar and Henry V), 
and Hamlet was probably substantially complete a year or two thereafter. This is not 
to suggest that the testamentary theme is irrelevant to the Jacobean plays. On the 
contrary, I hope to show that all theatrical drama is in a deep sense testamentary. 
Nevertheless, the themes and language of testament, inheritance and succession are 
more prevalent in Shakespeare’s Elizabethan works. Some of the Jacobean plays 
engage with the broadly testamentary concern that an aging father would naturally 
have for his daughter (think Lear, Prospero and Shakespeare himself), but in the 
Elizabethan plays a legal last will and testament appears as a plotting device and 
even as a physical prop, and it is only in the Elizabethan plays that the word 
‘testament’ is ever repeated and (with the exception of that very late, and seemingly 
valedictory, work The Tempest) it is only in the Elizabethan plays that the 
testamentary word ‘executor’ ever appears. If Shakespeare was particularly engaged 
with testamentary concerns in the Elizabethan period this might have been down to 
                                               
6 Ibid., para [1]. 
7 For further insight into the rhetorical nature of legal language the reader is directed 
to Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts (Stanford, 
Ca: Stanford University Press, 2014) and to the writings of James Boyd White (see J 
Etxabe and G Watt (eds), Living in a Law Transformed: Encounters with the Works 
of James Boyd White (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2014)) and Peter 
Goodrich. 
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public concern over matters of royal succession (we consider this below, but suffice 
to say here that such tensions might be more tactfully touched upon through talk of 
testaments than by direct handling). It might, by the same token, have been down to 
Shakespeare’s literary ‘sources’ or ‘precedents’ (many of which, we will see, were 
concerned with issues of testament and succession). Shakespeare’s interest in issues 
of testament in the Elizabethan period might also be attributable to more personal 
factors. His only son died on 9 August 1596 and his father died on 7 September 
1601. 
The title of this chapter quotes the painter in Timon of Athens.8 Given that the 
main focus of this book is upon Shakespeare’s Elizabethan dramas, the Jacobean 
play Timon of Athens might seem an unlikely starting point. We start with it because 
Timon’s painter spoke more wisely than he knew. In that one line (with a little 
licence of interpretation) he has conveniently indicated a number of premises for the 
present study. Before we consider the merits of the quote, we should briefly attend to 
its context. On the way to seeking a commission from Timon, the painter asserts that 
it is ‘most courtly and fashionable’ to promise to act without actually doing the deed 
spoken of (‘the deed of saying’), and that people who actually perform are ‘the 
plainer and simpler kind of people’ (Tim, 5.1.24-25). These are amusingly self-
deprecating lines for an actor to utter in the very act of performing a play. The 
painter implies that anyone who performs today what they might put off until 
tomorrow must lack a future, or lack imagination to foresee a future. They might as 
well be on their deathbed, for ‘performance is a kind of will or testament which 
argues a great sickness in his judgment that makes it’ (Tim, 5.1.27-28). In early 
                                               
8 Quotations from Shakespeare’s works are from the most recent edition published 
by Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare unless otherwise stated.  
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modern England it was rare to make a will unless illness or violent threat gave cause 
to fear impending death (see Per, 1.1.42).9 Shakespeare himself wrote his will 
shortly before he died. It was drafted in January, amended and executed in March, 
and he died on 23 April 1616.10 
The first thing we learn from the statement ‘performance is a kind of will or 
testament’, is that Shakespeare appreciated the drama inherent in the performance of 
a last will and the drama of legal testamentary language. Words uttered at thresholds 
between states of being have a quality that is called in various contexts ‘ceremonial’, 
‘ritual’, and even ‘magical’. All liminal language is potent, but none more so than 
words spoken at the threshold between life and death. Shakespeare acknowledges 
elsewhere that ‘the tongues of dying men / Enforce attention like deep harmony’ 
(RII, 2.1.5-6).11 In theatre, the language of the play performs a sort of magic as it 
passes from the world of the stage to the world of the playgoers. In law, so-called 
‘operative words’ (such as ‘I agree’, ‘I declare’ and ‘I swear’) have a comparable 
                                               
9 This was in large part a matter of superstition (see E. A. J. Honigmann and Susan 
Brock, Playhouse wills, 1558–1642 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1993), 17. The authors note that in their sample, the average time between the 
making of the will and burial is just two weeks). A short gap between will and death 
was also practically advantageous because early modern wills were not effective to 
dispose of lands acquired by the testator after the date of the will (Joseph Chitty ed, 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1765–69), (London: 
William Walker, 1826), II.23, 378. 
10 Jane Cox, ‘Shakespeare’s Will and Signatures’, in Shakespeare in the Public 
Records (London: Public Records Office, 1985), 25. 
11 Compare Per, 4.2.90-91. 
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capacity to move people from one state of social being to another. When 
Shakespeare was writing, legal forms of words had power to marry, adopt, bastardize 
and kill. The words of a last will and testament have a distinctive liminal power to 
cross the threshold of death itself. Through words of will and the performance of the 
testamentary document, one acts now to expresses one’s will over the properties of a 
future world. (It has been said that all ‘law is the attempt to build future worlds’).12 
The performance of will is not complete in the form of the words alone, but requires 
the complicity of witnesses, the agency of executors and the confirmation of 
probate.13 Legal and theatrical modes of performance are in many respects vastly 
different, of course, but one way in which theatre is ‘testamentary’ is the way it 
engages actors to execute the dramatist’s will and playgoers to witness it, test it and 
hopefully approve it. The judgment that a play calls for is not passive, but 
participatory: ‘[t]he art of the drama makes a primary demand on us: to leave our 
armchair throne of judgment and descend into the mellay of contradictory passions – 
which the action of a play is’.14  
                                               
12 Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, 95 Yale Law Journal 1603 (1985-1986) 
1602 fn.2. I am grateful to Angela Luk Fan, a student on the joint degree in law and 
literary studies at The University of Hong, for bringing this quotation to my 
attention. 
13 These are the general rules. In the case of emergencies, as also in the case of 
soldiers on active duty, exceptions have been made since ancient times. 
14 Harley Granville-Barker, ‘Shakespeare’s Dramatic Art’, in A Companion to 
Shakespeare Studies, H. Granville-Barker and G. B. Harrison eds (Cambridge: CUP, 
1934), 45-87, 86. On the participation of playgoer as judge see Julen Etxabe, The 
Experience of Tragic Judgment (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
	 48	
The second thing we learn from Timon’s painter is that performance was a 
concern of early modern culture that pervaded and connected such seemingly 
disparate practices as law, theatre and painting. Lorna Hutson advises that we should 
be cautious in resorting to the performance trope in literary studies, including studies 
in law and literature. She does not deny the metaphor’s ‘explanatory power’, but 
suggests that its dominance might obscure the merits of other analyses, including one 
based on ‘narrative’.15 It is an excellent point, but ‘performance’ still seems the best 
metaphor to describe the central concerns of the present study. This book aims to 
appreciate the practices by which will is expressed in the form of words, and 
specifically to appreciate how words produce physical forms in the mind and how 
the materiality of the playhouse contributes to this process. Of course, it is necessary 
to take narrative seriously even within the wider trope of performance. The sense 
that narrative produces material forms in the mind is so strong that Shakespeare 
frequently writes of narratives that ‘break’ off (e.g. CE, 1.4.96; R2, 5.2.2; KJ, 
4.2.235; Ham, 1.1.40). In Chapters Two and Six we will examine how Shakespeare 
sometimes employs on-stage witnesses to narrate accounts of events involving the 
handling of material stuff. We will see that this device is especially effective in 
conveying a felt experience of the drama.  
A third thing we learn from Timon’s painter is that Shakespeare employed 
legal notions of performance playfully and without undue respect for thresholds 
between technical categories. The painter blithely borrows the language of 
                                               
15 Lorna Hutson, ‘“Lively Evidence”: Legal Inquiry and the Evidentia of 
Shakespearean Drama’, in Shakespeare and the Law, B. Cormack, M. Nussbaum 
and R. Strier eds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 72-97, 73. 
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testamentary law to make a point about contractual performance.16 Shakespeare 
enjoyed the protean possibilities of legal language and was adept at moving lawyers’ 
terminology from one technical category to another, thereby diverting the power of 
legal language to his own dramatic use while simultaneously subverting law’s 
authority to restrict legal subjects to its own terms. In the special context of 
testaments, the law itself was capable of imaginative indulgence and looked to the 
intent rather than the form of words, on the presumption that the testator ‘has not 
time to settle every thing according to the rules of law, and wills are most commonly 
made on a sudden, and in the testator's last moments’.17 Without neglecting technical 
boundaries between legal categories, my main focus will be upon the interplay of 
words between legal categories and upon the interplay of linguistic cultures and 
practices between drama and the law. This requires us to attend to cultural 
appreciation of ‘word play’, and above all to the arts of rhetoric that informed legal 
practice and practice on the Shakespearean stage.18 
                                               
16 On the significance to the painter’s lines of the equitable doctrine of ‘specific 
performance’ of a contract, see Luke Wilson, Theaters of Intention: Drama and the 
Law in Early Modern England (Palo Alto, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
178-182; and Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2009), 114-116. 
17 Throckmerton v. Tracy (1555) 1 Plow 145, 159, 162-3, per Sir Robert Broke, 
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.  
18 On the rhetorical cultures that connected early modern theatre and law, see, for 
example, Quentin Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare (Oxford: OUP, 2014) and Lorna 
Hutson and Victoria Kahn eds, Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 
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A fourth thing we learn from the painter is that performance in all its forms 
has the capacity to perfect what is otherwise imperfect and incomplete. (A legal 
testament, for example, is not finally fulfilled until the testator’s death and due 
execution of the terms of his will.) It is in this sense that ‘the text of a play’ can be 
considered, in Granville-Barker’s phrase, to be ‘a score waiting performance’.19 
Fifth, and related to the previous point, we learn that the ‘deed of saying’ (assuming 
that it goes beyond the deed of merely saying) can perfect the performance of words 
by enacting them through appropriate deeds. There is something of this sense in 
Hamlet’s suggestion that theatrical performance should ‘suit the action to the word’ 
(Ham, 3.2.17). In King John, Constance talks of actions as signs that confirm words. 
Her rhetorical questions (addressed to Salisbury, whom she fears has come to 
confirm bad news concerning her son’s prospects of attaining the English throne) 
have the effect of inviting the playgoers to witness with her, and to join her in 
forming a judgment:  
 
What dost thou mean by shaking of thy head? 
Why dost thou look so sadly on my son? 
What means that hand upon that breast of thine? 
Why holds thine eye that lamentable rheum, 
… 
Be these sad signs confirmers of thy words? (2.2.19-24)20 
 
                                               
19 Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare (London: Batsford, 1930), 5. 
20 Compare KJ, 4.2.231-37. On signs and deeds in King John, see Chapters Two and 
Six. 
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The performative process of word confirmed by act is even observable at the 
governmental level when an ‘Act’ of Parliament confirms the speech (‘parlement’) 
of the legislative body. In this example the speech is to a great extent the very 
essence of the authoritative Act (see the discussion of ‘speech acts’ below). While 
we are discussing ‘acts’, it should be noted that actio originally described the 
gestural action of orators and that ‘action’ described legal proceedings long before 
‘acting’ became a byword for playing in the public playhouses.21 If we extend our 
retrospective to prehistory, we will conclude that forms of words were originally the 
perfection of gesture, as gesture was the perfection of word. Thus Dietrich Stout and 
Thierry Chaminade see similar ‘cognitive control processes’ in the ‘hierarchically 
complex, multi-stage action sequences’ of prehistoric handaxe production to ‘those 
involved in modern human discourse-level language processing’.22  Or, as Elias 
Canetti wrote more than half a century earlier: ‘Words and objects are...emanations 
and products of a single unified experience: representation by means of the hands.’23 
To handle language well, one must develop one’s embodied sensitivity to the feel of 
words. Accordingly, one of the rehearsal strategies recommended by Cicely Berry, 
                                               
21 The earliest theatrical usage cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is Robert 
Green’s Green’s Neuer too Late (1590): ‘Men greedie of gaines did fall to practise 
the acting of such Playes’. (ii. sig. B4v). On the terminology of ‘acting’, see, 
generally, Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage, 1574-1642, 4th edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 118.  
22 ‘Stone tools, language and the brain in human evolution’, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 
(2012), 367, 75–87, 81.  
23 Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, Carol Stewart trans (New York: Continuum, 
1973), 217.  
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the founding Voice Director of the Royal Shakespeare Company (hereafter ‘RSC’), 
is to encourage the actors to speak their lines whilst simultaneously finding physical 
objects, handling them and building them into structures.24 
A sixth, and for present purposes final, thing we learn from Timon’s painter 
is that the expression of ‘will’ is a prime objective of performance. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, amongst the earliest records of the Anglo-Norman word 
‘performance’ are those in the twelfth century in which it was ‘frequently in legal 
use’ in connection with the object ‘will’. Shakespeare himself refers to the 
performance of ‘will’ (AWW, 2.1.204) or ‘desire’ (2H4, 2.4. 262-3; Mac, 2.3.29-30) 
or ‘purpose’ (H8, 4.2.41-2) more often than the performance of plays (H5, 
3.prologue.35). Frequently, as in Timon, he writes of the performance of a ‘promise’. 
‘Performance’ did not acquire its distinctive theatrical sense until during 
Shakespeare’s lifetime. For the purpose of this book, I take it that ‘performance’ is 
the expression of will in and through artificial forms, or through artistic engagement 
with natural forms, and that performance is perfected not only by the people who are 
the principal actors in the performance but by the community of people who interact 
with the performance and approve it. 
 As intimated earlier, it is not a primary aim of this book to establish that 
Shakespeare had knowledge of particular laws or that legal matters directly 
influenced his work. Causal inquiries of this kind are fascinating, but their results are 
always highly contestable. We will occasionally identify similarities between 
Shakespeare’s texts and contemporary legal treatises. On the subject of testaments, 
                                               
24 Cicely Berry, From Word to Play: A Handbook For Directors (London: Oberon 
Books, 2008), 127. 
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Henry Swinburne’s Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes25 and William West’s 
Symbolæography,26 both appearing as first editions in 1590, are especially 
noteworthy. It is likely that Shakespeare knew both of these works, but whether, and 
in what ways, they might have contributed to the content of his plays is hard to say. 
There is also significant correspondence between Shakespeare’s plays and the 
English law reports of Edmund Plowden that were published in French during 
Shakespeare’s lifetime, but we can only speculate as to how Shakespeare 
encountered them.27 There is equally compelling correspondence between some of 
Shakespeare’s lines and the content of the English language rhetoric manuals, 
including Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique.28 Shakespeare was almost 
certainly familiar with Wilson, and with other contemporary rhetoric manuals in 
English (such as George Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie), but surface 
similarities between English expressions used in the manuals and the plays might 
obscure the possibility that Shakespeare was more deeply ‘influenced’ by the Latin 
originals that he had used during his Grammar School days?29 What does ‘influence’ 
                                               
25 Henry Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes (London: John 
Windet, 1590). 
26 William West, Symbolæography etc. (London: Totthill, 1590). 
27 Edmund Plowden, Les Commentaries, ou les Reportes (London: Tottyl, 1571). 
28 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560), G. H. Mair ed (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909). 
29 Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 
80-95. Classical originals that Shakespeare would probably have encountered 
include Cicero’s De officiis and De inventione, Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria and 
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mean anyway? More interesting, and more provocative to thinking about how we 
might be ‘influenced’ by Shakespeare today, is to see Shakespeare as a lively mind 
writing and working in a highly productive creative culture that was both 
collaborative and acquisitive. Connections between ‘early modern theatrical, legal, 
historiographical, and political modes of authorization…speak less to a rich network 
of mutual influences and interconnections…than to a pervasive cultural 
preoccupation that found expression in various areas of life’.30  
Early modern culture was a culture of performance of every sort: including 
performance of law, dress, architecture, music and plays, and in tension with all 
these was the overriding sense that this was a culture in which a life was performed 
not merely in the expression of self in an (emerging) modern sense, but performed 
also in furtherance of the forms of social order. This called for service to one’s social 
superiors and, lest we forget it, service to Church and to God. There is no more 
extensive and direct textual influence on Shakespeare than the words of the Geneva 
Bible. At the heart of early modern Christianity was belief in the Divine 
performance, wherein ‘Word was made flesh’ in the figure of Christ.31 The central 
ceremonial performance of the age, the Christian Eucharist, was at the heart of the 
Protestant schism concerning the capacity of sacramental words to transform bread 
into Christ’s flesh. This was an age in which the spoken performance of words was 
deeply material. It has been said that theatrical performance is in several senses 
                                               
the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium. The latter was frequently and erroneously 
attributed to Cicero. 
30 Holger Schott Syme, Theatre and Testimony in Shakespeare’s England: A Culture 
of Mediation (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 19. 
31 John 1:14 (Geneva Bible, 1599).  
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‘material’, and that the most important is the sense in which ‘theatrical performance 
has real social and physical consequences’.32 The same was true of performance in 
religion and law during Shakespeare’s lifetime. Like the theologians, the common 
lawyers appreciated materiality in the microscopic minutiae of forms of words. Sir 
Edward Coke, Shakespeare’s contemporary and the preeminent common lawyer of 
his age, once contemplated a single short statement of law (the maxim ‘possessio 
fratris de feodo simplici facit sororem esse haeredem’),33 and concluded that almost 
‘everie word’ should be considered ‘operative and materiall’.34 Appreciating the 
performative and rhetorical culture that law shares with theatre will help us to 
appreciate in Shakespeare’s lines what Coke appreciated in legal lines, which is 
nothing less than the power of words to wield matter and to do the work of 
performing will in the world. It will also help us to appreciate the pliability and 
playfulness of words. Most important of all, an understanding of the capacity of real 
rhetoric to touch and move us through words and action will yield appreciation for a 
type of performance that has the capacity to transform lives and reform society. This 
is the sort of performance we can hope for in the law and it is the sort of 
performance that continues to be the promise of Shakespeare’s plays.  
An initial spur for this book was the observation that many of Shakespeare’s 
plays recognize the dramatic power inherent in testamentary wills. We can observe 
                                               
32 Erika T. Lin, Shakespeare and the Materiality of Performance (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 9. 
33 ‘The brother’s possession of the fee simple makes the sister the heir’. 
34 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (London: Society of 
Stationers, 1628), I.15b (note). 
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by way of overview (with representative examples in parenthesis) that in some plays 
the opening scene presents a point of legal testamentary contention (AYL, H5, 3H6, 
KJ) that another deploys the physical form of a testamentary will at the dramatic 
climax of the play (JC) and that another employs a testamentary provision as a 
significant sub-plot (MV). Even where the performance of an individual’s will does 
not take a form that the law would consider to be testamentary, it might nevertheless 
exhibit a testamentary power to disrupt default schemes of succession and 
inheritance (R2, KJ, Ham, KL). Or an individual’s will might be enforced in life with 
such stubborn finality that it feels as inflexible as the testamentary wishes of the 
dead. Where the performance of stubborn will is aligned with such sources of 
authority as the regal or ducal (AWW, CE, KL, MM), the contractual (MV) or the 
marital (TS, WT) its dramatic power is all the more pronounced. Most common of all 
is alignment with parental authority. A father’s will ruling over a daughter’s will 
appears frequently in ways that are not technically ‘testamentary’ in the legal sense 
of the word (KL, MND, MA, RJ, TGV). Then there are plays in which an individual’s 
will and performance, which should be conjoined, are, instead, alienated from each 
other. This can be effective in comedy (AYL, LLL), but in cases of radical alienation 
the effect is tragic (Ham, R2). Not only does Shakespeare make extensive use of will 
as a plot or premise for his plays, but his use of testamentary language is impressive 
in its diversity and extent. So much so that a barrister working in Victorian Liverpool 
devoted a short book exclusively to the topic.35 
It is notable that John Austin’s theory of the ‘speech act’ or ‘performative 
utterance’ – the theory that certain forms of words enact changes in the world – was 
                                               
35 William Lowes Rushton, Shakespeare’s Testamentary Language (London: 
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premised on the example of legal language, and specifically upon testamentary 
language.  He appreciated that testamentary terminology is deeply imbued with the 
sense that spoken and written words have the capacity to perform powerfully upon 
the world of ‘real’ things: 
 
 Lawyers when talking about legal instruments will distinguish between the 
preamble, which recites the circumstances in which a transaction is effected, 
and on the other hand the operative part – the part of it which actually 
performs the legal act which it is the purpose of the instrument to perform...‘I 
give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ would be an operative clause and 
is a performative utterance.36  
 
The word ‘bequeath’ is perfectly suited to Austin’s argument. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary it was originally ‘a strong verb’ in the Anglo-Saxon. It is 
not merely the ‘quote’ or ‘quoth’ of saying, but an emphatic sense of saying with 
binding power. The difference between the spoken ‘quoth’ and the binding 
‘bequeath’ might be compared to the difference between the regular Anglo-Saxon 
sense of speech as ‘spiel’ and the sense that some speech has a potency and power to 
bind that makes it ‘gospel’ or magical ‘spell’. To bequeath connotes the sense of 
                                               
36 J. L. Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’, in J L Austin: Philosophical Papers, J.O. 
Urmson and G.J. Warnock eds, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 233, 236. 
Austin developed this idea of ‘performative utterance’ into his theory of the ‘speech 
act’: J. L. Austin, How to do things with Words: The William James Lectures 
delivered at Harvard University in 1955, J. O. Urmson ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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attempted authority over the material world that we still use when we say that 
something is ‘spoken for’. 
The etymology of ‘testament’ is a clue to the fact that since ancient, even 
prehistoric, times testaments have acquired their legitimacy as performances played 
out before witnesses. The English word derives from the Latin testamentum, which 
connotes a witness (testa-) to the mind (‘-mentum’). A great deal of the language of 
Roman Law was derived from very ancient roots,37 and the ‘testa-’ of testament is a 
case in point. The sense of ‘witness’ originates in the idea of a third person standing 
by, which in the reconstructed Proto-Indo-European lexicon approximates to *tri-st- 
(‘third’-‘standing’). As a result of a ‘sound change’, this became ters(t) and tes(t).38 
In Roman law, witnesses gave the testament its ‘testamentary’ quality. They were 
the spectators and audience to a ceremonial performance that had a director, a script, 
props, and actors with allocated parts to play. As ‘performance is a kind of will or 
testament’; so in Roman Law testament is a kind of performance. Leaving aside the 
testament made before the army in anticipation of war (testamentum in procinctu), 
Roman law originally recognized two main methods for making wills. By the most 
ancient method, the will was made or confirmed in a committee (the comitia calata) 
                                               
37 See Michael Weiss, ‘Indo-European Languages’ in M. Gagarin and E. Fantham 
eds The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece & Rome (Oxford, OUP, 2010), 61-
63, 63. 
38 Benjamin W. Fortson, Indo-European Language and Culture: An Introduction, 
2nd edn (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 303. 
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which was called together twice yearly for the purpose,39 but ‘[t]he comitial will was 
obsolete before real history begins’.40  It was succeeded by, and in due course 
superseded by, the mancipatory testament ‘performed by bronze and balance’ (‘per 
aes et libram agitur’), which was ‘the will of the classical age’.41 The mancipatory 
testament was an ancient ceremonial mode of sale (mancipatio) performed before 
witnesses which had been adopted for use in testamentary transfer. The word 
‘mancipatio’ indicates that the subject matter of the transfer was physically handed 
over (literally ‘captured in the hand’). The aes (‘bronze’) was ancient currency in the 
form of crudely cast pieces of the metal, later superseded by coinage of the same 
name. According to Gaius, the heir was represented by a person playing the part of 
the ‘purchaser’ and ‘the testator directed him with reference to what he desired to be 
given to anyone after his death’.42 The heir in this ceremony was more closely akin 
to the executor of an English testament (that is, the one who carries out or ‘executes’ 
the will according to its terms) than to the beneficiary of an English testament (the 
one who benefits from the assets passed on by the will). The ‘purchaser’ (playing the 
part of the heir) had this scripted line to speak: ‘Let your family and money pass into 
my charge and custody, and, in order that you may make your will properly in 
                                               
39 The Institutes of Gaius, II.101-104. See George Willis Botsford, The Roman 
Assemblies: From Their Origin to the End of the Republic (New York: Macmillan, 
1909), 159. 
40 Buckland, Manual of Roman Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1928), 174, §65.  
41 Ibid., 174, §64. 
42 Gaius, II.103.  
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accordance with the public law, let them be purchased by me with this bronze’.43 
Having said these words, the ‘purchaser’ struck the balance with the bronze, and 
delivered it to the testator as symbolic purchase money.44 Then the testator spoke his 
part while holding the will in his hands:  ‘As is written in these tablets of wax, so I 
give, so I bequeath, so I declare my will, and so do you, citizens, bear witness’.45 In 
course of time the ceremony of mancipatory testament continued as a matter of form, 
but the person performing the ceremonial role of purchaser no longer played the part 
of heir. Instead, a different person was ‘appointed heir under the will’ and ‘charged 
with the distribution of legacies’. This later form of will, was not published until 
after the testator’s death.46 Even later, the Romans introduced a third form of will 
called the ‘Praetorian Testament’, ‘by which the praetor accepted the seals of seven 
witnesses instead of mancipatory performance, and other forms of will followed that, 
but this sketch will suffice to show that the idea of testament was intensely 
performative in its origins and that the performance was ‘testamentary’ because it 
required the participation of witnesses. 
In the early modern playhouses, witnesses to the performance included ‘the 
vnderstanding men in the yard’47 and those sitting in the higher-priced ‘stands’ or 
                                               
43 Gaius, II.104. Francis de Zulueta trans, The Institutes of Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1946). 
44 Gaius, II.104. 
45 Ibid., (R. W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law, 4th edn (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1956), 188). 
46 Lee, ibid., 187. 
47 Vox Graculi, or Iacke Dawes Prognostication for the Elevation of All Vanity, etc. 
(1623), cited in Glynne Wickham et al., English Professional Theatre, 1530-1660 
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‘galleries’, including those sitting in the ‘lords’ rooms’.48 Had Prince Hamlet visited 
the playhouses of late Elizabethan England, ‘Th’observed of all observers’ (Ham, 
3.1.153) would certainly have had a seat in the lords’ room, or even (depending upon 
how one interprets the debatable evidence) a seat on the edge of the stage itself.49 In 
the Elizabethan playhouse, the playgoer in the gallery seats ‘not only sees everything 
well, but can also be seen’.50 The popular metaphor of theatrum mundi (‘all the 
world’s a stage’) implied ‘a showing and seeing place or a showing off and being 
seen place’.51 Today, as then, playgoers have a ‘creative role as imaginers of the 
drama’,52 and the playing of this role can be assisted by material efforts to 
                                               
(Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 416. 
48 Which are conjectured to have been situated in the elevated galleries immediately 
adjacent to, or at the rear of, the stage. See Gabriel Egan, ‘The Situation of the 
‘Lords Room’: A Revaluation’, Review of English Studies 48 (1997), 297-309; 
Derek Peat, ‘Looking Back to Front: The View from the Lords’ Room’, in 
Shakespeare and the Sense of Performance: Essays in the Tradition of Performance 
Criticism in Honor of Bernard Beckerman, Marvin Thompson and Ruth Thompson 
eds (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), 182, 185; E. K. Chambers, The 
Elizabethan Stage (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923), III.118.  
49 Egan, ibid. 
50 Thomas Platter’s report of his visit to the Globe on the afternoon of 21 September 
1599. Quoted in Jean Wilson, The Shakespeare Legacy: The Material Legacy of 
Shakespeare’s Theatre (Godalming: Bramley Books, 1995), 62. 
51 C. W. R. D. Moseley, ‘Judicious, Sharp Spectators? Form, Pattern and Audience 
in Early Modern Theatre’, Cahiers Élisabéthains 85 (2014), 16. 
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incorporate playgoers into the action. The most obvious assistance provided by the 
physical structure of the Elizabethan playhouse was to use a thrust stage to place the 
downstage action in the very midst of the throng of playgoers.  
Playgoing witnesses play their part, but actors of a more active sort take 
centre-stage. In the case of an Elizabethan testament, it was the executors who 
performed the testator’s wishes ‘by arranging probate and the distribution of the 
estate’.53 In a simple case, the executors produced the testament to the clerical judge 
in the ecclesiastical court (this official was known as ‘Ordinary’, for reasons we will 
consider in Chapter Six) and swore an oath to affirm or ‘prove’ that it represents the 
testator’s last will and testament and to undertake to administer the estate according 
to its terms.54 All that was required was that the will be made in writing, but in the 
event of any doubt regarding the testament, witnesses might be called to prove the 
testament per testes in solemn form of law.55 It was therefore standard practice to 
have witnesses attest the will when the testator made it. Henry Swinburne 
recommended at least two witnesses.56 Swinburne distinguishes testamentary wills 
from non-testamentary wills on the technical basis that the former name executors, 
but is content to use ‘testament’ in the general sense to cover wills with or without 
                                               
Globe Rebuilt, J. R. Mulryne and M. Shewring eds (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 169-
176, 171.  
53 Honigmann and Brock, Playhouse wills, 12 (citing West, ‘Symbolæography’, sect. 
639); Cox, ‘Shakespeare’s Will’, 24. 
54 See Clarkson and Warren, Law of Property, 269. 
55 Clarkson and Warren, ibid., 270. 
56 Swinburne, ‘Testaments’, 18.  
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executors.57 William West calls the testator and executor the ‘principall persons’, 
distinguishing them from the witnesses and ‘legatories’ (persons taking benefits 
under the will), whom he calls ‘lesse principall’. For West, only the testator is 
involved in the ‘active makynge of a Testament’, whereas the executor, witnesses 
and beneficiaries are involved in the ‘passive makynge of a Testament’.58 
What is critical for present purposes is that West acknowledges all parties to 
be participants with some part to play in constituting the efficacy of the will. He also 
acknowledges the constitutive effect of the testamentary speech act. We saw earlier 
that John Austin was impressed by the performative power of bequeathing, which is 
a sort of speaking or ‘quothing’ into being. William West seems to have been 
similarly impressed. He calls a testament a ‘iust sentence, or declaration of our 
minde, concerning that which wee would have done after our deathes, with the 
ordayning of an executor thereof’.59 If the testator’s words in the will supply the 
script of the testamentary play, then the executor must be considered its principal 
actor. The executor’s role is metaphysically sublime. The executor is a mediator 
between the living and the dead, and it has long been the rule that when the testator 
dies, and even before probate, ‘the property of the goods which was in the testator, is 
                                               
57 Swinburne, ‘Testaments’, 3. West takes a similar view, ‘Symbolæography’, sect 
680. Technically speaking the term ‘testament’ should also have been reserved for 
will not including land, but this was a rule more honored in the breach than the 
observance. A devise of land by will was commonly referred to and for most 
purposes treated as if it were a testament. 
58 West, ibid. 
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cast upon and vested in the executors’.60 In Elizabethan England the testator’s debts 
would also be passed on to the executors.61 In fact, the real ‘actor’, or active 
instrument that connects the work of the executor to the work of the stage actor, is 
the ‘hand’. An early modern treatise on palm reading states that ‘our Hands are the 
most Noble Members in perfecting of al manner of Actions; they are the executors of 
our Primary Conceptions’.62 A treatise on the art of gesture states in similar vein that 
‘the hand ... by gesture makes the inward motions of the minde most evident’.63 The 
idea goes back to Aristotle, for whom the hand was ‘the instrument of instruments’.64  
Shakespeare flourished in a particular historical period in which significant 
legal reforms were transforming the social power of individual will. The Statute of 
Wills (32 Hen 8 c.1), which came into force on 20 July 1540, had empowered feudal 
tenants to devise two-thirds of their land by will, but, most significantly, it went even 
further in the case of tenants holding under the most common form of feudal tenure 
(‘socage’ tenure). On them it conferred freedom to dispose of their entire interest in 
the land by will. In the words of the statute, it conferred a new: 
                                               
60 Alvared Graysbrook, Executor of the Testament of Thomas Kene v. Robert Fox 
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full and free liberty, power and authority to give, dispose, will and devise, as 
well by his last will and testament in writing, or otherwise by any act or acts 
lawfully executed in his life, all his said manors, lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, or any of them, at his free will and pleasure65 
 
The pronoun ‘his’ was intended to be discriminatory. The 1540 Statute was 
supplemented in 1542 by An Act for the Explanation of the Statute of Wills, which 
confirmed that a married woman (‘woman covert’) had no power to leave land by 
will.66 Neither was The Statute of Wills concerned with the non-freeholding masses, 
including those many outside London and at the labouring level of society, who held 
their land by customary copyhold tenure (a form of ‘tenancy at will’ held from the 
lord of their local manor).67 The Statute of Wills conferred testamentary freedom, 
but it was not free for all. (It should be noted in passing that many landholders in the 
City of London did not need the assistance of the statute, for in matters of testament, 
as in matters of trade, the City of London had always been something of a law unto 
                                               
65 Section 1. 
66 34 Hen. 8 c.5, s.14. 
67 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England Volume I: ‘Coke’s Littleton’ 
(London: Society of Stationers, 1628), 59 b. The surrender of copyholds to uses 
specified in testaments was part of the custom by Shakespeare’s day. See, for 
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itself.)68 The main beneficiaries of the statute were the landed nobility and gentry. It 
liberated their land-holdings from the feudal scheme of inheritance and represented, 
for them, a triumph of individual will over the prerogative will of the monarch. The 
statute can therefore be seen as an incident, and an instigator, of what Stephen 
Greenblatt identified as the tension in the early modern period between ‘a new stress 
on the executive power of the will’ and ‘the most sustained and relentless assault 
upon the will’.69 By legitimating land owners’ testamentary control over their 
estates, the Statute of Wills incidentally promoted progress from the social scheme 
of the Middle Ages, which in its feudal aspect was committed to a hierarchy of 
‘fixed and traditional’ social status,70 to a society in which wealth and opportunity 
had some genuine potential to pass horizontally between people regardless of their 
social rank. S. B. Liljegren observed that: 
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from the reign of Henry VIII down to the last days of James I, by far the 
better part of English landed estate changed owners, and in most cases went 
from the old nobility by birth and the clergy into the hands of those who 
possessed money in the period of the Tudors, i.e. principally the merchants 
and industrialists or the newly created nobility and gentry…71 
 
The Statute of Wills was literally crucial. It marked, in the most important 
field of property rights, a crossing point between medieval and modern views of the 
world. The traditional default scheme (which preferred lineal descendants to 
collateral descendants, males to females, and first-born males to all others) was still 
in the background, and still applied to estates not disposed of by will, but individual 
testamentary will now had the power to oust the traditional feudal order. It is no 
exaggeration to say that ‘since the Statute of Wills in 1540 the personal will as a 
legal instrument had become associated with the subject’s rights in the face of the 
monarch’s privilege’.72 It cannot be denied that the early modern world view was 
still heavily influenced by the medieval concept of the ‘Chain of Being’ by which all 
Creation was understood to descend by fixed degrees downwards from the 
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Godhead,73 but the early modern mind was increasingly looking outwards along the 
horizontal plane to new horizons of place, politics and individual personhood. 
Richard Wilson provides a pithy summary when he observes that the 1540 Act 
‘installed the capitalist notion of the sovereign individual’.74 By allowing individuals 
to substitute a testamentary scheme for the feudal scheme, the 1540 statute 
effectively established the individual landholder as monarch over his own private 
domain. He could leave land (or more accurately ‘devise’ land – which is 
etymologically to ‘divide’ it up) as he willed and the terms of his will were respected 
almost like a royal decree. By 1590, around the time that Shakespeare was 
embarking upon his career as a playwright, Henry Swinburne cited it as a maxim 
‘that the will or meaning of the testator is the Queene or Empresse of the 
testament’.75 
Elizabeth I was a sort of Queene or Empresse of a testament. She had 
succeeded to the throne in accordance with the terns of the last will and testament 
executed by her father Henry VIII in 1547. The Third Act of Succession (1544) had 
authorized Henry, in the absence of a lawful successor by blood, to determine his 
successor by ‘letters patents under the great seal, or by his last will in writing signed 
with his most gracious hand’.76 Whether Elizabeth’s accession was attributable to the 
operative power of Henry’s testamentary will or to the power of parliamentary will 
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expressed in the Act of Succession remains moot. Edmund Plowden and other 
leading common lawyers agreed with the orthodox opinion that ‘[t]he king as king 
had no power to determine the succession by testament’.77 The provision in the Third 
Act of Succession that had empowered Henry to determine the succession by his 
testament followed a similar provision in The Second Act of Succession.78 The close 
proximity of the Second Act of Succession (June 1536) to the Statute of Uses79 
(April 1536) is curious, for the Statute of Uses had purported to close down a 
conveyancing procedure (the ‘enfeoffment to use’ or simply the ‘use’)80 which had 
successfully conferred a large degree of testamentary freedom on private 
landholders, whereas the Second Act of Succession conferred testamentary freedom 
on the king in relation to no less a thing than title to the Crown itself. The aims and 
principles of the statutes were inconsistent to the point of hypocrisy. As things 
turned out, clever conveyancers discovered a loophole in the Statute of Uses and 
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78 28 Henry 8 c.7 (1536), s.18. 
79 27 Hen 8 c.10. 
80 See A. W. B. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law 2nd ed 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ch.8; Neil Jones, ‘Uses, Trusts and a Path to 
Privity’, Cambridge Law Journal 56(1) (1997), 175-200; Neil Jones, ‘Trusts in 
England after the Statute of Uses’, in Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in 
Historical Perspective, Richard Helmholz and Reinhald Zimmermann eds (Berlin: 
Duncker and Humblot, 1998), 173-205, 173. (The church had a long-standing 
interest in assisting landholders to give lands to the church by deathbed gifts, see H5, 
1.1.9-10.) 
	 70	
found ways to create uses that could operate despite the statute. Just a few years after 
the Statute of Uses, the king relented in the face of demands for testamentary 
freedom and parliament passed the Statute of Wills. Thus the 1540 Statute of Wills 
did not so much cause as re-confirm, and formally approve, an epochal shift from 
feudalism to ‘free will and pleasure’ (to quote the first section of the statute) in 
relation to the supremely important issue of transfers and testaments of land. What 
had previously been achieved indirectly by means of the equitable ‘use’ could now 
be achieved directly in law. The Statute of Wills was a development for which Henry 
(who by his various parliamentary ‘acts of will’ had authorized a statutory trend in 
favour of testament over tradition) had only himself to blame. It has been said that 
aristocracies are in principle ‘opposed to wills as the means of conveying estates’ 
because of their ‘scope for whims and passions of all sorts’ and in particular because 
they allow ‘large scope for paternal affection’,81 but the traditional order of 
succession cannot stand when the monarch at the head of the aristocracy is the very 
embodiment of whim and passion. 
Shakespeare’s parents were born in the pre-1540 world of feudalism. 
Shakespeare was born into the post-1540 world of ‘free will and pleasure’. There is 
always a danger of attributing a special unique historical context to the unique genius 
of Shakespeare, but there is an opposite danger of underestimating the scale of the 
social transformation that occurred during his lifetime. Shakespeare lived between the 
moment of the English monarchy’s supreme sovereignty and the moment of its most 
profound subjection. Thirty-three-years before Shakespeare’s birth, Henry VIII had 
been newly installed as supreme head of the Church in England following the break 
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from Rome.82 Thirty-three years after the poet’s death a commonwealth of citizens 
had been newly installed at the country’s head in place of the recently decapitated 
Charles I.83 The dramatic rise and fall of the monarchy in such a short span is 
attributable to innumerable historical factors, but significant amongst them is the 
factor of individual will and in broad terms a shift from monarchical to popular will. 
The short span in which royal sovereignty fell from its greatest height to its greatest 
depth contained within it the golden age of early modern English theatre. That golden 
age ended when Cromwell’s parliament closed the theatres in 1642, having begun (as 
is often supposed) with the appearance in 1561 of Gorboduc, the first English play in 
blank verse. Gorboduc was written by two common lawyers (Thomas Norton and 
Thomas Sackville) and first performed by lawyers before an audience of lawyers at 
Inner Temple. The play was on themes of royal succession and the wilful (albeit 
lifetime) disposition of a realm by its king.84 Gorboduc was written early in the reign 
of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and she is known to have attended a performance on 18 
January 1562 (1561 Old Style). The young queen could hardly have failed to hear a 
lesson on succession in the lines of the final speech: ‘No ruler rests within the regal 
seat; / The heir, to whom the sceptre ’longs, unknown’.85 The question of succession 
to the English throne continued to be a vexed and vital one throughout the early years 
of Shakespeare’s theatrical career, and his Elizabethan plays frequently connect 
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testamentary concerns to concerns of traditional, especially royal, succession. For 
example, Richard II and King John, which are the focus of Chapter Two, exploit the 
dramatic conflict between royal and testamentary succession. (William West divides 
succession neatly into ‘royal’ and ‘civil’; and civil into two sorts – the ‘immediate or 
lawfull’, which we call inheritance or intestacy, and the ‘mediate or testamentarie’, 
which is inheritance by will.)86  
One way to express the distinctive quality of Shakespeare’s historical 
moment is to talk in terms of transition from the medieval world of feudal tradition 
to the modern world of free trade. The transition can be conceived as a move from a 
social scheme arranged along the vertical axis according to hierarchies of status to a 
social scheme in which people deal with each other on-the-level in the lateral plane. 
The testamentary freedom established by the 1540 Statute of Wills is a feature of this 
trend because testament can be understood as a form of trade in the way that it 
enables individuals to depart at their own ‘free will’ from the default rules of 
inheritance and succession (we return to the idea of testament as trade in Chapter 
Two). None of this is to suggest that the distinction between feudal tradition and free 
trade was a clear one at any historical point, or to suppose that the move to free trade 
represents unambiguously positive progress,87 still less to say that Shakespeare 
plotted his plays along two rigid axes. It is to claim, rather, that in the tension 
between feudal tradition and free trade Shakespeare found scope for infinite 
playfulness.  
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In modern usage the word ‘trade’ is resonant of hand-to-hand dealing and it 
has carried that sense for centuries. Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century that 
‘traditione’, or handing-over, of an asset was one of the ‘five garments’ ‘necessary 
for the cloathing of contracts’,88 and even in Shakespeare’s lifetime it was noted that 
the hand-to-hand business of free trade had produced a world in which a few people 
found themselves holding the lot.89 In fact, the word ‘trade’ is etymologically more 
akin to the tread of feet than to dealing between hands (the word comes from the Old 
English verb tredan). What both senses – the ‘hand-to-hand’ and the treading foot –
seem to agree on is that trade operates on the level, in the lateral plane. Tradition, in 
contrast, is generally associated with handing down from generation to generation. 
Tradition need not imply hierarchy, but in many traditions, including the ‘feudal’, 
the hierarchy of handing down from social superior to social inferior is a defining 
feature of the scheme.  
This dramatic tension between tradition along the vertical or hierarchical axis 
and trade in the lateral or horizontal plane was built into the physical fabric of the 
Elizabethan playhouse. The thrust stage was physically elevated above the yard by 
some four or five feet, but as the actors treaded the boards downstage they were very 
much walking in the midst of the playgoers. Socially speaking the downstage area 
was especially representative of street-level and as such it was conceptually of one 
level with the groundlings treading in the playhouse yard. Sometimes, the stage was 
                                               
88 Cited in Throckmerton v. Tracy (1555) 1 Plow. 145, 161; 75 Eng. Rep. 222, 250 
(Brook, C.J.). 
89 A statistic of 1604 records that ‘[t]he masse of the whole trade of the realme is in 
the hands of some 200 persons’ (Orig. Jrnls. House of Commons (21 May 3 f. 
251v)).  
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even used as a sort of village green or public highway for displaying thieves ‘taken 
pilfring’ at a play.90 Robert Weimann’s argument that the yard and the main 
downstage plane of the stage were united by a sense of communally shared space is 
important here. Weimann borrows the terminology of medieval theatre to suggest 
that the players on the foremost thrust part of the stage share with the groundlings 
the area of the ‘platea’. Downstage is, as it were, ‘down with the people’. The 
vertical structures of the stage (pillars, balcony, heavens and so forth) in the upstage 
area form the distinct area of the ‘locus’.91 In terms of social hierarchy, descent is 
from locus to platea and not from the downstage area to the yard. The exchange or 
trade that takes place in the platea (the word means ‘street’)92 between the players 
and the playgoers is a trade of treading or walking together. It symbolizes shared 
economic enterprise and social mobility even as the vertical structures in the 
background stand for the unmoving hierarchies of feudal tradition. 
As the dramatic tension between the vertical order of feudal tradition and the 
horizontal freedom of trade was played out in the physical structure of the 
playhouse, so it played out in the careers of the players themselves. It is only a slight 
oversimplification to observe that the course of Shakespeare’s professional life 
mirrored the economic evolution of England from feudal tradition to free trade, for it 
                                               
90 William Kempe, Kempe’s Nine Daies Wonder (1600), G.B. Harrison ed (London: 
the Bodley Head, 1923), 9. Cited in M. C. Bradbrook, The Rise of the Common 
Player (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), 105. 
91 Robert Weimann, Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies 
in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 222.  
92 The Latin ‘platea’ derives from Ancient Greek πλατεῖα (plateîa), meaning ‘street’. 
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was broadly one of progress from being a servant and dependent subject within a 
hierarchy of noble patronage to being (whilst still in official form a servant) a much 
more free agent operating within a horizontally-ordered community of venturers. 
It is unfashionable nowadays to talk in terms of such simple binaries as 
tradition and trade, heaven and hell, interior and exterior, male and female, true and 
false, but the early moderns used such simple pairings as a ‘binary code’ through 
which a mesh of great complexity could be fabricated and contemplated and played 
out. The moderns forgot the complexity. The postmoderns are in danger of forgetting 
the play. We will see in the chapters that follow that it is through their spirit of 
playfulness that Shakespeare’s dramatic works continue to open more questions than 
can ever be closed. It is also through their playful spirit that they bear testament, 
even today, to the ongoing human struggle to perform individual will against the 




Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance 




Handling Tradition: Testament as Trade in Richard II and King John 
 
Richard II1 and King John exemplify Shakespeare’s method of engaging the 
materiality of the playhouse to assist playgoers to handle the questions and dramatic 
conflicts of a play. The vertical and lateral planes of the architecture, the movement 
and gesture of the actors, the performance of costume and hand props are all artfully 
suited to the logical and embodied sense that is produced by silences and words. 
Voice, movement and stage stuff combine to produce a totality of dramatic tension, 
and in these plays the tension is palpably that which arises from interactions between 
the vertical, hierarchical order of tradition and the lateral, horizontal potential of 
                                               
1 In all five quarto editions of the play published before the first folio of 1623, the 
play is called The Tragedie of King Richard the Second, but in the first folio it 
appears with the Histories as The Life and Death of King Richard the Second. The 
compositors might have borrowed the type-set already prepared for the preceding 
play in the collection, The Life and Death of King John (Charles R. Forker, Richard 
II, The Arden Shakespeare, third series (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 179 n). In this 
chapter, all references to Richard II are to Forker’s edition unless otherwise stated. 
References to King John are to E. A. J. Honigmann, King John, The Arden 
Shakespeare, second series (London: Methuen, 1954). 
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trade. In Chapter One, where I outlined the etymological and stage significance of 
‘tradition’ and ‘trade’, I stressed that Shakespeare does not assert a strict distinction 
between these ideas, but seeks to explore their playful and dramatic interaction. In 
Richard II and King John, Shakespeare presents worlds of traditional order in 
decline or under threat and invites playgoers to witness will expressed in these 
worlds in the language and actions of testament and trade. The participation of the 
playgoers as third party witnesses gives the performance a testamentary quality, but 
their participation is not passive. They are encouraged to subject the performance, 
and the will expressed in it, to a process of trial or testing. In legal testamentary 
terms they are invited to subject the will to ‘probate’ or ‘probation’,2 which means 
that they are asked to approve what they have seen. I should stress again that as we 
think in testamentary terms, our focus should not be upon legal technicalities for 
their own sake but upon the ways in which the rhetorical, material and communal 
practices and effects of law are broadly akin to those of theatre. It has been said that 
modern playgoers approaching Richard II (and the same is true of King John), ‘are a 
bit like anthropologists dropped into a village just as a ritual begins; our task is to 
make sense of what we see’.3 The sense we are looking for ‘lies in the gesture, the 
object, the act, the person’ and ‘not in any secondary explanations, or reasons, or 
justifications’.4 To assist us in this task of sensing the full make-up of the play, 
                                               
2 West describes probate as ‘probation of the testament’ (William West, 
Symbolæography etc. (London: Totthill, 1590), s.684). 
3 James Boyd White, ‘Shakespeare’s Richard II: Imagining The Modern World’, in 
Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law and Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), ch.2, 51. 
4 Ibid., 57. 
	 78	
Shakespeare presents on-stage witnesses, including manipulators and manual 
workers. They help the playgoers to handle the great questions raised by great 
events. In King John, the chief witness is Philip the Bastard; in Richard II it is the 
gardener.  
When the gardener observes that the crown has been ‘quite thrown down’ by 
Richard’s ‘waste of idle hours’ (3.4.66), he plants a question in the minds of the 
playgoers.5 The question is whether Richard’s ‘waste’ is of the active or the passive 
sort. The word ‘idle’ suggests the former. The word ‘thrown’ suggests the latter. 
This question presents choices for the scene in which the physical crown changes 
hands from Richard to Bolingbroke. Should Richard cast it aside, or willingly hand it 
over, or willingly let it fall, or should he involuntarily lose his grip? If the latter, is it 
because of his own weakness or because of Bolingbroke’s force? There is talk of 
Richard’s ‘willing soul’ adopting Bolingbroke as his heir (4.1.109-10), but at the 
crux of the dramatic action Richard equivocates: ‘What you will have, I’ll give, and 
willing too; / For do we must what force will have us do’ (3.3.206-207). To the great 
advantage of the play, the text does not close the question of free will and possession 
of the crown, but leaves it to the playgoers to test the issues and reach conclusions. 
They might conclude that Richard’s neglect of the crown justified Bolingbroke’s 
                                               
5 On the play’s capacity to constitute the playgoers as self-aware witnesses of the 
spectacle, see Bridget Escolme, Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance, 
Self (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). Phyllis Rackin argues that Richard II casts the 
playgoers in ‘a carefully calculated role’ (‘The Role of the Audience in 
Shakespeare’s Richard II’, Shakespeare Quarterly 36(3) (1985), 262–81, 263). See, 
also, Jeffrey S. Doty, ‘Shakespeare’s Richard II, ‘Popularity,’ and the Early Modern 
Public Sphere’,  Shakespeare Quarterly 61(2) (2010), 183-205, 185. 
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possession of it, but however that question is settled on the surface it will merely 
disturb this deeper question: ‘can the destination of the crown be determined by 
individual will?’ That question had been revived by Henry VIII’s attempt to devolve 
the crown by his last will and testament and ‘was never settled’.6 Shakespeare 
declines to resolve the debate and instead exploits its dramatic tension. The debate is 
a deep one. It calls for nothing less than to ask whether the right to govern can pass 
by human handling or must be allocated by the lottery of birth and blood. Deeper 
still is the challenge to divine on which side of these possibilities the will of God is 
at work. For early modern playgoers, informed by such schools of thought as 
Richard Hooker’s ‘latitudinarian’ Anglicanism (which regarded individual piety as 
more important to God than traditional ecclesiastical structures), such issues 
translated into nascent political questions of democracy and personal election.7 
Adam the gardener, representative of the Biblical Adam,8 was inviting the playgoers 
to question the power of individual agency to control events and to speculate with 
him that the high affairs of State might be better handled by common folk. 
Let us suppose, as Andrew Gurr supposes, that Bolingbroke ‘sees the crown 
as the title to a property which can be bequeathed by will like the property of an 
                                               
6 Andrew Gurr ed, King Richard II (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 20. On Henry VIII’s 
will, see Chapter One. 
7 On Hooker’s influence, see Paul Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: 
Late-Elizabethan Politics and the Theatre of Law (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 23-33; and, 
White, Acts of Hope, ch.3. 
8 He is ‘old Adam’s likeness, / Set to dress this garden’ of England’s ‘other Eden’ 
(3.4.72-3; 2.1.42), echoing Genesis 2:15. (Compare ‘Adam was a gardener’, 2H6, 
4.2.124.) 
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ordinary title-holder’;9 still we never learn if Bolingbroke is right. The openness of 
such questions maintains the on-going life of the drama on the stage, and even in the 
study. We know that Bolingbroke took the crown into his own hands, but we are 
never sure if he stole it, or bargained for it, or merely picked up what had been 
dropped or thrown down. In Richard II, Richard calls Bolingbroke a thief (3.2.47), 
but it is not clear that Bolingbroke accepts the charge. Later in the tetralogy Henry 
admits that he ‘stole all courtesy from heaven’ (1H4, 3.2.50) and confesses on his 
deathbed that he ‘purchas’d’ (2H4, 4.5.199) the crown. At worst the word ‘purchase’ 
indicates theft, for Shakespeare sometimes uses it as a synonym for ‘steal’ (1H4, 
2.1.91; H5, 3.2.42) as he does ‘convey’ (R2, 4.1.317), and at best it makes 
Bolingbroke an enterprising businessman. His language is financially loaded even 
when he talks of friendship (R2, 2.3.60-62). ‘Enterprise’ means ‘to take in hand’, and 
from Bolingbroke’s own mouth we learn, when he is king, that his ‘hands are full of 
business’ (1H4, 3.2.179). According to the gardener, even Richard himself ‘is in the 
mighty hold / Of Bolingbroke’ (R2, 3.4.83-84). In 1 Henry IV, Worcester regards 
Henry as an opportunist and alleges to his face ‘You took occasion… / To grip the 
general sway into your hand’ (1H4, 5.1.56-57). Whether this was enterprise or theft 
remains unclear. The dying Henry acknowledges that the crown ‘seem’d in me / But 
as an honour snatch’d with boist’rous hand’ (2H4, 4.5.190-191), but to say it 
‘seem’d’ so is not to say it was. The question remains open. 
The passing of the crown is not just a question of having or taking laterally 
within the horizons of opportunity. It is also necessarily a question of traditional 
descent. The question of descent is central to the play’s grand theme of Richard’s fall 
and Bolingbroke’s rise and it is amplified through the physical structures of the 
                                               
9 Gurr, Richard II, 20. 
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Elizabethan playhouse and stage. We consider two key episodes later in this chapter: 
Richard’s descent from the castle walls (3.3.178-182), followed by the narrated 
account of the citizens’ ascent to the ‘windows’ tops’ of London (5.2.1-6). 
Considered as a connected pair of scenes, these episodes have the effect of staging a 
democratic displacement of the king from his elevated position. Spatial inversion on 
stage mirrors upheaval in the State. The vertical vectors of the play and the 
antithetical association of high to low is rendered dynamic by movement, props and 
such gestural points as the courteous bending of knees and the throwing down and 
picking up of gages.10 In the very first scene, in the quarrel between Bolingbroke and 
The Duke of Norfolk (Thomas Mowbray), we have in quick succession John of 
Gaunt’s ‘Throw down, my son, the Duke of Norfolk’s gage’ (1.1.161) and King 
Richard’s ‘Norfolk, throw down his. / … / Norfolk, throw down, we bid’ (1.1.162, 
164). A kinaesthetic effect induced by the continuous ups and downs of the stage 
action amplifies the conceptual contrast between the highs and lows of the 
characters’ fortunes and status.11 The gardener’s reference to the high crown ‘thrown 
down’ is one of many dynamic instances of the vertical vector of the play. Indeed the 
word ‘thrown’, by punning on ‘throne’, concentrates the antithesis in itself. The fact 
that the throne (more properly ‘the state’)12 is a major stage property, but one that the 
                                               
10 See, generally, P. A. Jorgensen, ‘Vertical Patterns in Richard II’, The Shakespeare 
Association Bulletin 23(3) (1948), 119-134. 
11 Ibid., 119. 
12 ‘Chairs of state on the Elizabethan stage…were not just centrally positioned on the 
horizontal axis…they were also raised on a ‘halpace’ or low dias’, thus ‘[t]he 
monarch physically climbed up the steps to take his or her seat on the state’ (Janette 
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actors cannot wield physically,  means that it must be handled in the mind; as much 
by the playgoers as by the players. In contrast, the gages (gauntlets) are the hand 
prop par excellence. We will pick them up again before the end of this chapter. For 
now it is important to stress that they move across the stage horizontally as well as 
moving up and down through the vertical axis. Gages are exchanged hand to hand by 
a kind of trade bargain that implies documentary performance made ‘under hand’. 
That is, with the signature or handwriting of the parties, hence Aumerle refers to his 
gage as a ‘manual seal’ (4.1.26).13 The legal and trade sense of the gage is clear in 
Mowbray’s declaration: ‘I… /… interchangeably hurl down my gage’ (1.1.145-6). In 
Shakespearean usage, the word ‘interchangeably’ is inseparable from the legal 
performance of trade bonds and other deeds. It is used later in the play to describe 
the setting down of ‘hands’ in sealing a document (5.2.98), as it is elsewhere (1H4, 
3.1.77; TC, 3.2.56-7).  
There is, of course, another puzzle posed by the gardener’s reference to the 
crown ‘thrown down’, beyond the immediate question of royal succession, and that 
is to know whose will is at work in the world and whose hand performs it. Intriguing 
here is the gardener’s observation that Richard has insufficient weight on his side of 
the balance: ‘In your lord’s scale is nothing but himself / And some few vanities that 
make him light’ (3.4.85-6). This may be an allusion to the supernatural, disembodied 
hand that wrote on the wall to warn King Belshazzar of his imminent downfall in the 
biblical Book of Daniel. The writing recorded the judgment that the king had been 
                                               
Dillon, Shakespeare and the Staging of English History, Oxford Shakespeare Topics 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012), 40). 
13 The word ‘gage’ continues to have commercial connotations to this day, notably in 
the form of real security that goes by the name of ‘mortgage’. 
	 83	
‘weighed in the scale and found wanting’ (Daniel 5:27).14 However that may be, it is 
clear that the gardener, the manual worker, is inviting the playgoers to join with him 
in holding matters in the hands of the mind: grasping, wrestling, reshaping them, and 
weighing them in judgment. Shakespeare sometimes makes this invitation express, 
as when the chorus to Henry V concludes the first prologue by urging the playgoers 
‘Gently to hear, kindly to judge our play’ (1.prologue.34). The chorus animates the 
playgoers to imaginative engagement of a hands-on sort: ‘deck our kings’ 
(1.prologue.28); ‘Grapple your minds to sternage of this navy’ (3.prologue.18); and, 
finally, he invites them to be conveyers of the king – to ‘Heave him away upon your 
winged thoughts’ and ‘fetch’ him in (5.prologue.8, 28). The invitation is expressly to 
‘behold / In the quick forge and working-house of thought’ (5. prologue.22-23). 
Shakespeare would have his playgoers grapple like sailors, work like smiths and 
graft like gardeners. They are constituted hands-on participants in the play. 
As the gardener is a biblical type of everyman, so he is a political everyman 
who works at the level of the ground and of the groundlings. We might be tempted to 
call him a ‘levelling’ type, but although his policy of humbling the haughty (he cuts 
the heads off ‘too fast-growing sprays’ (3.4.34)) might sound to modern ears like a 
policy of social equality (‘All must be even in our government.’ (3.4.36)), we should 
not ascribe twentieth-century individualistic notions of equality to the Elizabethans. 
They would have been quite as likely to hear the cutting off of heads as a caution 
against social climbing and excessive ambition. The notion of ‘even’ government 
                                               
14 Psalm 62:9 contains the words ‘weights’ and ‘vanitie’ and might therefore be an 
even stronger analogy. See, generally, Naseeb Shaheen Biblical References in 
Shakespeare’s Plays (1989) (Newark: University of Delaware, 2011), 377. Biblical 
quotes are from the Geneva Bible unless otherwise stated. 
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promoted by Shakespeare’s gardener was unlikely to have been our modern idea of 
uniformity across all strata of social status, but something more akin to a just and 
unbiased ordering of the social scheme: ‘Concord, not equality.’15 The sense of even 
ground is enhanced when the Queen, just prior to her encounter with the gardener, 
employs the metaphor of the sport of bowls (3.4.3-5). (Compare King John, 
discussed below, where the corrupting effect of ‘commodity’ on the ‘world’ is 
represented as a biased bowling ball.) The gardener’s policy is one of balancing the 
constituents of society as a conscientious cultivator balances the elements of his 
garden. His desire for harmonious balance between justice of a horizontal sort and 
order of a hierarchical sort is confirmed by his image of the scales, and that image is 
supported in the stage action through the balanced choreography of two parties: the 
queen and her two attendants on one side, the gardener and his two workers on the 
other. There is no modern sense of social equality here, at least not in the crude form 
‘equality is uniformity’, but there is a sense of common human dignity regardless of 
social status. This is confirmed by the fact that the gardener speaks verse, as do the 
citizens of Angiers in King John (see below). It is true that Richard II contains no 
prose lines, which is true also of King John, 1 Henry VI and 3 Henry VI, but if 
Shakespeare had wanted to denigrate the gardener he could have given him prose 
despite the predominance of verse, as he did with Jack Cade and the rebels in 2 
Henry VI.  
Shakespeare’s history plays can be regarded as extended rhetorical arguments 
designed to persuade the playgoing witness, not to a particular verdict or point of 
view, but to an appreciation of what it feels like to handle the evidence and to 
                                               
15 L. C. Knights, Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1968), 144.  
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participate in political discourse. The weight and ‘feel’ of the dramatic dispute is 
handled as matter in the mind, and occasionally a conceptual question is enlivened 
by a sensory conundrum. For instance, what weight should we associate with a king 
who is lighter than Bolingbroke in the gardener’s image of the scales but heavier 
than Bolingbroke in Richard’s own image of the buckets in the well? (4.1.184-
189).16 We are not compelled to resolve this apparent contradiction, but if the 
gardener’s scales are indeed the Biblical scales of the Divine assessor, we can 
perhaps understand Richard to be thrown down in the affairs of men, even to death, 
and at the same time to be taken up in the hands of God. This approximates to 
Richard’s own understanding. Addressing his wife en route to the Tower he tells her: 
‘Our holy lives must win a new world’s crown, / Which our profane hours here have 
thrown down’ (5.1.24-25). At a (perhaps unwise) distance from the stage we might 
see Richard’s complete trajectory as down and then up, forming as it were the ‘V’ 
that makes the top half of a saltire. Bolingbroke’s corresponding trajectory of rise 
and demise throughout the tetralogy would supply the lower half, with each half 
touching at the crossover point. Certainly there is a substantial crossing over of the 
characters’ fortunes within Richard II and this is frequently emphasised through the 
rhetorical figure of chiasmus, which is a ‘criss-cross’ figure.17 A sub-species of 
chiasmus (‘antimetabole’, in which words are exactly repeated and reversed in the 
form A-B-B-A) is pithily employed at the moment of formal transfer of the crown 
when Richard equivocates his consent: ‘Ay, no. No, ay’ (4.1.201). At the moment of 
his death, Richard confirms a crossroad even in his own divided being: ‘Mount, 
mount, my soul! Thy seat is up on high, / Whilst my gross flesh sinks downward 
                                               
16 Jorgensen, ‘Vertical Patterns’, 129. 
17 Forker, Richard II, 88. 
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here to die’ (5.5.111-12). The same sentiment is expressed in Shakespeare’s The 
Rape of Lucrece (1594) which was written closely contemporary with Richard II: 
‘This brief abridgment of my will I make: / My soul and body to the skies and 
ground’ (1198-9).18 This antithetical treatment of soul and body is specifically the 
standard wording of an Elizabethan testament.19 
Part of the appeal of Shakespeare’s Richard II resides in references to the 
performative rituals of everyday life and death in early modern England, many of 
which required the hands-on participation of ordinary folk. For example, when King 
Richard’s laments that imprisonment divorces him from his wife ‘hand from hand’ 
(5.1.82) Shakespeare’s playgoers would have recognised a reference to, and reversal 
of, the joining of hands in marriage and, more specifically, a reference to the ritual 
handfasting that sealed a betrothal.20 Shakespeare himself might have been bound to 
                                               
18 Katherine Duncan-Jones and H. R. Woudhuysen, Shakespeare’s Poems, The 
Arden Shakespeare (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 333. 
19 E.A.J. Honigmann and Susan Brock, Playhouse Wills, 1558–1642 (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1993), 19. For a template see West’s ‘verie perfect 
forme of a Will’ (Symbolæography, s.689). 
20 David Cressy notes that ‘[t]he word ‘handfasting’, which called attention to the 
ritual action, was more commonly used in the north’. It involved ‘holding and 
releasing of hands, the plighting of troths, kissing, drinking, and the ritual exchange 
of betrothal rings’ (Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life Cycle 
in Tudor and Stuart England (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 269, 273). The word ‘gage’ 
(with its associations to the hand) survives in the modern betrothal language of 
‘engagement’. 
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Anne Hathaway by handfasting prior to marriage,21 and it is likely that he acted as 
witness to this rite in 1604 when he ‘made sure’ the betrothal of Stephen Bellott to 
Mary Mountjoy at the moment of their ‘giving each other’s hand to the hand’.22 An 
effect of Richard’s performative reversal of handfasting is to remind the playgoers of 
the preceding Act of the play in which they had seen the seriatim reversal of the 
elements of Richard’s coronation rite. As the un-fasting of the matrimonial hands 
implies Richard’s separation from his wife, it also implies his imminent separation 
from life, since marriage lasts only until death.  
The testamentary sense is even stronger in those communal performances 
alluded to, or incorporated, in Shakespeare’s Richard II that specifically relate to 
death and burial. Amongst these we must include the documentary performance of 
the last will and testament, which we will consider in more depth when we consider 
Richard’s ‘talk of wills’ (3.2.148). At this point we will concentrate on a material 
correspondence between the documentary performance of a will and the physical 
performance of funeral rites. In Elizabethan times, both performances involved an 
express passing of the soul into the hands of God, and of the body to the earth.23 (We 
shall shortly see that there is significance in the fact that earth itself was passed from 
                                               
21 Germaine Greer, Shakespeare’s Wife, (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 87. 
22 Daniel Nicholas, deposition of 19 June 1612 (Bellott–Mountjoy, Court of 
Requests). The italicized words are scored through in the original, which perhaps 
raises a doubt as to the veracity of this part. See, generally, Charles Nicholl, The 
Lodger: Shakespeare on Silver Street (London: Allen Lane, 2007), ch.27.  
23 See Cressy, Birth, Marriage, and Death, ch.18. 
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human hands as part of the Elizabethan burial rite.) The preamble to Shakespeare’s 
last will and testament was in a form standard for the time:24  
In the name of god Amen I William Shackspeare of Stratford vpon Avon in 
the countie of warr[wick] gent[leman] in p[er]fect health & memorie god be 
praysed doe make & Ordayne this my last will and testam[en]t in mann[er] 
and forme followeing That ys to saye ffirst I Comend my Soule into the 
hand[es] of god my Creator hoping & assuredlie beleeving through thonelie 
merit[es] of Iesus Christe my Saviour to be made p[ar]taker of lyfe 
everlastinge And my bodye to the Earth whereof yt ys made25 
This documentary form had a post-mortem counterpart in the dramatic performance 
of the funeral rite. The words spoken at Shakespeare’s funeral (and at the funeral of 
his son, Hamnet, which was roughly contemporary with Richard II and King John) 
would have been the words ordained to be spoken by the priest ‘At the Burial of the 
Dead’ according to the 1552 Book of Common Prayer. That ritual form of words, 
which was adopted without amendment by Queen Elizabeth in her edition of 1559, 
was as follows: 
FORASMUCHE as it hathe pleased almightie God of his great mercy to take 
unto himselfe the soule of our dere brother here departed: we therefore 
commit his body to the ground, earth to earth, asshes to asshes, dust to dust, 
in sure and certayne hope of resurreccion to eternal lyfe, through our Lord 
Jesus Christ, who shal chaunge our vyle bodye, that it maye bee lyke to his 
                                               
24 Honigmann and Brock, Playhouse Wills, 19. 
25 Transcription based on Honigmann and Brock, Playhouse Wills, 105. Italic 
additions in square parentheses indicate characters not appear in the original will. 
	 89	
glorious bodye, according to the mightie working wherby he is hable to 
subdue all thinges to himselfe.26 
This text had been significantly reformed from that of the 1549 first edition. The 
original wording had left the priest in his traditional position as mediator between 
God above and people below. The priest had uttered in the first person ‘I commende 
thy soule to God the father almighty, and thy body to the grounde’ (emphasis added). 
The second edition talks instead of ‘our dere brother here departed’ and uses the 
communal ‘we therefore commit his body to the ground’ (emphases added). 
Ritual power was taken not only from the mouth of the priest but also from 
his hands. The words of committal in the first edition are preceded by the direction: 
‘Then the priest castyng earth upon the Corps, shall saye.’ In the reformed (second) 
edition of 1552, that direction is altered in a small but important detail, for it is now 
the bystanders, not the priest, who perform the ritual act of casting dust upon the 
corpse: ‘Then whyle the earth shal be cast upon the body by some standing by, / the 
priest shall saye.’ This exemplifies that genre of participatory public performance 
that I call ‘testamentary’, for the third party bystander (the ‘tri-st’ or ‘testa’) is not a 
passive observer but a participant without whom the performance would be 
incomplete.27  
The ritual of the Roman Catholic priest casting dust down from a position 
somewhere between man and God, with the hierarchy that implies, was replaced by 
the horizontal ritual of brothers, members of a common priesthood of believers, 
casting dust upon one of their own.28 The dust becomes a prop in a protestant drama 
                                               
26 Compare Ecclesiastes 3:20. 
27 See Chapter One. 
28 For a Derridean appreciation of the dust in Richard II as a sign of the ‘crumbling 
	 90	
with protestant script and protestant stage directions. The performative power of 
ordinary people taking matters into their own hands is an enduring one. Ben 
Whishaw, who played Richard II in The Hollow Crown production (BBC, 2012) and 
who based his portrayal partly upon the dictator Colonel Gaddafi, notes that in 
footage of Gaddafi’s capture ‘people are throwing things at him’.29 The footage 
shows shoes being wielded by his captors, and presumably the deposed dictator was 
struck by these in accordance with the Arab notion that the shoe is ceremonially 
unclean and to be struck by it is symbolically to be trodden down in the dust. In a 
famous incident at a news conference in 2008, the same insult was quite literally 
hurled at President George Bush Jnr by an Arab journalist. Bush managed to dodge 
the flying shoe, but his father had been forced to take a similar insult lying down. In 
1991, President George Bush Snr had suffered the discomfiture of having a huge 
mosaic portrait of his face set into the floor at the entrance to one of Baghdad’s 
major hotels. This cultural understanding of the shoe might be a reason why the 
celebrated Arab theatre designer Farrah (Abd’Elkader Farrah) employed a portrait of 
King Richard as a backdrop and lowered it to form a sloped stage for Bolingbroke to 
tread upon in Terry Hands’ Richard II (RSC 1980).30  
The character of Northumberland, whom Richard labels ‘thou ladder 
wherewithal / The mounting Bolingbroke ascends’ (5.1.55-56), is a self-willing 
agent and an early modern protestant before his time. This is apparent from such 
                                               
of the principle of sovereignty’, see Geoffrey Bennington,‘Dust’, Oxford Literary 
Review 34(1) (2012), 25-49, 42.  
29 John Preston, ‘Ben Whishaw on his new role as Richard II’, The Telegraph 
(online), 30 Jun 2012. 
30 Cited in Forker, Richard II, 106. 
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lines as ‘My guilt be on my head, and there an end’ (5.1.69). He excises the priest 
from the proceedings. Again, when Richard is deposed, there is no bishop to preside 
over the reversal of the coronation rites. Richard asks, ‘Am I both priest and clerk?’ 
(4.1.174). He answers his own question when he washes away the balm of his 
anointing with his own tears and gives away his crown with his own hands, thereby 
reversing the sacramental actions of the priest in the coronation ceremony. Richard is 
reduced to acting as his own agent, but the play’s exemplar of the modern, self-
determining agent is Bolingbroke. The Victorian critic Frederick Boas conceived 
him in typically Victorian terms, to be an ‘iron-willed man of affairs’.31 That may be 
overstating the efficacy of Bolingbroke’s will, for there is truth in John Dover 
Wilson’s suggestion that Bolingbroke is to some extent ‘borne upward by a power 
beyond his volition’,32 but even if fate placed the ladder of opportunity at 
Bolingbroke’s feet it is clear that he scaled it voluntarily: ‘In God’s name I’ll ascend 
the regal throne’ (4.1.114). From the opening scene of the play, he declares his will 
to enact what he speaks: ‘what I speak / My body shall make good upon this earth’ 
(1.1.36-37). This is the very manifesto of modernity, even post-modernity. He is a 
self-willing actor setting out to perform his individual identity on the political and 
theatrical stage. The historical Richard II has been described as ‘the last king ruling 
by hereditary right, direct and undisputed, from the Conqueror’,33 and therefore as 
                                               
31 Frederick S. Boas, Shakspere and his Predecessors (1896) (London: John Murray, 
1940), 250. 
32 John Dover Wilson ed, Richard II (Cambridge: CUP, 1939), xx. 
33 A. B. Steel, Richard II (Cambridge: CUP, 1941), 1. 
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‘the last king of the old medieval order’.34 The medieval nature of Shakespeare’s 
Richard and his faction can be emphasized through costume, for example by 
adopting Tillyard’s suggestion that Bushy, Green and Bagot were ‘very plainly 
Morality figures and were probably marked in some way by their dress as abstract 
vices’.35 If Shakespeare’s Richard is mediaeval, he is nevertheless confronted with 
emerging modernity and ultimately his world is ‘superseded by the more familiar 
world of the present’.36 Again, the mode of costume can be employed to represent 
tension between the old order and the new. For example, in Michael Bogdanov’s 
Richard II (English Shakespeare Company, 1989), epochal change was demonstrated 
by contrasting Richard’s ‘languid Regency dandy’ with Bolingbroke’s ‘sombre 
Edwardian civil servant’.37 
The bystanders in an Elizabethan burial service who threw dust upon the 
coffin had their counterparts in the commoners who cast dust on the head of Richard 
as he entered London trailing behind the triumphant Bolingbroke. The scene of 
Bolingbroke’s entry is reported by the eyewitness account of the Duke of York 
speaking privately to his wife. The Duke had broken off his tale, so the Duchess 
urges him to continue from ‘that sad stop, my lord, / Where rude misgoverned hands 
from windows’ tops / Threw dust and rubbish on King Richard’s head’ (5.2.1-6). 
The Duke continues: 
 
                                               
34 E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays (1944) (London: Penguin Books, 
1991), 259, citing Steel ibid.  
35 Ibid., 268. 
36 Ibid., 265. 
37 Jack Tinker, Daily Mail, 28 January 1989.  
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As in a theatre the eyes of men, 
After a well-graced actor leaves the stage, 
Are idly bent on him that enters next, 
Thinking his prattle to be tedious, 
Even so, or with much more contempt, men’s eyes 
Did scowl on gentle Richard. No man cried God save him! 
No joyful tongue gave him his welcome home, 
But dust was thrown upon his sacred head. 
Which with such gentle sorrow he shook off. (5.2.23–30) 
 
The episode has a counterpart in the Old Testament. Not long after King David lost 
his throne to the rebellion of his son Absalom, we read that a Hebrew by the name of 
Shimei ‘threw stones against him, and cast dust’ (2 Samuel 16:13).38 When 
Shakespeare’s Richard ‘shook off’ (5.2.31) the dust, he was returning a Biblical 
curse upon the London citizens.39 A stage director might choose to represent the 
casting of dust on Richard by means of a confetti shower, shadow show, video 
projection or some other such device, but it might be better to leave the falling dust 
to York’s narrative account and to omit any peripheral physical representation of the 
actual matter. The power of the scene may be heightened if the playgoers are 
required to hold the dust in the hands of their minds, there to weigh it up and grasp 
its significance. Imagined stage properties can sometimes have a more powerful hold 
upon playgoers’ minds than physical props presented on stage. (The pound of flesh 
                                               
38 Shaheen, Biblical References, 386. 
39 Matthew 10:4-5. 
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in The Merchant of Venice is a case in point.)40 Held in the hand of the mind, the 
significance of the dust is something like the significance of the ‘gage’ considered 
earlier. Both things are taken up and thrown down in the vertical plane but they also 
have strong connotation of movement in the horizontal plane. We saw that the dust 
of the burial rite was taken up and thrown down in the horizontal plane of protestant 
brotherhood. The dust thrown down on Richard covers him in the shifting matter of 
the common highway and the platea (Greek ‘street’) that connects the low stage to 
the playgoers in the yard. ‘Dust’ would have a number of material implications for 
the Elizabethan playgoer. One playgoer would have thought of ashes scraped from 
the hearth, another of food scraps, and another of the contents of a chamber pot or 
‘jordan’ (2H4, 2.4.32-33).41 Encouraged by the players’ repeated contact (by means 
of hands, knees and words) with the imagined stage soil of England, some playgoers, 
perhaps the groundlings especially, would have thought of the dust of the ground. 
For some, the reference to dust might have brought to mind the dust of the burial rite 
or (less likely) the dust of the Biblical encounter between Shimei and King David. 
Whatever idea of ‘dust’ it brought to mind, York’s description of commoners’ 
wielding dust would have encouraged mental grappling with material such as the 
chorus urges in Henry V.  Through mental engagement, the London playgoer was 
turned from witness to actor even as the actor playing the Duke of York played 
                                               
40 Gary Watt, ‘The Law of Dramatic Properties in The Merchant of Venice’, in 
Shakespeare and the Law, P. Raffield and G. Watt eds (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 237-
251. 
41 The production of Richard II for the series The Hollow Crown (BBC, 2012) 
presents this scene in flashback and shows dung landing on Ben Whishaw’s King 
Richard. The act of throwing this ‘dust’ is not shown. 
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witness to the actions of commoners in the London streets. The dust of the burial 
rite, which moved from the priest to the people and endowed them with performative 
agency, here moves from the theatrical players to the playgoers and endows them 
with the power of participation in affairs of State.  
The drama of commoners casting dust upon the captive King Richard seems 
to have had an uncommon hold on Shakespeare’s imagination. He even refers back 
to it from 2 Henry IV, where the Archbishop of York condemns the commoners who 
‘threw’st dust upon [King Richard’s] goodly head’ and with ‘loud applause’ blessed 
Bolingbroke (1.3.103; 91). The word ‘applause’ here echoes the Duke of York’s use 
of theatrical metaphor to describe the same event in Richard II.42 The hold that the 
scene had upon Shakespeare’s imagination was specifically a theatrical hold. 
On King Richard’s return to England from Ireland, his first act had been to 
touch the ground. He blessed it, communed with it and pleaded with it to ‘Throw 
death upon thy sovereign’s enemies’ (3.2.22). Yet in the event of Bolingbroke’s 
triumphal entry into London, Richard’s subjects become his enemies and they throw 
death upon him in the form of dust. In this expressly theatrical scene, the dramatic 
prop of the burial rite is thrown on Richard’s head as if he were already dead. The 
kingship lives in Henry Bolingbroke and that which trails behind him in the form of 
Richard is the mere corpse of a king. It is perverse and paradoxical that the fleshy 
form of a king should outlive the sacred substance of his kingship, but here, as 
elsewhere (most profoundly in King Lear), Shakespeare exploits the drama inherent 
in the paradox. Richard presumes that ‘The worst is death’ (3.2.103.), but worse than 
                                               
42 Hands clap in the parallel episode in one of Shakespeare’s ‘sources’: Samuel 
Daniel, The First Fowre Bookes of the Civile Wars (registered 1594, printed 1595), 
stanzas 67-69. 
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death is living death and worse for a king is to be treated in life and death as if he 
were no more exalted than any corpse laid low in the earth. When Bolingbroke’s 
fellow subjects – the common bystanders who witnessed and participated in his 
triumph – cast dust upon Richard, they effectively buried their king in the road of the 
merchant metropolis of London. Shakespeare had earlier caused Richard to 
anticipate this fate: 
Or I’ll be buried in the King’s highway, 
Some way of common trade, where subjects’ feet 
May hourly trample on their sovereign’s head; 
For on my heart they tread now whilst I live, 
And, buried once, why not upon my head? (3.3.155-159) 
This passage begins with the antithetical pairing of ‘buried’ and ‘the king’s 
highway’, but the antithesis is more nuanced than a commonplace contrast between 
high and low, for the way of the king in Shakespeare’s play is not as high as it 
should be; it is imagined as a low road of ‘common trade’.43 The substantial contrast 
being made here is not between high and low along the vertical axis, but between the 
vertical order of tradition and the horizontal plane of trade. 
Richard confesses that his ‘coffers… / …are grown somewhat light’ and that 
he is ‘enforced to farm our royal realm’ (1.4.43-47) (Compare (H5, 5.2.124-7). This 
confirms that he has turned from tradition to trade. This word ‘farm’, which derives 
from the French ferme (‘lease’) and ultimately from the Latin firma (‘fixed sum’) 
                                               
43 On ‘trade’ and ‘tread’ see the discussion below, and Chapter One. 
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indicates that Richard is landlord of a lease.44 Gaunt establishes this with his 
complaint that England had been ‘leased out… / Like to a tenement or pelting farm’ 
and his indictment of Richard: ‘Landlord of England art thou now, not king’ (2.1.59-
60; 113).45 Shakespeare is here presenting landlord and king as incompatible offices. 
The well-known labels ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’, which even today attach to the parties 
to a lease, might suggest that the arrangement was akin to the feudal relationship 
between lord and tenant. The basic scheme of the feudal system was that all land in 
the realm was owned by the Crown and every land holder (tenant) held his estate 
from his superior (his lord) and so on all the way up the chain to the monarch as 
supreme overlord. In fact, the farm lease ‘had…nothing…feudal in its nature, and 
was, consequently, exempt from the feudal rule of descent to the eldest son as heir at 
                                               
44 See, further, William O. Scott, ‘Landholding, Leasing, and Inheritance in Richard 
II’, Studies in English Literature, 42 (2002), 275–92; Dennis R. Klinck, 
‘Shakespeare’s Richard II as Landlord and Wasting Tenant’, 25(1) College 
Literature Law, Literature, and Interdisciplinarity (1998), 21-34. The Wilton 
Diptych represents Richard’s connection to the land in the form of his insignia, the 
White Hart, tethered to the land by a chain (see Raffield, ‘Imaginary Constitution’, 
ch.3. 51-73). At the end of Gregory Doran’s production of Richard II (RSC, 2012) 
the stage floor was raised to reveal David Tennant’s Richard chained to the dungeon 
floor. Thus Richard, who began at the top of the social ‘chain of being’ under God, is 
shown sunk to its lowest level. 
45 These lines have close counterparts in the anonymously authored play Thomas of 
Woodstock (c.1591-1595). See P. Corbin and D. Sedge ed, Thomas of Woodstock 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 4.1.147-8; 5.3.106-7. 
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law’.46 The lease was essentially contractual in its origins and the feudal terminology 
of tenant and lord was adopted out of familiarity or as a rhetorical pretence. England 
‘leased out’ is for Gaunt an England in legal and commercial bondage (2.1.63-64, 
114). Feudal land holding was understood in terms of ‘tenure’, which described the 
terms on which a tenant held the land from his superior lord. The species of ‘tenure’ 
denoted the sort of duties that accompanied the holding. For example, tenants 
holding under the tenure of ‘Knight-service’ had the very onerous obligation of 
supplying military service to the Crown, or (as it evolved) a substantial cash 
equivalent. The relational nature of feudal land holding meant that it was a sort of 
‘hand-holding’ between the tenant and his lord.47 In Richard II, feudal tradition loses 
its grip and the realm itself is handled as an object of commercial trade. In Gregory 
Doran’s production (RSC, 2012), the throne of state took the form of a movable 
platform that reached its elevated position above the stage by descending from the 
fly loft. The ‘state’ should be stable and static. (Shakespeare consciously juxtaposes 
‘state’ and ‘change’ (3.4.29-30)48.) Its descent in this production signals that the 
political State itself was unstable and set on a tragic downwards trajectory. Richard 
abandons tradition for the low road of trade in other actions too, the most significant 
                                               
46 Joshua Williams, Principles of the Law of Real Property  (London: S. Sweet, 
1845), 9-10. F. H. Lawson agrees that the landlord-tenant relationship was not 
feudal, but an ‘alien commercial element’ (Introduction to the Law of Property 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958)). 
47 Bradin Cormack, ‘Shakespeare Possessed: Legal Affect and the Time of Holding’, 
in Shakespeare and the Law, P. Raffield and G. Watt eds (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 83-
100. 
48 On ‘stasis’, see Chapter Four [of Acts of Will]. 
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being the seizure of the inheritance that should have been handed down to 
Bolingbroke from John of Gaunt. This act, discussed further below, was the one by 
which Bolingbroke was, in his own words, ‘trod down’ (2.3.126).  
In the context of land transfer, legal inheritance by ‘heirs’ under traditional 
default rules of descent can be displaced by lifetime sales and other legal ‘acts of 
trade’ but also by the legal ‘act of will’ we call the testament. It follows that 
testament and trade both effect lateral hand-to hand transfer in opposition to vertical 
hand-down by tradition. A lifetime purchaser of a fee simple was said to be an 
‘assign’, and in early modern England the same label properly applied to the 
recipient of a fee simple under a testamentary will.49 It is fitting, then, that David 
Tennant’s Richard crawled along the ground – effectively representing the king as a 
downtrodden subject of trade, and one who treads or trades horizontally – as he 
spoke the play’s most obviously testamentary line ‘Let’s choose executors and talk 
of wills’ (3.2.148) (Gregory Doran, RSC, 2012).  When Lepidus contrasts 
‘hereditary’ to ‘purchased’ (1.4.13-14) in Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare is 
accurately alluding to the legal distinction between acquisition as an heir and 
acquisition as an assign by testament or trade. A testament produces succession but it 
does not produce ‘inheritance’ properly so called. When a testator writes his will he 
cannot name his heir because nobody can know who will be their heir at the future 
date of their death (for one thing, the present ‘heir apparent’ might predecease the 
testator). Hence the doctrine, recited by Sir Edward Coke, that heirs ‘in the legall 
understanding of the Common Law, implyeth…he to whom lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments by the act of God, and right of blood doe descend of some estate of 
                                               
49 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworths, 
1990), 298. 
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inheritance, for Solus Deus haeredem facere potest non homo’ (‘Only God has the 
power to make an heir, not man’).50  
King Richard’s reference to ‘common trade’ comes immediately after the 
‘list of exchanges’51 that Richard ‘must’ (a most unprincely word)52 perform as a 
result of his having traded places with Bolingbroke. The lengthy, itemised list is 
rendered in the form of rhetorical anaphora and reads like a trader’s ledger of 
bargains. It starts ‘I’ll give my jewels for a set of beads’ and concludes ‘And my 
large kingdom for a little grave’ (3.3.147-53). Charles Forker notes that the word 
‘tread’ in Richard’s ‘Some way of common trade… / … / … on my heart they tread’ 
(3.3.156, 158) is ‘quibbling on trade’.53 Both words share the same etymology and 
in some Elizabethan dialects were very likely pronounced the same.54 Even modern 
ears can hear the sound of ‘tread’ amplified through the consonance of its elements 
in the adjacent words ‘trade’ and ‘head’, but why does Shakespeare emphasise the 
                                               
50 Coke, Littleton, 191a. 
51 Ivor B. John ed, The Tragedy of King Richard II, The Arden Shakespeare (1912) 
3rd rev. edn. (London: Methuen and Co, 1934), xxv. 
52 It is said that shortly before her death Queen Elizabeth was told by Robert Cecil 
that she ‘must’ go to bed, to which her indignant response was ‘Must! Is must a word 
to be addressed to princes?’. 
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54 In Elizabethan pronunciation, ‘tread’ rhymed with ‘head’ (LLL, 4.3.274-77) and 
‘red’ (MND, 3.2.390-91) as it does today, but it is likely the Elizabethan ‘trade’ did 
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word ‘tread’ in connection with dust and a King’s demise? It seems likely that 
Shakespeare is recalling the Psalms of King David, and in particular the lines: ‘Then 
let the enemie persecute my soule and take it: yea, let him treade my life downe vpon 
the earth, and lay mine honour in the dust’ (Psalm 7:5). 
The words of King David begin with a personal prayer in the style of a 
rhetorical apostrophe to God in which he calls upon the Lord to be his defender 
against his enemies or else, if He judges David to be wicked, then to let his enemies 
triumph and tread him in the dust. According to the The Book of Common Prayer’s 
‘Order how the Psalter is appointed to be read’ every Psalm was required to be 
recited every month in every parish in England. Shakespeare would have heard many 
of those readings and he would also have been familiar with Miles Coverdale’s 
English translation of the Psalms from their appearance in the Geneva Bible.55 On 
the evidence of Richard II, we can speculate that Shakespeare was impressed by the 
inherent drama of King David’s high-stakes wager with God. Quite certain is the fact 
that the same biblical drama would make a significant impression a generation after 
Shakespeare’s death on opposing sides in the debate surrounding the deposing of 
Charles I. King David’s wager figured in polemics pleading the Royalist cause on 
the one side and the Parliamentary cause on the other. The Royalist polemic was the 
Eikon basilike, a tract attributed (somewhat dubiously) to Charles I during his time 
in prison awaiting trial. In the section entitled, ‘Upon His Majesties going to the 
                                               
55 See, generally, Steven Marx, Shakespeare and the Bible (Oxford: OUP, 2000); 
John W. Velz, ‘Shakespeare and the Geneva Bible: The Circumstances’, in 
Shakespeare, Marlowe, Jonson: New Directions in Biography, T. Kozuka and J. R. 
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House of Commons’,56 Charles calls God to be his Witness: ‘But thou, O Lord, art 
my witnesse in heaven, and in my Heart: If I have purposed any violence or 
oppression against the Innocent: or if there were any such wickednesse in my 
thoughts’, and, continuing, makes the wager that King David had made in Psalm 7:5: 
‘Then let the enemy persecute my soule, and tread my life to the ground, and lay 
mine Honour in the dust’. If the Psalm was at the front of Charles’s mind, so 
Shakespeare’s play might have been in the rear of it. Charles is known to have 
personally annotated his own copy of the 1632 second folio of Shakespeare’s 
Complete Works.57 (The evidence is even stronger to suggest that Shakespeare’s play 
featured in high-stakes political drama in February 1601. Supporters of the Earl of 
Essex had paid for a performance at the Globe of a play by the Lord Chamberlain’s 
Men called the ‘kyllyng of Kyng Richard the Second’,58 which was presumably 
Shakespeare’s play.59 It was performed on the 7th of February and the very next day 
the Earl led the so-called ‘Essex rebellion’ for which he was later executed.) In 
response to the Eikon basilike, Parliament commissioned John Milton’s 
Eikonoklastes, which was published following the trial and execution of Charles I. 
                                               
56 Eikon basilike, The pourtraicture of His Sacred Majestie in his solitudes and 
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58 National Archives, SP 12/278, no. 78, fol. 130r. 
59 See Paul E. J. Hammer, ‘Shakespeare’s Richard II, the Play of 7 February 1601, 
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Milton cleverly quotes Charles’s own words as evidence of God’s judgment against 
the king: ‘What need then more disputing? He appeal’d to Gods Tribunal, and 
behold God hath judg’d, and don to him in the sight of all men according to the 
verdict of his own mouth.’60 Milton inevitably had the last word, but had Charles 
lived he might have cited another Psalm in which the downtrodden King David 
attributes his fallen state, not to Divine judgment, but to betrayal by the people. 
David is confident that in the eyes of God he ‘shall stand fast for evermore as the 
moon, and as the faithful witness in heaven’, but of the people he hears God 
complain: ‘Thou hast broken the Covenant of thy servant, and profaned his crown, 
casting it on the ground…Thou hast caused his dignity to decay, and cast his throne 
to the ground’ (Psalm 89:39, 44). This Psalm perhaps inspired Shakespeare’s 
‘crown…quite thrown down’ (3.4.66). 
When Shakespeare’s King Richard utters those plaintive lines: ‘For God’s 
sake let us sit upon the ground / And tell sad stories of the death of kings’ (3.2.155-
6), it will have called to playgoers’ minds The Mirror for Magistrates, which was 
popular in various editions from 1559 to 1610. Thomas Sackville, one of the co-
authors of Gorboduc (see Chapter One), was a key contributor. Richard’s lines might 
also have evoked John Lydgate’s Fall of Princes (c. 1431-38) to which The Mirror, 
according to its Preface, was a sequel. Both works were collections of didactic tales, 
mostly metrical, on the de casibus theme of the fall of (or of that which befell) great 
historical figures. The earliest royal life reflected upon in The Mirror is that of 
Richard II and it is now trite to say that Richard’s troubles as portrayed in 
Shakespeare’s play were popularly considered to be a cautionary tale on the dangers 
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of uncertain royal succession. It therefore held up a mirror to the aged and childless 
Elizabeth. There is even an oft-repeated legend that Elizabeth once remarked to the 
jurist William Lambarde, ‘I am Richard II, know ye not that?’61 
Scene 3.2, in which we find Richard on the ground talking of graves, is the 
first of the two central scenes of the play. Together the pair of central scenes form 
the fulcrum on which the fortunes of the characters turn. Referring to the play’s 
dominant image of a set of scales, Andrew Gurr summarizes the structure of Richard 
II in the single word ‘balance’.62 Mark Rose suggests that the ‘play pivots’ in Scene 
3.3.63 The deposition scene that follows (4.1) is not so much a substantial shift in the 
status of Richard and Bolingbroke as a formal confirmation of the substantial 
changes that have already occurred in Act 3. The deposition scene was nevertheless 
symbolically potent enough to prompt its tactful (or perhaps tactical or compulsory) 
omission from all printed forms of the play during Elizabeth’s reign.64 The first of 
the two central scenes of the play, Scene 3.2, places the action on the coast of Wales 
where King Richard has just returned from Ireland. His first action is to salute the 
earth with his ‘hand’, and (presumably) to stoop down to do it ‘favours’ with his 
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‘royal hands’ (3.2.6; 10-11). In the BBC’s Hollow Crown production, Ben Whishaw 
paws at the sand, hollows out a handful and scoops it up. This was an inspired 
choice. Richard will shortly ‘talk of graves’ and specifically of a ‘little grave’ and 
here he grabs burial dust in his hand and engraves a little grave in the earth.65 
Richard’s stoop to the ground represents his declining status. The supreme overlord 
of all land is reduced to manual holding of the earth’s base matter.66 In feudal terms 
he becomes the lowliest form of land-holder. A related image of decline appears near 
the end of the play where the queen likens Richard to the king of beasts and cautions 
him against passivity. She advises that ‘The lion, dying, thrusteth forth his paw / 
And wounds the earth, if nothing else, with rage’ (5.1.29-30).  
On the coast, hand-on-ground, King Richard feels the threat of ‘the 
treacherous feet / Which with usurping steps do trample’ (3.2.16-17) on his land. 
This is the threat of those levelling subjects who would tread down tradition and the 
threat of Bolingbroke in particular who would trade places with his king. A sense of 
trade is present again when the Bishop of Carlisle counsels Richard to have respect 
for the Divine power that made him King. Speaking in terms of Richard’s ‘will’ to 
accept the divine ‘offer’ (3.2.29-31) is more appropriate to describe a contractual 
deal than a divine gift. Richard attempts to reassert his traditional hierarchical status 
when he urges his followers to raise their sights: ‘Look not to the ground, / Ye 
favourites of a king. Are we not high? / High be our thoughts’ (3.2.87-89). His 
fortunes and his mood fluctuate with each fresh piece of news and are finally 
downcast by Sir Stephen Scroop’s report of general rebellion amongst the King’s 
                                               
65 ‘Grab’ and ‘grave’ share the same etymology. 
66 The land is Richard’s demesne, which indicates his possession ‘in hand’ 
(Cormack, ‘Shakespeare Possessed’, 86). 
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subjects: men and women, young and old. Without the prop of popular support, the 
King’s mind now plummets to thoughts of death: ‘Revolt our subjects? That we 
cannot mend. / They break their faith to God as well as us. / Cry woe, destruction, 
ruin and decay. / The worst is death, and death will have his day’ (3.2.100-103). 
Richard’s reference to ‘subjects’ and ‘God’ invokes the settled hierarchy in which 
the King is situated above his subjects and below his Divine Lord, but the words 
‘revolt’ and ‘decay’ acknowledge that the traditional social settlement is being over-
turned and is falling away. The play’s grand motif of Bolingbroke’s rise and 
Richard’s fall is immediately reiterated by Sir Stephen Scroop’s report that Richard’s 
closest confidants, Bagot, Bushy and Green, have been executed by Bolingbroke and 
now ‘lie full low, graved in the hollow ground’ (3.2.140). It is these burial words that 
finally throw Richard down into the dust: ‘For God’s sake let us sit upon the ground’ 
(3.2.155).67 To emphasise their continuing hold on the King’s mind, Shakespeare 
plots the words ‘grave’, ‘hollow’ and ‘ground’ throughout Richard’s next speech. It 
is the famous speech in which Richard, confronted with the immediacy of death and 
his own mortal state, turns testamentary: 
 
          …Of comfort no man speak! 
Let’s talk of graves, of worms and epitaphs; 
Make dust our paper and with rainy eyes 
Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth. 
Let’s choose executors and talk of wills. 
                                               
67 If the ‘let us sit’ is played as an invitation, the king’s attendants are bound to join 
him on the ground, but see Forker, Richard II, 329, for performative alternatives. 
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And yet not so, for what can we bequeath 
Save our deposed bodies to the ground? 
Our lands, our lives and all are Bolingbroke’s, 
And nothing can we call our own but death 
…For within the hollow crown 
That rounds the mortal temples of a king 
Keeps Death his court; and there the antic sits, 
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp, 
Allowing him a breath, a little scene, 
To monarchize, be feared and kill with looks… (3.2.144-152, 160-165) 
 
The combination of performance and introspection in this scene is typical of many in 
which Richard appears to sit in witness to the execution of his own will. Palmer 
suggests that he may be ‘the only appreciative witness of his tragedy’,68 echoing 
Chambers’ suggestion that he ‘becomes an interested spectator of his own ruin’.69 
Richard is his own audience too.70 He witnesses events, but he has so lost his grip on 
them that he cannot even think to hold a writing instrument in his hand. Dust is his 
                                               
68 John Palmer, Political Characters of Shakespeare (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1945), 159. Cited in Forker, Richard II, 32 n. 
69 E. K. Chambers, Shakespeare: A Survey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), 
91. Cited in Forker, ibid.  
70 Harry Berger, ‘Richard II 3.2: An Exercise in Imaginary Audition’, ELH 55:4 
(1988), 755-96, 756.   
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paper and his writing rains down in tears.71 Richard’s hand grows weak as 
Bolingbroke’s hand is strengthened. 
There is something shocking in King Richard’s overt ‘talk of wills’ and 
executors. It has long been standard practice for monarchs of England to write wills, 
but in the matter of succession of the Crown the individual monarch’s will can only 
be a hollow performance. Richard’s question ‘for what can we bequeath / Save our 
deposed bodies to the ground?’ was very much a live one for the monarchy when 
Shakespeare wrote the play, and the orthodoxy then, as now, is that the Crown 
passes by traditional rules of succession which cannot be altered by the testamentary 
will of the particular king or queen. (See the discussion in Chapter One.) The reason 
for this is that the incumbent ruler may die, but the monarch never will. The 
monarchy is a corporation perpetual.72 The doctrine of the ‘king’s two bodies’ 
provides that when a king dies his ‘body natural’ perishes but his ‘body public’ does 
not.73 This means that when a monarch dies (the principle applies to a queen as well 
                                               
71 On the use of ‘dust’ in Elizabethan writing, see Chapter Six [of Acts of Will]. 
72 F. W. Maitland, ‘The Crown as Corporation’ in Collected Papers, H. A. L. Fisher 
ed (Cambridge: CUP, 1911), III.251. 
73  Ernst Kantorowicz based his famous reading of Richard II’s deposition (The 
King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957)) on The Case of the Duchy of Lancaster: ‘the King has in 
him two bodies, viz. a body natural, and a body politic. His body natural (if it be 
considered in itself) is a body mortal…his body politic is a body that cannot be seen 
or handled’ (Mich. Term. 4 Eliz (1561) 1 Plow. 212, 213; 75 English Reports 325, 
326). This case confirmed that Henry IV had successfully separated his Lancastrian 
inheritance from the Crown estate. It remains part of the monarch’s privy purse to 
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as to a king), the crown passes immediately to the new monarch and the deceased 
monarch’s last will and testament, even if it purports to pass the crown, has no crown 
to give. It is a basic principle of logic and law that people cannot give what they do 
not have (‘nemo dat quod non habet’). Richard perceives that he will not have to 
wait for death to take his crown, for it is already slipping from his grip. The 
concluding call of Richard’s speech is inevitably a call to dispense with tradition. 
Shakespeare has just placed in Richard’s mouth the theatrical image of his reign as a 
‘little scene’ and now he has him speak a stage direction to his followers who, as 
etiquette demanded, are bareheaded in their sovereign’s presence: ‘Cover your 
heads, and mock not flesh and blood / With solemn reverence. Throw away respect, / 
Tradition, form and ceremonious duty’ (3.2.171-3). With these words, the actor 
playing Richard might choose to throw away the crown.74   
The second of the pair of pivotal scenes at the centre of Richard II is Scene 
3.3. It is the one in which Richard for the first time encounters Bolingbroke face-to-
face since Bolingbroke’s illegal return to England. The scene is loaded with the 
antithetical motif of rise and fall and therefore presents an image of the play in 
microcosm. It begins when Northumberland reports the news that ‘Richard’, refuged 
in Flint Castle, has ‘hid his head’ (3.3.6). Northumberland’s omission of the title 
‘King’ lowers Richard as surely as if his head had been physically removed from his 
shoulders. Richard is a master of ceremonial courtly display, as will soon be 
apparent from his celestial appearance high on the castle walls, but Bolingbroke 
                                               
this day; inheritable, but not alienable by sale. Shakespeare’s Bolingbroke begins to 
draft the legal theory of the two bodies when he claims that he was banished as 
Hereford, but returns as Lancaster (R2, 2.3.113-4).  
74 As David Tennant did (Gregory Doran, RSC, 2012).  
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knows better how to stage-manage political theatre for common consumption. One 
of his favourite performative points is the courteous kneel, sometimes accompanied 
by the courteous kissing of an offered hand. Bolingbroke was required, as a vassal 
lord, to kneel and kiss the hand of his liege lord during the feudal ceremony of 
homage and would have done likewise out of courtesy on other courtly occasions, 
but Shakespeare has him turn the obligation into a performative opportunity. It has 
been observed that ‘[e]ach time after his exile that Bolingbrook kneels…he rises 
with his powers enlarged’, whereas each time ‘Richard sinks to, kneels, or sits upon 
the ground after his return from Ireland, he rises weaker than before’.75 Before the 
trial by combat that preceded his banishment, Bolingbroke had requested permission 
of the Lord Marshal to ‘kiss my sovereign’s hand  / And bow my knee before his 
majesty’ (1.3.46-47). King Richard’s response – ‘We will descend and fold him in 
our arms’ (1.3.54) – anticipates his future descent from king to subject. 
Bolingbroke did not reserve his courtesies for the king. On at least one 
occasion he doffed his hat to an oyster-wench, and we are told that a ‘brace of 
draymen… / …had the tribute of his supple knee / With ‘Thanks, my countrymen, 
my loving friends’’ (1.4.32-4). Bolingbroke knew the trick of bending low to pick up 
the favour of the people, and the king is actor enough to know that he is being 
upstaged by him. Richard complains that Bolingbroke is acting ‘As were our 
England in reversion his, / And he our subjects’ next degree in hope’ (1.4.35-6). In 
the scene of Bolingbroke’s illegal return to English soil, Shakespeare employs 
Bolingbroke’s uncle, The Duke of York, to alert the playgoers to the hypocrisy in 
                                               
75 Philip C. McGuire, ‘Choreography and language in Richard II’, in Shakespeare 
the Theatrical Dimension, P. C. McGuire and D. A. Samuelson eds (New York: 
AMS Press, 1979), 61-84, 75-6. 
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Bolingbroke’s genuflection (2.3.83-4), but Bolingbroke is undeterred. He performs 
his gestural trick even as late as Scene 3.3 in which he offers to kiss Richard’s hand 
and bend both his knees in obsequience to the King (3.3.35-37; 48). In this scene, 
Shakespeare causes Bolingbroke to fall into a trap of metaphor and paronomasia 
(pun). Bolingbroke identifies himself with water and the King with fire: ‘Be he the 
fire, I’ll be the yielding water; / The rage be his, whilst on the earth I rain’ (3.3.58-9). 
At first sight these metaphors seem a wise choice if Bolingbroke wishes to 
communicate his humility (flames rise up ambitiously and water tends humbly 
downwards to the lowest level), but Bolingbroke is betrayed by the metre of a line 
that leaves him hanging on the damning consonance of ‘rain’ and ‘reign’. Hence the 
hasty enjambment: ‘My waters – on the earth and not on him’ (3.3.60). The actor has 
the choice to pause at the end of the verse line or continue to the end of the clause. 
The former will betray Bolingbroke’s subliminal treachery; the latter will suggest 
loyalty.  
When Richard appears resplendent on the castle walls, his first words 
indicate his readiness still to believe the physical formalities of deference: ‘long have 
we stood / To watch the fearful bending of thy knee’ (3.3.72-73). He berates 
Northumberland for his failure to perform: ‘how dare thy joints forget / To pay their 
awful duty to our presence?’ (3.3.75-76). The king from the upper stage makes an 
optimistic apostrophe to the Divinely ordered hierarchy – the ‘chain of being’ – in 
which God is the lord over kings, kings the lords over men, and men mere ‘vassal’ 
subjects (3.3.85-90). Confirmation that the ‘chain of being’ is undone comes when 
Richard descends into the base court of the castle: ‘Down, down I come, like 
glist’ring Phaëthon, / … / In the base court? Base court where kings grow base / … / 
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In the base court? Come down? Down court, down king!’ (3.3.178-182).76 When 
Richard reaches the level ground of the stage, he finally sees the insincerity of 
Bolingbroke’s genuflectory posturing: ‘Fair cousin, you debase your princely knee / 
To make the base earth proud with kissing it. / … / Up cousin, up. Your heart is up, I 
know, / Thus high at least, … although your knee be low’ (3.3.190-195). (The actor 
may choose to lower the register of their voice on the word ‘low’, which can serve to 
intensify both the king’s gravity and the sense of his downwards trajectory.)77 
Shakespeare places a scene late in the play (5.3) in which Bolingbroke is made to 
arbitrate a contest of supplicatory kneeling that verges on the comic. Bolingbroke 
urges throughout that all parties – the Duke of York on the one side and York’s wife 
and son on the other – should rise to their feet, but Shakespeare obliges him to 
witness a mockery of his own genuflectory excess. The points of his own 
performance are played against him, and the playgoers enjoy seeing him pricked by 
it. Played one way they will laugh with him; played another they will laugh at him.  
Just before his descent from the castle walls, Richard remarks that 
Bolingbroke ‘is come to open / The purple testament of bleeding war’ (3.3.93-94). 
George Steevens made the common sense observation that ‘purple’ indicates the 
effusion of blood and that ‘testament’ is used in its legal sense:  ‘Bolingbroke is 
come to open the testament of war so that he may peruse what is decreed there in his 
                                               
76 Charles Moseley identifies impressive similarities between Richard’s fate and 
Ovid’s account of the Phaëthon myth (Shakespeare’s History Plays (London: 
Penguin, 1988), 122).  
77 David Tennant employed this technique (Gregory Doran, RSC 2012).  
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favour’.78 Instead of submitting to succession by lineal descent, Bolingbroke is 
content that the crown should descend by bloody acts of will.79 Does this necessarily 
imply that Bolingbroke’s will is opposed to the will of God? Shakespeare, ever keen 
to keep open the question of the rights and wrongs of Bolingbroke’s actions, has 
Bolingbroke dispute any such suggestion. When the Duke of York urges 
Bolingbroke to have regard to the heavens above his head, Bolingbroke claims to 
‘oppose not myself  / Against their will’ (3.3.18-19). Bolingbroke can be understood 
to regard war as a traditional mode of direct appeal to Divine authority, which is how 
he regarded his personal trial by combat with Mowbray. On this view, Bolingbroke 
is prepared to act by rolling the dice and to leave it to God to decide the outcome, 
whereas his father had been content, in more passive mode, to leave the ‘quarrel to 
the will of heaven’ without taking up arms to test the point (1.2.6). For Bolingbroke, 
the outcome of a war witnesses to the divine will, so that war is a ‘purple testament’ 
in that sense too. To open a testament of this sort, by way of trade or bargain with 
God, supports our suspicion that Bolingbroke is ever the businessman. On his illegal 
return to England, Bolingbroke confirms with heart and hand his bond of friendship 
with his allies: ‘My heart this covenant makes; my hand thus seals it’ (2.3.50). The 
language here is the biblical language of the Divine covenant written directly on the 
heart,80 but it is also the language of commercial trade (it is preceded by references 
to ‘count’, ‘fortune’ and ‘recompense’).  
                                               
78 The Plays of William Shakespeare (in eight volumes) Vol IV (London: Longman 
et al, 1797), 190n.  
79 On seal and blood, see Chapter Six [of Acts of Will]. 
80 Hebrews 10:16; quoting Jeremiah 31:33. In Hebrews 8:10, the same verse from 
Jeremiah is paraphrased with the word ‘testament’ substituted for ‘covenant’. 
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Shakespeare emphasizes Bolingbroke’s self-conscious agency when, wrongly 
put out of his rightful inheritance, Bolingbroke takes matters into his own hands: ‘I 
am a subject, / And I challenge law. Attorneys are denied me, / And therefore 
personally I lay my claim / To my inheritance of free descent’ (2.3.133-36).81 We 
know that Bolingbroke subsequently went further than this when he laid claim to 
Richard’s royal inheritance. Bolingbroke was bound to claim that the usurpation was 
righteous and in accordance with God’s will. On his deathbed he confides in Prince 
Hal that all his reign had ‘been but as a scene / Acting that argument’ (2H4, 4.5.197-
8), adding that ‘what in me was purchas’d  / Falls upon thee in a more fairer sort; / 
So thou the garland wear’st successively’ (4.5.199-201). Henry asserts that his death 
‘Changes the mood’ (2H4, 4.5.199). Not the ‘mood’ only, but also the ‘mode’. 
Bolingbroke acquired the crown by trade ‘purchase’ (1H4, 2.1.93), but his son will 
take it by traditional descent. Henry V’s settled state of possession is what lawyers 
call ‘quiescence of title’, hence Henry IV’s dying words to his son: ‘To thee it shall 
descend with better quiet’ (2H4, 4.5.187). At the last, Bolingbroke (King Henry) 
appeals to God to grant a gift by his Divine grace, signalling that his days of 
bargaining with God are over. Addressing Prince Hal he says ‘How I came by the 
crown, O God forgive, / And grant it may with thee in true peace live!’ (4.5.218-
219). His prayer is that God will fill up the crown that he had hollowed out. 
In Richard II, Henry Bolingbroke’s hollow performance was not restricted to 
his knee. It extended to his hand, as when he threw down his gage in the opening 
scene and in doing so purported to discard his high status: ‘I throw my gage, / 
                                               
81 Contrast Thomas Cromwell’s fatal submission to parliament under Henry VIII: ‘I 
am a subject and born to obey laws’ (J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, 
Oxford History of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 415). 
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Disclaiming here the kindred of the King, / And lay aside my high blood’s royalty,’ 
(1.1.69-71). Despite this disclaimer, he takes the chance at every turn to bring up his 
status again, as, for example, when he refers to ‘the glorious worth of [his] descent’ 
(1.1.107)). When King Richard invites Bolingbroke to pick up his gage, Bolingbroke 
replies ‘Shall I seem crest-fallen in my father’s sight? / Or with pale beggar-fear 
impeach my height’ (1.1.188-189)). His refusal to pick up his gage is a deliberate 
assertion of his status. He only bows when it suits his own performance. No wonder 
Richard gives Bolingbroke the mock title ‘high Hereford’ (1.4.2). In Shakespeare’s 
lifetime, and as far back as the reign of Richard II, the throwing down of a gauntlet 
in gage of combat was employed ceremonially in the celebrations following the 
coronation of English monarchs.82 Few people, if any, in Shakespeare’s audience 
would have been aware of that obscure ceremony, but many would have witnessed 
the use of a glove or gauntlet in a ceremony known as ‘livery of seisin’ and many 
would have taken an active part in it. In the middle ages, the ceremony of livery of 
seisin was ‘the most essential part’ of the conveyance of inheritable estates and 
interests in land.83 Even during Shakespeare’s lifetime, this hands-on method 
remained the standard mode of acquiring land by purchase or gift.84 The general rule 
requiring land transactions to be made in writing did not enter the law until the 
                                               
82 Alice Hunt, The Drama of Coronation: Medieval Ceremony in Early Modern 
England (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 36.  
83 W. S. Holdsworth, An Historical Introduction to the Land Law (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1927), 288. 
84 Coke, Littleton, 60-66. P. S. Clarkson and C. T. Warren, The Law of Property in 
Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Drama (1942) (New York: Gordian Press, 1968), 
113. 
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enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677 (29 Car 2 c 3). Holdsworth notes that, 
whereas the English relied on actual public performance of the ceremony of livery of 
seisin, on the European mainland ‘under the influence of Roman law, there was a 
tendency to allow the delivery of a document, stating that seisin had been delivered, 
to operate as an actual livery of seisin’.85 As part of the ceremony items of material 
stuff – normally a sod of earth, a twig or such like, but occasionally something more 
exotic like ‘the door, the hasp, or the ring of the house’86 – was held in hand to 
symbolise transfer of title to the land. Holdsworth records that ‘a sod from the 
churchyard will do, or a knife without any sod, or a glove, or indeed any small thing 
that lies handy’.87 (Compare the use of earth from the churchyard in the ritual 
‘passing’ of the dead in the Elizabethan burial rite, discussed earlier.) One might 
assume that the use of a glove was simply intended to symbolize the ‘handing over’ 
of the land. Perhaps it was, but it might also have been a vestige of something more 
violent. The legal historians Pollock and Maitland record that it was frequently 
required that the donee should wear a war glove or gauntlet transferred to him by the 
donor and that this glove was the ‘vestita manus that will fight in defence of this land 
against all comers’.88 The hand vested in a glove or gauntlet therefore connects the 
gage thrown down in offer of combat with the land offered in lifetime purchase or 
gift. In both combat and contract, the gage of a glove is a material token of the fact 
                                               
85 Holdsworth, Historical Introduction, 112-13. 
86 Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, 2.18.12; Coke, 
Littleton, 48a.  
87 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law 
before the Time of Edward I, 2nd edn (Cambridge: CUP, 1898), II.86. 
88 Pollock and Maitland, History, II.85. 
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that traditional matters of honour and landholding are being grasped into human 
hands by human will. 
Bolingbroke is not the only self-willing trader in town. When Richard 
appropriates Bolingbroke’s Lancastrian inheritance (the estate which should have 
passed to Bolingbroke on the death of his father John of Gaunt), the wording of 
Richard’s ‘speech act’ betrays him: ‘Think what you will, we seize into our hands / 
His plate, his goods, his money and his lands’ (2.1.209-10). Here we glimpse the 
historical Richard whom Holinshed records ‘began to rule by will more than by 
reason’ and by whose parliamentary authority ‘diuerse rightfull heires were 
disherited of their lands and liuings’.89 In Troilus and Cressida, Ulysses observes 
that ‘when degree is shaked, / Which is the ladder to all high designs, / The 
enterprise is sick.’ (1.3.101-3). Ulysses is talking here of such subversive acts as 
Richard’s enterprise in pulling the ladder of inheritance away from Bolingbroke and 
Bolingbroke’s enterprise in pulling the ladder of royal status away from Richard. 
Ulysses’ point is that commercial ventures are no bad thing in themselves, but that 
trade is detrimental when it subverts the traditional order of things, for it is only ‘by 
degree’ that ‘Peaceful commerce … / The primogeneity and due of birth, / 
Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels, /…stand in authentic place’ (TC, 105-
108). Under feudal law a traitor’s estate was automatically forfeited into the hands of 
his lord,90 but until he broke his banishment Bolingbroke was no proven traitor (as 
York points out at 2.1.192-4) so Richard’s seizure of Bolingbroke’s estate is 
                                               
89 Holinshed, Chronicles, (London: J. Harison, 1587 ), VI.493 (An. Reg. 21. Richard 
II). 
90 William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (ten volumes) (London: 
Methuen, 1922-32), III.69 n.3. 
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illegitimate. Rejecting tradition, he has treated Bolingbroke’s noble inheritance as if 
it were common stuff of trade to be grabbed and handled and passed from person to 
person regardless of due descent. It is surely no coincidence that the sound of ‘seisin’ 
is concealed in Richard’s ‘seize into’. The very next line betrays him further, for his 
inventory of the Lancastrian estate is in the itemised form that one associates with a 
bill of trade or a testament made by private will. Richard should take heed. Kings 
who favour trade over tradition might one day have to hand over their crown. 
The Duke of York is incredulous that Richard intends to seize Bolingbroke’s 
inheritance, he dares to challenge him directly: ‘Seek you to seize and gripe into 
your hands / The royalties and rights of banished Hereford?’ (2.1.189-190). This is 
surely the chief offence to which York was alluding, a few lines earlier, when he 
referred to ‘England’s private wrongs’ (2.1.166). The word ‘private’ is apposite. By 
seizing into his own hands that which ought to have been handed down to 
Bolingbroke by inheritance, Richard effectively privatizes the public dignity of the 
nobility. Traditional inheritance becomes no better than the hollow subject matter of 
common trade, valued only as a commodity of bargain and exchange. York is in no 
doubt about the serious implications of Richard’s offence: ‘Take Hereford’s rights 
away, and take from Time / His charters and his customary rights; / Let not 
tomorrow then ensue today; / Be not thyself, for how art thou a king / But by fair 
sequence and succession?’ (2.1.195-9). York contrasts Richard’s privateering to the 
dignity of Richard’s royal predecessors whose hands had won glory by battle and 
blood; a mode traditionally approved as being dependent upon the providential hand 
of God (2.1.171-172, 179-181). Richard’s act of seizing Bolingbroke’s Lancastrian 
inheritance pre-empted and denied the providence of God. His hand had seized 
where God’s hand should have granted. Bolingbroke’s response, we might say his 
revenge, is to seize Richard’s royal inheritance.  
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The play’s final and climactic use of the word ‘seize’ comes in King 
Richard’s line ‘Here, cousin, seize the crown / Here cousin: / On this side my hand, 
and on that side thine’ (4.1.182-183). Director and actor have significant choices to 
make in the suiting of gesture to these words. Should Richard stretch towards 
Bolingbroke the hand that holds the crown? This would be to ‘tender’ the crown in 
the etymological sense of ex-tending it in offer. David Tennant’s Richard did 
something subtly but effectively different to this when he extended his arm, not 
towards Bolingbroke, but into neutral space, and without looking towards 
Bolingbroke beckoned him as a dog to a bone with a small, high-pitched ‘Here 
cousin’ (Gregory Doran, RSC 2013). Or should Richard merely hold the crown and 
require Bolingbroke to make all the moves? Fiona Shaw’s Richard set the crown on 
the ground and with a little gesture of her hands goaded Bolingbroke to pounce on it 
(Deborah Warner, National Theatre, 1995). Ben Whishaw’s Richard (BBC, 2012) 
remained rooted and Bolingbroke (Rory Kinnear) slowly walked towards him. When 
Bolingbroke took hold of the crown, Richard tightened his grip, and, contracting his 
arm, moved in to meet Bolingbroke at close quarters over the golden hollow. 
Eventually, Richard relinquished the crown by rolling it along the ground towards 
Bolingbroke, who wisely declines to stoop but stands in silence. Bolingbroke’s 
agent, Northumberland, picks up the crown for him. 
The physical passing of the crown is the moment of formal hand-over from 
Richard to Bolingbroke, from tradition to trade. Richard employs the language of 
commerce when he laments the trading of his name: ‘I have no name, no title / … / if 
my word be sterling yet in England, / Let it command a mirror hither straight, / That 
it may show me what a face I have, / Since it is bankrupt of his majesty’ (4.1.255; 
264-7). When he throws down the mirror it symbolizes the casting down of that 
aspect of himself that was king. The moment Richard performs the stage direction 
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‘Shatters glass’ (4.1.288), his regal image turns to dust. The gesture echoes the 
moment that Richard threw his warder (ceremonial staff) down to halt the trial by 
combat between Bolingbroke and Mowbray (1.3.118). Jorgensen notes that ‘[t]his 
simple motion, halting the empty ceremony of the combat, has solid repercussions 
for Richard’. Jorgensen cites the observation made by Mowbray in 2 Henry IV that 
‘when the king did throw his warder down, /… / Then threw he down himself’ 
(4.1.125,127).91 It has been said that King Richard ‘mistook his warder for an 
enchanter’s wand’,92 but in Shakespeare’s hands the warder does have magical 
properties on stage (compare Richard’s ‘senseless conjuration’ of the soil (3.2.12-
23)). Sir James George Frazer divided the ‘sympathetic magic’ of material objects 
into two main branches – the ‘imitative’ (or ‘homeopathic’), and the ‘contagious’.93 
The glove (or gauntlet or gage), which performed so powerfully in early modern 
ritual, is magically potent in both of Frazer’s senses. Its physical form imitates the 
hand, and because it has been in contact with the hand it carries the ‘contagious’ 
magic of continuing contact. The mimetic and contagious qualities that we see in the 
throwing down of a glove as gage are also present in the casting down of Richard’s 
warder. The contagious quality is present in the fact that the warder has been in 
contact with the King and the mimetic quality is present in the warder’s capacity to 
represent the rectitude of regal rule. The phallic implications of the metonymic 
object and the symbolic implications of its removal from the king are self-evident. 
Richard seems to assert his royal power when he throws down the warder, but by 
interrupting Divinely supervised combat it is arguable that the true effect is to curtail 
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a traditional basis for determining royal right to rule. As such the throwing down of 
the warder can be seen as a symbolic and prophetic act of self-emasculation.94  
Richard had said ‘show us the hand of God / That hath dismissed us from our 
stewardship; / For well we know no hand of blood and bone / Can gripe the sacred 
handle of our sceptre, / Unless he do profane, steal or usurp’ (3.3.77-81), but 
Richard’s own anointed hand acts as the ‘hand of God’ to dismiss him from the 
throne. Richard’s hand trades with Bolingbroke’s in the shared business of deposing 
the true king. York reports to Bolingbroke that Richard is willing to yield his sceptre 
‘To the possession of thy royal hand’ (4.1.111). He then proceeds immediately to the 
pretence that the trade has effected an orthodox succession when he invites 
Bolingbroke to ‘Ascend his throne, descending now from him’ (4.1.112). The truth 
is that the crown did not descend by the traditional mode. It became a hollow 
commodity of trade the moment Richard took it off. A few lines later, at the point of 
transfer of the physical crown, Richard’s words emphasize the work of his own hand 
in the business of hand-over: ‘I give this heavy weight from off my head, / And this 
unwieldy sceptre from my hand, /… / With mine own hands I give away my crown’ 
(4.1.204-205, 208). The form of his words might seem to suggest that this is a 
unilateral and willing gift, but in substance it is a bilateral transaction. The reason we 
can never decide if Richard’s hand gave or if Bolingbroke’s hand took is because 
they were both complicit in transferring the Crown. In the moment of their trade, in 
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the joining of their hands either side of the physical crown, they shake hands upon a 
bargain. 
And yet not so, for there can be no true bargain with a hollow crown, and no 
true bargain without consent, and Shakespeare embeds the sense (as must be 
common sense) that Richard is not a free and fully willing party to the deal. One of 
Shakespeare’s most brilliant techniques for achieving this uncanny sense of 
unwilling volition is a method that I call ‘fractional inference’. What I mean by this 
is that Shakespeare omits a key word but amplifies our sense of its absence by 
scattering fractions of the word throughout the text. In the following passage, for 
example, he omits the word ‘will’, but the sound elements of ‘will’ are included in 
such words as ‘well’ and ‘fill’ and ‘whilst’ and through the repeated sound of ‘w’. 
This prompts a subconscious search for the word ‘will’ which makes us feel its 
absence all the more: 
 
Now is this golden crown like a deep well 
That owes two buckets, filling one another, 
The emptier ever dancing in the air, 
The other down, unseen and full of water. 
That bucket down and full of tears am I, 
Drinking my griefs, whilst you mount up on high. (4.1.184-189) 
 
Bolingbroke’s very next line – ‘I thought you had been willing to resign’ – by 
expressly using the word ‘will’, joins together the elements of ‘will’ that had been 
present in fractured parts in Richard’s speech. We now sense more strongly than 
ever, if only subconsciously, that the word ‘will’ was absent from Richard’s speech 
and we perhaps begin to feel deep down that Richard could not bring himself to say 
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the word ‘will’ because his mind was fundamentally unwilling. Richard’s response – 
‘My crown I am, but still my griefs are mine’ (4.1.191) – purports to express his 
willingness to pass the crown, but through the assonance of ‘still’ it serves only to 
amplify again the absence of Richard’s actual will. Like a stage silence, the absence 
of Richard’s expressed ‘will’ demands our attention. Like a ‘pregnant pause’, it is a 
full absence. It fills up our attention. The placement of the static ‘I am; but’ between 
the ‘w’ of ‘crown’ and the ‘ill’ of ‘still’ adds another dimension. It produces the 
subconscious sense that Richard is poised in perfect stasis between will to resign and 
will to remain king.95 
‘Performance is a kind of will’, but Richard’s performance is a kind of 
unwilling will. It is true that, having handed over the crown, he calls himself a traitor 
to have given it with his ‘soul’s consent’ (4.1.249), but beforehand he had never 
once expressed his free consent to pass it. His ‘I will undo myself’ (4.1.203) is not so 
much a statement of his volition, as a prediction of his future action. His statement 
‘I’ll give, and willing too; / For do we must what force will have us do’ (3.3.206-
207) equivocates the voluntary nature of his actions. As far as we know, Elizabethan 
playgoers were never permitted to witness the politically incendiary deposition scene 
on stage. Certainly they never saw an authorized version in print. Despite this, the 
fact of the disposition was plain enough from the play, and it was plainly puzzling. 
Part of the puzzle was to know if human will had forced the transfer of the crown or 
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whether everything had unfolded according to the will of God. The question was 
intensely relevant to the question of who should succeed to the English crown after 
Elizabeth, and the related question of the mode by which the next monarch should 
succeed. In breach of the traditional rule of primogeniture, Henry VIII’s will had 
sought to oust the Scottish line descended from his elder sister Margaret in favour of 
the descendants of his younger sister Mary Tudor. Elizabeth ignored her father’s 
testament and confirmed the traditional mode of descent by consanguinity and 
primogeniture. She designated James VI of Scotland to be her successor, and though 
he had ‘a hereditary claim no stronger than Bolingbroke’s’, it was at least a plausible 
hereditary claim. Elizabeth therefore ‘spared the land the spectacle of a Monarch 
being designated by purely human agency’.96 When Shakespeare wrote Richard II, it 
was politically prudent to leave the question open as between succession by tradition 
and succession by testament. The weighty question of will and descent was left in 
the playgoer’s hands and in the balance of their minds – on this side one argument, 
and on that another. 
 This seems an appropriate point at which to pass from Richard II to King 
John. Tillyard downplays the correspondence between Richard II and King John, but 
this is because he was determined to demonstrate the unity of Richard II and Henry 
IV. He argued that between Richard II and King John ‘the connexions are fitful and 
unimportant’.97 I will argue, to the contrary, that the plays are in many substantial 
respects twinned; and not only because they are amongst a small group of 
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Shakespeare’s plays that are entirely in verse, or because they appear adjacent to 
each other (King John first) in the First Folio, or because they were both written 
around the same time.98 The more important fact is that King John and Richard II 
resonate with each other and amplify each other through such shared thematic 
concerns as testamentary will, succession, inheritance, tradition and trade. The two 
plays also correspond in the ways these themes are realised through such 
performative attributes as staging, physical gesture and touch.  
The key question posed by King John is essentially the same as that posed by 
Richard II. As Robert Lane puts it, King John asks ‘to what extent should the prince 
be able to dispose of the Crown as if it were his/her own property, thereby 
superseding the historically sanctioned rules of succession?’ 99 Swinburne correctly 
summarizes the legal orthodoxy when he writes that ‘It is unlawfull for a king to 
giue awaie his kingdome from his lawfull heires’,100 but the orthodoxy had certainly 
been by challenged by the pretensions of Henry VIII’s testament (supported by 
statute, see Chapter One) and, as we observed in relation to Richard II, the position 
remained doubtful and dramatically potent throughout Elizabeth’s reign.  
The traditional rules of succession by blood supported Arthur’s (John’s 
nephew’s) claim to the throne by virtue of his being the surviving legitimate son of 
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99 Robert Lane, ‘‘The Sequence of Posterity’: Shakespeare’s ‘King John’ and the 
Succession Controversy’, Studies in Philology 92(4) (1995), 460-481, 467. 
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John’s elder brother Geoffrey, Duke of Brittany. John disputes Arthur’s claim, and 
when he observes ‘There is no sure foundation set on blood’ (4.2.104) Shakespeare 
might be implying, beneath the more obvious sense of blood in battle, that an estate 
established on lineal descent of blood is less secure than one established by a strong 
political will. Arthur is a somewhat weak-willed creature, quite unlike his mother 
Constance but rather like Richard II. He even resembles Richard in talk of graves (‘I 
would that I were low laid in my grave’ (2.1.164)) and in his precipitous descent 
from a castle wall. In Arthur’s case, his descent is an immediate fall to his death. The 
text tells us that ‘th’ inheritance of this poor child’ is a ‘little kingdom of a forced 
grave’ (4.2.97-98). (Recall that Richard traded his ‘kingdom for a little grave’ 
(3.3.153).) If this is what becomes of Arthur’s weak will and his claim based on 
inheritance by descent, perhaps John was right to suppose that a claim based on will 
is superior to one based on blood.  
In terms of direct and prior lineage, John’s title is not so well supported as 
Arthur’s, but it has its props. One is John’s ‘strong possession’ of the crown; another 
is the support of the people; a third is the testamentary will of his elder brother 
Richard I; and a fourth is the fierce support of his mother Elinor (of Aquitaine). As 
for the first prop, Elinor confides in John that she suspects that he relies on ‘strong 
possession’ more than his ‘right’ (1.1.40). It may be that possession cannot confer 
moral ‘right’, but the position in law was, and remains, that possession confers a 
presumption of formal entitlement. This is why King John can challenge the citizens 
of Angiers with the question ‘Doth not the crown of England prove the king?’ 
(2.1.273). John’s argument was an old one, as William Camden confirmed in his 
Annales of the reign of Queen Elizabeth: ‘The Lawes of England many yeeres agoe 
determined ... That the Crowne once possessed, cleareth and purifies all manner of 
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defaults or imperfections’.101 We noted earlier that Shakespeare’s King Henry IV 
was confident on his deathbed that his son’s possession of the crown would quietly 
settle the title that had hitherto been questionable. This was an important principle 
for the Tudor dynasty, for it relied upon the crown’s peaceful descent to Henry VIII 
to settle the title that his father Henry VII had acquired through war. Shakespeare 
includes essentially the same theme in King John. John had acquired the crown 
laterally by act of will, but when John dies Philip the Bastard expresses the hope that 
John’s son, Henry, will succeed by traditional vertical (lineal) descent: 
PRINCE HENRY  
At Worcester must his body be interr’d; 
For so he will’d it. 
BASTARD  
Thither shall it then: 
And happily may your sweet self put on 
The lineal state and glory of the land! 
To whom, with all submission, on my knee 
I do bequeath my faithful services 
And true subjection everlastingly. (5.7.99-105) 
 
Regarding the second ‘prop’ in John’s support, which is the support of the 
commoners, John argues that if the crown does not prove him king then ‘I bring you 
witnesses, / Twice fifteen thousand hearts of England’s breed’ (2.1.274-5). John’s 
reliance upon commoners to bear witness echoes Bolingbroke in Richard II, who had 
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issued the instruction ‘Fetch hither Richard, that in common view / He may 
surrender…’ (4.1.156-7). Bolingbroke, fortified by the commons, looked to God to 
bless his possession of the crown. Robert Parsons, an early modern commentator, 
saw something similar at work in the reign of the historical King John. He wrote that 
Arthur sought ‘to remedy the matter, by warr, yet it semed that god did more defend 
[the] election of the common wealth [in favour of John], then the right title of Arthur 
by succession’.102 The third prop supporting John was the will of Richard I. This was 
of prime importance to the historical King John (Holinshed records that the will had 
purported to assign to John ‘the crowne of England, and all other his lands and 
dominions’),103 but Richard’s will is passed over only fleetingly and obliquely in 
Shakespeare’s play. No doubt ‘Richard I’s will gave the succession dispute in King 
John a direct relevance to the Elizabethan debate’,104 but Shakespeare did not focus 
on historical detail to the detriment of drama. Regardless of what he knew about the 
testament of Henry VIII, the Acts of Succession and the Statute of Wills, 
Shakespeare’s instinct for dramatic tension led him to focus on battles between the 
wills of the living rather than upon the documented will of the dead. When Elinor 
opposes Constance and Arthur with the claim ‘I have a will’, Shakespeare elides the 
fact that she is referring to the will of her son King Richard I. Constance’s reply – 
‘Ay, who doubts that? a will! a wicked will; / A woman’s will; a cank’red grandam’s 
will!’ (2.1.193-194) – puts the focus firmly on the living will of Elinor (and of her 
son John) as the main dramatic opposition to Arthur’s claim. 
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In King John and Richard II, Shakespeare invites us to question the capacity 
of individual will to determine the destination of the Crown and of other landed 
estates. To respond to that invitation involves nothing less than to question an 
individual’s capacity to depart from tradition. King John poses the question in the 
opening scene in which the king adjudicates upon the testamentary will of the 
deceased gentleman Sir Robert Faulconbridge. The primacy and prominence of this 
testamentary trial indicates Shakespeare’s intent to make contested will a central 
agon of the play. Lane points out that the testamentary episode ‘is wholly 
Shakespeare’s invention’, there being no reference to a testament in the earlier play 
The Troublesome Reign of King John which supplied Shakespeare play in other 
respects.105 In the opening scene, Shakespeare’s King John performs the role of the 
participatory witness and judge. He is the testamentary ‘third party standing by’ who 
plays the part that is necessary to fulfil the dramatic action of the two protagonists 
(see Chapter One). The dispute between them concerns their entitlement to succeed 
to the Faulconbridge estate. On one side is an elder son fathered by Richard I but 
born to the wife of Faulconbridge. On the other side is the younger son of the same 
mother, but this one fathered by Faulconbridge. The younger asserts the testamentary 
wishes of the deceased Faulconbridge. He claims to be entitled to ‘My father’s land, 
as was my father’s will’ (1.1.115). John rejects that claim and instead recognizes the 
rights of the elder son. He employs the then standard, and dehumanizing, proprietary 
reasoning that applied to a child born to a woman within wedlock, which was to 
recognize the husband’s entitlement to the ‘calf bred from his cow’ (1.1.124).106 The 
upshot was that the elder Faulconbridge, though acknowledged to be the bastard son 
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of Richard I, was adjudged to be the legitimate son of Sir Robert. Thus Philip 
Faulconbridge, called the Bastard, was held to be heir to the Faulconbridge estate. 
John explains to the younger son that ‘Your father’s heir must have your father’s 
land’ (1.1.129). In dismissing the will of Faulconbridge and favouring the traditional 
mode of descent by inheritance, King John was obeying the law as it was prior to the 
1540 Statute of Wills, but it was nevertheless somewhat hypocritical to do so when 
he had himself taken the crown by will despite Arthur’s better legal claim by blood. 
The hypocrisy does not lie, as Lane suggests, in the fact that King John depended 
upon the will of Richard I.107 The historical king did, but Shakespeare’s king did not. 
In the play, John’s decision to oppose individual will in the Faulconbridge dispute is 
hypocritical, not because John’s title rests on the testamentary will of Richard I, but 
because John’s title rests on the living will of John, supported by the living will of 
his mother Elinor. 
In Richard II, the initial scene of the king on his high throne and the central 
scene of Richard ‘on the Walls’ (stage direction 3.3.62) is succeeded later in the play 
by the commoners on the high walls of London who look down on Richard and 
Bolingbroke (5.2). In King John, the opening scene of the king on his high throne 
arbitrating between the two sons of Faulconbridge is followed in the next Act by the 
scene of the citizens of Angiers installed high ‘upon the walls’ of their city (stage 
direction 2.1.200) arbitrating between King John and King Philip of France. At this 
point ‘the stage picture is divided significantly both horizontally and vertically, with 
the English and French either side of the stage, and the Citizens centrally and 
above’.108 As in the opening scene, the conflict before the walls of Angiers is 
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between traditional lineal succession and individual will, but the subject matter of 
the issue between King Philip and King John concerns nothing less than the proper 
descent of the English crown. The citizens who look down on the debating kings are 
not mere passive bystanders, but observers of an active and participatory sort. To 
express their role in testamentary language, we can say that they are not mere 
witnesses but judges who are called upon to observe the trial or probation of John’s 
will. In other words, to decide in testamentary mode if his will has ‘passed probate’. 
If not, the default rule of lineal descent should determine the outcome in favour of 
Arthur and the French king. The progress of the play from the first scene to this has 
the effect of passing judicial authority from monarch to commoner. That progress 
naturally culminates in the passage of judicial authority from the citizens on stage to 
the citizens in the audience. Thus ‘Shakespeare provokes precisely what the Crown’s 
policy precluded - the exercise of critical judgment on the part of his audience - 
casting them as participants in the process of determining the successor’.109 
Modern playgoers are also invited to participate as judges,110 although we 
may ‘feel that, like the citizens of Angiers, we cannot adjudicate between the 
claims’.111 The question put to the Citizens of Angiers, and hence to the playgoers, is 
not a straightforward dispute between traditional inheritance and testamentary will.  
On the side of traditional inheritance is the default mode of lineal succession 
according to descent by blood; which order of descent was assumed to have been 
ordained by Divine providence of priority and gender at birth. Advocating this side 
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of the argument on behalf of Arthur, King Philip appeals to ‘God and our right!’ 
(2.1.299) and asks John ‘How comes it then that thou art call’d a king, / When living 
blood doth in these temples beat, / Which owe the crown that thou o’ermasterest?’ 
(2.1.107-9).112 In similar vein, Arthur’s mother Constance complains that Elinor is a 
‘monstrous injurer of heaven and earth!’ (2.1.174) for denying ‘The dominations, 
royalties and rights / Of this oppressed boy: this is thy eld’st son’s son’ (2.1.184-5). 
The words ‘o’ermasterest’ and ‘oppressed’ both connote the revolutionary overthrow 
of God’s order and imply that John, in wrongfully assuming a height not ordained by 
God, has turned the true king into a ‘subject’ – literally someone thrown-under (sub-
jactus). The language of over-mastering and over-pressing evokes the image of the 
king trodden underfoot, which was so powerfully employed in Richard II. Indeed, 
King Philip makes express the connection between ‘tread’ and the subjection of 
Arthur and the justice of his claim: ‘For this down-trodden equity, we tread / In 
warlike march these greens before your town’ (2.1.241-242). ‘Equity’ in the sense 
used here, means the Divinely ordained descent of the crown.113 The word imports a 
sense of substantial truth and justice that differs from formal appearance. John’s title 
is based on the legal formality of physical possession and (obliquely) upon the form 
of Richard I’s will. Philip claims that despite John’s formal or apparent title, 
Arthur’s title is the one supported by the Divinely ordained default rules of descent. 
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When King Philip later turns traitor against Arthur, Constance turns Philip’s own use 
of ‘tread’ against him. She complains that fortune ‘with her golden hand hath 
pluck’d on France / To tread down fair respect of sovereignty,’ (2.2.57-8). In this we 
hear her complain that tradition has been downtrodden by the levelling tread of 
trade. It is a note that resonates with Richard II, but also with the passage in King 
John where the Bastard delivers his famous commentary on ‘commodity’. In that 
speech, he likens the distorting effect of commodity on the world to the distorting 
effect of a bias (weight) on a bowling ball (2.1.574-580). In his plays, Shakespeare 
usually employs the word ‘commodity’ in the economic sense of the word. (The 
phrase ‘profitt and comodytye’ even appeared in his deposition in the dispute over 
the dowry to the marriage of Stephen Bellott to Mary Mountjoy.114 This followed his 
role as ‘an agent, a go-between, a broker’ in securing that marriage.)115 In King John, 
the Bastard’s usage emphasizes commodity as ‘exchange-value’.116 He should know, 
for he had exchanged his own feudal inheritance for ‘adventure capital on the 
international battlefield’.117 The Bastard helps the playgoers to see the mercantile 
reality of the peace brokered between King John and King Philip, which had been 
sealed by the marriage of John’s niece Blanche to the Dauphin together with ‘Full 
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thirty thousand marks of English coin’ (2.1.530).118 The Bastard alerts us to the fact 
that ‘Angiers finally opens its gates, not to its rightful king but to a bargain’.119 
King Philip had Arthur in hand when pleading his traditional right: ‘Lo, in 
this right hand, whose protection / Is most divinely vow’d upon the right / Of him it 
holds, stands young Plantagenet’ (2.1.236-8), but King John had tried to take Arthur 
in hand by force of will: ‘Arthur of Britain, yield thee to my hand; / And out of my 
dear love I’ll give thee more / Than e’er the coward hand of France can win: / 
Submit thee, boy’ (2.1.156-159). In the event, the two kings cut a deal that rendered 
Arthur irrelevant and they sealed it by the joining of their hands. The scene has been 
called ‘[p]erhaps the most graphic illustration of the symbolic power invested in the 
early modern handclasp’.120 The business handled between the kings, mirrored in the 
handfasting of Lewis and Blanche (2.1.532-3), engages the playgoers to handle the 
matter in their minds. The papal legate will soon be persuaded to approve the kings’ 
bargain, but initially he cautions ‘Philip of France, on peril of a curse’ to ‘Let go the 
hand of that arch-heretic’ (3.1.191-192). The legate will later say that John, having 
seized Arthur, holds a ‘sceptre snatch’d with an unruly hand’ (3.3.135) (compare 
Henry IV’s deathbed confession that the crown ‘seem’d in me / But as an honour 
snatch’d with boist’rous hand’ (2H4, 4.5.190-191). Philip initially resists the legate’s 
request to part hands that have been ‘newly knit…newly join’d in love’ (3.1.226, 
240), and at first he refuses to ‘Unyoke this seizure and this kind regreet?’ by 
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snatching ‘palm from palm’ (3.1.241, 244), but he inevitably relents. Only when 
John makes his peace with the papal legate, is the pact between the kings confirmed. 
In King John, the matter of tradition, which should be handed down inviolate, is 
handled like the stuff of trade. As in Richard II, even the crown is physically handed 
over. For Shakespeare, the most significant event of the reign of King John was not 
the signing of Magna Carta, but the surrender of the crown to the papal legate and 
his receiving it back again ‘as a vassal of the Pope’.121 John’s ‘Thus have I yielded 
up into your hand / The circle of my glory.’ (5.1.1-2) receives the reply of the papal 
legate: ‘Take again / From this my hand, as holding of the pope’ (5.1.2-3). When 
John hands the crown to the Pope and receives it back, he claims that he does so in a 
manner that is ‘but voluntary’ (5.1.29). This confirms that the transfer is part of a 
free-will bargain, and yet it is the sort of foolish exercise of free will that merely 
serves to produce new subjection. (For discussion of this species of foolish will in 
Shakespeare’s comedies, see Chapter Three of [Acts of Will]).  
The bargains in King John, and the many other evidences of John’s self-will, 
collectively demonstrate the same shift from handed-down tradition to hand-to-hand 
testamentary trade that we witnessed in Richard II. Queen Elinor employs 
testamentary language when she invites the Bastard Faulconbridge to pursue his will 
and abandon his inheritance to the younger Faulconbridge: ‘…wilt thou forsake thy 
fortune, / Bequeath thy land to him and follow me?’ (1.1.148-9). His response – 
‘Brother, take you my land, I’ll take my chance’ (1.1.151) – leaves us unsure, as the 
broker Bolingbroke left us unsure, whether to choose chance is to choose the path of 
self-will, or to commit the lottery to the hand of God. The Bastard’s preference for 
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‘chance’ is in one respect the commercial preference of a merchant venturer, but it is 
also, etymologically-speaking, a preference for whatever may fall from on high. 
Elinor’s use of the word ‘fortune’ is similarly ambiguous in the way it confuses 
notions of traditional inheritance with merchant commodity. What we are really 
seeing when we see a shift from tradition to trade (and, by the same token, from 
tradition to testament) is not unlike the shift from status to contract that Sir Henry 
Maine observed in the ancient world;122 it is not a neat paradigm shift, but a 
dramatically significant change in emphasis. Elizabethan playgoers would have 
taken different sides in the drama and appreciated Shakespeare’s questions 
differently according to the perspectives of their own cultural, and specifically 
religious, traditions. It has been said, for example, that during Shakespeare’s lifetime 
‘the Catholic sin of usury’ became ‘the Protestant virtue of banking’.123 One person’s 
tradition is another person’s trade. 
The key witness to the wills and deeds in King John is the Bastard 
Faulconbridge. He is ‘a surrogate for a particularly arch kind of spectator’.124 This is 
perhaps especially clear in scene 2.1 in which he provides a running commentary on 
the contest conducted between the kings before the citizens of Angiers on their high 
walls. At the conclusion of that scene, the Bastard is left alone on stage to deliver his 
soliloquy on commodity. The scene can be appreciated as an extended metatheatrical 
exercise in the art of persuading the playgoers to identify themselves with the 
                                               
122 Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law (London, John Murray, 1861). 
123 Ben Ross Schneider Jr., ‘King Lear in Its Own Time: The Difference that Death 
Makes’, Early Modern Literary Studies 1(1) (1995), 3.1-49, 31. 
124 Smith, Cambridge Shakespeare Guide, 79. 
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citizens of Angiers. Some of the metatheatrical references will seem obscure to us 
now, including King John’s reference to ‘the sky that hangs above our heads’ 
(2.1.397) and Lewis’s reference to ‘the vaulty top of heaven / Figur’d quite o’er with 
burning meteors.’ (5.2.52-53), but Elizabethan playgoers would have incorporated 
this into their appreciation of a theatre whose ceiling was both the natural sky and 
the ceiling of the stage ‘heavens’ (i.e. the underside of the ‘hut’ projecting over the 
inner stage, which was decorated with comets and other celestial forms). Other 
metatheatrical references are blatant, as for example where the Bastard observes: ‘By 
heaven, these scroyles of Angiers flout you, kings, / And stand securely on their 
battlements, / As in a theatre, whence they gape and point / At your industrious 
scenes and acts of death’ (2.1.373-76). The play’s (politically dangerous) success in 
the endeavour of securing the playgoer’s imaginative participation might explain the 
strange change mid-scene from ‘Citizen’ to ‘Hubert’ in the First Folio’s designation 
of the spokesman for Angiers. The change might have signaled ‘a sense of political 
decorum’ and specifically a ‘reluctance to grant a significant role to an unnamed, 
untitled figure who speaks for a body of the king’s subjects’.125  
It is fitting that we should end with the practical business of the theatre. 
When Shakespeare referred to it as the ‘two hours’ traffic of our stage’ (RJ, 
1.prologue.12), we can be sure that one sense of the ‘traffic’ he had in mind was 
‘traffic’ as the commercial offering that his company made to the paying playgoers. 
His use of the word in the other nine plays in which it appears is always in a 
merchant or monetary context. In 1 Henry VI, reference is made to a royal marriage 
made ‘in traffic of a king’ (5.3.164). In Macbeth, he expressly pairs traffic with trade 
to emphasise their shared capacity to subvert traditional hierarchy. Hecate, Queen of 
                                               
125 Lane, ‘Succession Controversy’, 478. 
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the Witches, objects that her underlings (the ‘weird sisters’) have taken business into 
their own hands, and insists on her position at the top of the hierarchy (Mac, 3.5.4).  
The traffic of the stage that Shakespeare had in mind was the commercial 
offering that his playing company made to the paying playgoers, but he seems 
always to have had more than one thing in mind. Another sense of traffic is the 
traffic that takes place on the stage between the players. The word ‘traffic’ probably 
derives from the Vulgar Latin *transfricare (‘to rub across’), the original sense of 
the Italian verb being ‘to touch repeatedly, handle’.126 The traffic of the stage is the 
trade business of handling and handing on. Occasionally, it is the handing on of 
props such as crowns and rings and parchments: ‘[m]uch like coins and other units 
of currency, hand props testify by their size and portability to an open potential. 
They can be variously possessed, traded, lost, found, concealed, and evaluated.’127 
Gesture also plays its part in this stage traffic or trade. Since ancient times, 
rhetoricians have appreciated the need to combine gesture and word in the process of 
conveying an argument. For the ancient orators, and their early modern counterparts, 
rhetoric was the ‘open palm’ to logic’s ‘closed fist’.128 Even during every day 
speech, the gestural move from grasping to letting go, for example by relaxing and 
                                               
126 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, R K Barnhart, ed (London: H Wilson and 
Company, 1988). 
127 Douglas Bruster, ‘The Dramatic Life of Objects in the Early Modern Theatre’ in 
Staged Properties in Early Modern English Drama, J. G. Harris and N. Korda eds 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 67-96, 70-71. 
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opening up a fist, frequently signals a handing over of the power of speech.129 The 
business of Shakespeare’s stage was the urgent traffic of ‘two hours’ and lines were 
sometimes handed over so briskly that they rubbed up against each other. A single 
ten-syllable line of verse might be trafficked between parts as if the words were an 
object too hot to handle. A good example appears in King John, in the scene in 
which Hubert threatens to burn out Arthur’s eyes with a hot brand: 
 
HUBERT  
Young boy, I must. 
ARTHUR  
And will you? 
HUBERT  
And I will. (4.1.40)  
 
For all the talk of ‘will’ in that exchange, there is a clear sense that neither party is 
willing to hold the horrible thought for long. A scene such as this demonstrates one 
of the key demands made upon all theatrical performance: if the playgoers are to be 
moved, the drama must be full of moving energy and drive. When actors trade words 
and gestures and objects on stage it will be for nothing if there is no passing on of 
what I will term the performative ‘Urge’. The word ‘Urge’, from the PIE root *werg- 
(‘to work’, ‘to do’ or ‘to perform’) usefully combines the theatrical sense of practical 
production (‘dramaturgy’) with the theatrical sense of spiritual ceremony and dance 
                                               
129 S. Duncan, ‘Some Signals and Rules for Taking Speaking Turns in 
Conversations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 23 (1972), 283-292, 
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(as in the Greek ‘orgia’) with the sense of speed (‘urgency’) and thrust (‘energy’) 
and the sense that all parts (‘organs’) work together in the performance. Lag on stage 
is like ‘the law’s delay’ (Ham, 3.1.71); it does not feel ‘just’. Stage action feels fairer 
when it shows the humanity of swift and lively exchange between the players. The 
playgoers will be caught up in the current of the drama when the treading of the 
boards, trading of hands, and trafficking of words is done ‘trippingly’ (Ham, 3.2.2). 
To return to this chapter’s theme of ‘dust’, we can say that stage action should be 
like legal action in the popular ‘Court of Piepowders’. This ad hoc court was 
required to be present at medieval and early modern markets and fairs and was first 
named because merchants and market-goers would find justice done as ‘speedy’ 
there ‘for the advancement of trade and traffic, as the dust can fall from the foot’ 
(French: ‘pie poudre’).130 Sir William Blackstone called it ‘the lowest, and at the 
same time the most expeditious, court of justice known to the law of England’.131 
One of the rehearsal exercises employed by the Royal Shakespeare Company 
calls for a circle of actors to pass a pulse round the group with a clap of their hands – 
one actor clapping to give, and the next, facing, clapping to receive. Allocating the 
players a line from a passage of text, the exercise is repeated with each actor 
speaking their line before handing on to the next actor to speak theirs. The individual 
actor should not speak their line as if it stops with them. The breath must not be 
                                               
130 Coke, Institutes, IV.60. See Bradin Cormack, A Power to Do Justice: 
Jurisdiction, English Literature, and the Rise of Common Law, 1509-1625 (Chicago: 
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allowed to drop off at the end.132 Borrowing the legal vernacular of Richard II, we 
might say that the actor should not neglect or ‘waste’ the energy of the speech, but 
that it must be kept up and passed along. Cicely Berry notes that there are many 
clichés for this: ‘keep the ball in the air’, ‘pass on the baton’, and so forth.133 She 
advises that syllables should be differently weighted and that the ‘key’ is to ‘perceive 
the thought as movement’.134 Thus the practical traffic of the stage is a sort of trade 
in metaphysical currency; a discharging from hand-to-hand, and mind-to-mind, of 
the precious cargo of a question, an idea and a will. This precious thought, expressed 
in word and movement and gesture and breath, should not be wasted or dropped or 
thrown down. It must be handed on. It then becomes something more than it could 
have been in a single mind or in one person’s hands. The creative trade of hands fills 
it up with values that economic grasping would hollow out. It becomes a communal 
and artistic artefact that can be passed from the stage to be handled by the playgoers. 
The playgoers will feel the frisson of its touch. They will encounter its weight, and it 
will move them. This sort of traffic is Shakespeare’s stock-in-trade, and it is part of 
the legacy he hands on to us. 
 
                                               
132 I am grateful to RSC Voice coach Emma Woodvine for letting me participate in a 
demonstration of the technique. 
133 Cicely Berry, The Actor and the Text (1987) (London: Virgin Books, 2000), 82. 
134 Ibid., 83. 
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Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance 





‘Shall I descend?’: Rhetorical Stasis and Moving Will in Julius Caesar 
 
 
‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’ (3.2.74).1 The opening words of 
Antony’s funeral oration exemplify what the rhetorician Thomas Wilson called ‘a 
plaine beginning’ wherein ‘the hearer is made apt to giue good eare out of hande’.2 
This type of ‘plaine beginning’ has a history in English drama going back at least as 
far as The Castle of Perseverance (c. 1420), where the prologue contains the second 
flag-bearer’s ‘Farewel, fayre frendys, / That lofly wyl lystyn and lendys’.3 Antony 
delivers his opening words (in rhetorical terms his ‘exordium’) from what 
Shakespeare calls ‘the pulpit’. He addresses the plebeians down on the stage, but the 
                                               
1 In this chapter, all references to Julius Caesar are to David Daniell ed, Julius 
Caesar, The Arden Shakespeare, third series (London: Bloomsbury, 1998) unless 
otherwise stated. 
2 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560) G. H. Mair ed, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909), 99. On Shakespeare’s familiarity with Wilson’s Rhetoric, see Chapter 
One. 
3 F. J. Furnivall and A. W. Pollard eds, The Macro Plays (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1904), 75–188, lines 153-4. 
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groundlings in the playhouse yard, sharing the inferior aspect of the stage citizens, 
must have felt that Antony was delivering his rhetoric directly down to them.4 All 
classes of playgoer are incorporated into the performance. So when Antony 
addresses the ‘gentle Romans’ (3.2.73), Shakespeare is speaking to the gentlemen 
playgoers and to any who, like the poet, had the will and social ambition to climb up 
to gentility.5 Antony’s speech also speaks to playgoers of the highest social standing, 
and by the end of it they had cause to stir uneasily in their seats. 
To the Elizabethan playgoer, Antony in his ‘pulpit’ was in the familiar place 
of preacher. Brutus likewise. What kind of preachers were they? We might 
characterize Brutus as a sort of Puritan. From the first scene it is clear that the men 
of his faction disapprove of ceremonial holidays and the sanctification of Caesar. In 
this they share the Puritans’ objection to Roman Catholic ceremony and saints’ days. 
Brutus’s followers also object to the threatened crowning of Caesar and insist on the 
removal of robes and diadems from his public statues. What Brutus fears is a crown 
coupled to the caprice of individual ‘will’ (2.1.17). ‘Will’ was a particular concern of 
Protestantism during Elizabeth’s reign. Calvin, following Luther, believed that 
                                               
4 On the connection between the groundlings and the Roman Citizen in the context 
of the 1999 production at the Shakespeare’s Globe see Andrew Gurr, Around the 
Globe 11 (Autumn 1999), 33. Michael E. Mooney, ‘‘Passion, I See, Is Catching’: 
The Rhetoric of ‘Julius Caesar’’, The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 
90(1) (1991), 31-50, 32). 
5 Shakespeare possibly played a part in the grant of arms to his father in 1596 (see 
Raymond Carter Sutherland, ‘The Grants of Arms to Shakespeare’s Father’ 
Shakespeare Quarterly 14(4) (1963) 379-385). Heraldic arms were a standard 
indicator of gentlemanly status.  
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individuals have no free will to reject God if he chooses (‘elects’) them, but that 
humans are morally responsible for their own acts of will.6 Calvin’s rejection of 
astrology chimes with Cassius’s advice to Brutus that the ‘fault…is not in our stars / 
But in ourselves’ (1.2.139-140). The conspiracy of Brutus and Cassius can be 
understood in Calvinist terms as their taking responsibility for their own willed acts 
in resistance to the will of Caesar. Antony, in contrast, is no Puritan. In his forum 
speech he speaks of Caesar as Roman Catholics speak of saints: prophesying that the 
people would ‘dip their napkins in his sacred blood, / Yea, beg a hair of him for 
memory’ (3.2.134-5). The historical Antony was the holder of high priestly office in 
Rome, but Shakespeare’s play presents him as something like an altar boy to 
Caesar’s Roman Catholic priest. Antony plays his part in the ceremonial rites of 
Lupercal as Caesar directs him – ‘When Caesar says ‘Do this’, it is performed’ 
(1.2.10). 
If these are the respective natures of Brutus and Antony as Shakespeare 
presents them, does he give them rhetorical language appropriate to their character? 
Clearly not. One of Shakespeare’s masterstrokes is to lend Antony a style and an 
argument that should properly belong to Brutus. Antony employs a congregational 
style and argument in order to promote the quite contrary cause of Caesar and the 
crown. (‘A crucial point of contention between Anglican conservatives and Puritan 
reformers was whether a clergyman’s authority came from above or from below, 
from the crown or from the congregation’).7 Antony makes much of the fact that on 
                                               
6 See generally Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, J. I. Packer and O. R. 
Johnson eds (Grand Rapids: Fleming H: Revell Company, 1957) (translating 
Luther’s De Servo Arbitrio (1525)). 
7 Mark Rose, ‘Conjuring Caesar: Ceremony, History, and Authority in 1599’, 
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the feast of Lupercal he three-times offered Caesar a crown, which ‘he did thrice 
refuse’ (3.2.98), but he conceals the fact (revealed by Casca (1.2.241))8 that Caesar’s 
true desire was to take it. Outwardly Antony acknowledges the authority of the 
people, but he hides the crown in his heart. In contrast, Shakespeare makes the 
supposedly ‘congregational’ Brutus rely upon the inappropriately aristocratic virtue 
of his own high ‘honour’. As the historical Brutus rested his ultimate claim to 
honour on the merits of his ancestor Lucius Junius Brutus who had expelled the 
kings from Rome,9, so Shakespeare’s Brutus bases his claim to honour on his status 
as a patrician within the traditional social hierarchy. To early modern ears this 
undermines his congregational cause and his pretension to be a man of the people. 
Writing in 1579, William Harrison equated the Roman patricians with the English 
nobility.10 Brutus further damages his Calvanist credentials in the eyes of the 
playgoing ‘congregation’ by asserting human favour as the basis of his honour. For 
                                               
English Literary Renaissance 19(3) (1989), 291-304, 292. 
8 Casca is spelled Caska in the First Folio. Daniell follows this in his Arden edition. I 
have adopted the original Roman spelling.  
9 This Brutus features in Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece (1594). In a scene 
anticipating Julius Caesar, the people revolt following the display of Lucrece’s body 
in the Roman forum. (Lines 1734-5 are amongst many that bear comparison with the 
play (see JC, 3.2.175-6)). The poem contains one of the few Shakespearean uses of 
the word ‘testament’: ‘My stained blood to TARQUIN I’ll bequeath, / … / …as his 
due writ in my testament’ (1181-3). (Katherine Duncan-Jones and H. R. 
Woudhuysen eds, Shakespeare’s Poems, The Arden Shakespeare, third series 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2007).) 
 10 The Description of England (London: 1577), III.4. 
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Calvin, ‘anything in profane men appearing praiseworthy must be considered 
worthless’.11 (Compare Henry V’s ‘if it be a sin to covet honour’ (H5, 4.3.28)). By 
the same token, Brutus offends the ethos of the early modern neo-Stoics, for as 
Guillaume DuVair wrote in 1598, we should not look to others to honour us since 
that ‘doth no way depend of our willes’.12 The neo-Stoics were reacting to the 
commonplace notion that honour is the ‘reward due to virtuous action’.13 Brutus 
resorts to the commonplace when he purports to honour Caesar because he was 
‘valiant’ (3.2.25-6). 
Brutus demands that the ‘base’ plebeians should ‘honour’ him because of his 
superior status. Instead of demanding ‘Believe me for mine honour’ (3.2.14-15), he 
might have fared better if he had said ‘Honour me for mine acts’, or better still to 
have left his honour out of it. Antony, takes a very different approach. He 
commences his address to the plebeians with ‘humble talk to win their good wils’.14 
Shakespeare has Brutus speak in prose and Antony in verse. In a play that is only 
five per cent verse, this is clearly a considered choice. At first sight, prose might 
seem to enhance Brutus’s credibility with the commoners given Shakespeare’s 
known practice of allocating prose to lower status speakers, but Brutus’s prose 
                                               
11 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), Thomas Norton trans 
(London: Wolfe & Harisson, 1561), II.3.4. See R. M. Frye, Shakespeare and 
Christian Doctrine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 183. 
12 Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks (c.1585), Thomas James trans (London: Thomas 
Man, 1598), 47. 
13 Norman Council, When Honour’s at the Stake: Ideas of Honour in Shakespeare’s 
Plays (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), 12.  
14 Wilson, Rhetorique, 100. 
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speech gives no sense that he has the common touch. Instead, his prosaic style makes 
Brutus seem cold.  It confirms the perception that Brutus is employing rhetoric ‘by 
the book’, with its calculated logic and formal schemes (isocolon, parison, antithesis 
and chiasmus all figure prominently).15 Mark Antony’s more naturalistic verse 
speech achieves the early modern rhetorical ideal of hiding the art and it serves to 
emphasize the essential humanity that connects him to Caesar and the citizens.16 
Shakespeare has Brutus fall into the trap of promoting a coup by the nobility, leaving 
the way clear for Antony to feed, and to feed off, the forces of popular uprising.17 
Antony succeeds because he wields the popular will, and at the conclusion of his 
forum speech he wields it tangibly in the form of Caesar’s sealed testament. The 
assassins had manifested their bloody hands and stained swords. Antony brandishes 
the will marked red with Caesar’s seal.18 Antony tantalizes the citizens with talk of 
their legacy under it: ‘Let but the commons hear this testament - / Which, pardon me, 
I do not mean to read’ (3.2.131-2). This rhetorical device of paralepsis or 
praeteritio, a species of irony, serves to increase interest in the very thing that is 
                                               
15 R. W. Zandvoort, ‘Brutus’s Forum Speech in Julius Cæsar’, Review of English 
Studies 61 (1940), 62-66. A compact example of chiasmus is ‘Censure…your 
senses’ (3.2.16-17) 
16 Brian Vickers, ‘Shakespeare’s Use of Rhetoric’, in A Reader in the Language of 
Shakespearean Drama, Vivian Salmon and Edwina Burness eds (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamin, 1987), 398. 
17 On rebellion of the nobility, see the discussion of the ‘Essex Rebellion’ in Chapter 
Two. 
18	On the significance of bloody napkins and Caesar’s bloody toga, see Chapter Six 
[of Acts of Will].	
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purportedly downplayed. In Thomas North’s 1579 translation of Plutarch’s Lives, 
Antonius reveals the content of Caesar’s will before he reveals Caesar’s bloody 
mantle.19 In Shakespeare’s drama, suspense is sustained. The mantle is examined, 
the corpse is disclosed (an event not recorded in Plutarch) and only at the last, when 
the citizens have been stoked to mutinous fervour, does Antony restrain them just 
long enough for them to hear the terms of the will: ‘To every Roman citizen he 
gives, / To every several man, seventy-five drachmas. /… / Moreover, he hath left 
you all his walks, / His private arbours and new-planted orchards’ (3.2.234-239).20 
This is a popular will indeed.  
The unveiling of Caesar’s corpse relates to ‘the play’s interest in vesting and 
divesting of power’.21 Equally potent is the unfolding of the will, especially in the 
way it speaks to key socio-political concerns of early modern England, for it reveals 
the commoners’ vested interest in public discourse and public spaces (including their 
interest in the public forum) which had hitherto been the preserve of a privileged 
elite. The outcome of Antony’s oratory in Shakespeare’s play is the same as in 
North’s Plutarch: ‘his words moved the common people to compassion’ and they 
                                               
19 Shakespeare’s main ‘source’ for Roman history was Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble 
Grecians and Romans, Thomas North trans (1579); references are to Walter W. 
Skeat, ed (London: Macmillan and Co., 1875). 
20 On Caesar’s ‘transmutation of private land into public spaces’, see Michael 
Mangan, ‘‘I am no orator’: the language of public spaces’ in Longman Critical 
Essays: Julius Caesar, Linda Cookson and Bryan Loughrey eds (Harlow: Longman, 
1992), 66-77, 77. 
21 ‘‘A Savage Spectacle’: reproducing Caesar’, in Cookson and Loughrey, ‘Essays’, 
ibid., 17-26, 24. 
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‘fell presently into such a rage and mutiny, that there was no more order kept 
amongst the common people’.22 Like Bolingbroke in Richard II, Antony opens a 
‘purple testament’ of blood.  Crucially, though, and in true Elizabethan style, there is 
no outright rejection of monarchy.  Indeed, one of the plebeians responds to the 
reading of the will with the exclamation ‘O royal Caesar!’ (3.2.237). The word 
‘royal’ appears in only one other place in the play: in Antony’s description of Caesar 
spoken by Antony’s servant at the scene of the assassination (3.1.127). 
What action might suit Antony’s most famous phrase ‘Friends, Romans, 
countrymen, lend me your ears’? The first action, especially important in a rhetorical 
performance, is to assume an appropriate posture and demeanour. Before he spoke a 
word, Ray Fearon’s Antony (Gregory Doran, RSC, 2012) commenced with a 
suitably humble downwards countenance and slightly stooped stance. What next? 
Should the actor stand still or walk? What gesture should accompany the spoken 
words? Should the actor gesture with his hands? The action should be something 
suitable to the logical sense of the line, but the action (or inaction) accompanying the 
exordium of an oration should also be suitable as an introduction to the themes of the 
speech as a whole. The appropriate choice will vary according to the medium. The 
close confines of the Elizabethan theatre and Shakespeare’s references to ‘pulpit’ 
and ‘coffin’ suggest the intimacy of a church funeral service. Gestures might be 
correspondingly contained. In cinematic renditions, the dynamics can be quite 
different. Marlon Brando’s Antony spoke from the rostra in the noisy forum and had 
to shout down the clamour with ‘lend me your ears’ (Mankiewicz, MGM, 1953). 
Charlton Heston’s Antony (Burge, Commonwealth United Entertainment, 1970) 
shifted in the forum scene between public oration and private conversation and his 
                                               
22 North, Plutarch: Brutus, §15. 
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attempt to integrate these contrasting approaches perhaps comes across as a 
somewhat precarious balancing act. Don Kraemer supposes that in the forum scene 
Antony ‘deploys rhetorical strategies perfected by Demosthenes’.23 Demosthenes 
was one of the great orators of ancient Greece. The Vatican Museum in Rome 
contains a statue of the man that is missing its hands and which therefore stands as a 
symbol of the harm that is done to rhetoric by the removal of manual gesture. 
Rhetoric is too frequently regarded within the academic’s study as if it were only 
concerned with the short journey from brain to mouth and back again. A full 
appreciation of rhetoric’s true capacity to touch us and to move us requires us to 
attend to the whole body. That effort should include attention to the hands.24 Peter 
Ure summarized the forum speech in Julius Caesar in terms that merit repetition: 
 
The speeches are deeds done, in a society which is shown as moving and 
being moved primarily by the power of words, or, rather, by the arts of the 
orator, words accompanied by the proper and revealing gestures...with words 
men strike through each others’ armour and at each others’ wills25 
 
                                               
23 Don J. Kraemer Jr, ‘‘Alas, thou hast misconstrued every thing’: Amplifying 
Words and Things in Julius Caesar’, Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of 
Rhetoric, 9.2 (1991), 165-178, 166. 
24 See, further, Peter Goodrich, ‘The Missing Hand of the Law’, in Legal Emblems 
and the Art of Law: Obiter Depicta as the Vision of Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 
2013), ch.6. 
25 Peter Ure, Julius Caesar: A Casebook (London: Macmillan, 1969), Introduction, 
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Even when rhetoric is described as an art of speech, it is inevitably concerned with 
handling matter, and is frequently described using ‘manual’ terminology. Consider 
the opening paragraph of Thomas Wilson’s treatise: 
 
Rhetorique is an Arte to set foorth by vtteraunce of words, matter at large, or 
(as Cicero doth say) it is a learned, or rather an artificiall declaration of the 
mynd, in the handling of any cause, called in contention, that may through 
reason largely be discussed. 
 
For good or ill, rhetoric is an art of ‘handling’ or manipulation, and in this play 
Antony is the arch manipulator.26 Shakespeare has Antony manipulate the playgoers 
through props and gesture and through his feel for verse. Antony even uses Caesar’s 
corpse as a prop in his rhetorical performance and thinks of his ally Lepidus merely 
‘as a property’ (4.1.40). Casca is the conspirators’ counterpart to Antony when it 
comes to active exploitation of stage properties. Casca was the first assassin to stab 
Caesar and he was the only Roman to draw a weapon before the assassination.27 He 
enters Scene 1.3 with his sword drawn after an encounter with a lion and in another 
he points his sword to the sun (2.1.105). In the same scene, he indicates a 
correspondence between the physical Capitol and Caesar’s lofty status, at which 
moment it would be appropriate to point to the lords’ rooms or to the gallery 
(‘balcony’) aloft the stage (2.1.106-110). It is in Casca’s words as he stabs Caesar 
                                               
26 Harry Keyishian, The Shapes of Revenge: Victimization, Vengeance, and 
Vindictiveness in Shakespeare (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995), 87. 
27 Robert Hapgood, ‘Speak Hands for Me: Gesture as Language in Julius Caesar’, 
Drama Survey, 5 (1966), 162-70, 164.  
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that Shakespeare most clearly shows his appreciation of the expressive power of 
gesture: ‘Speak hands for me!’ (3.1.76).28 
‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’. As an experiment, let me 
invite you, the reader, to deliver Antony’s famous line. For this you will need to 
stand up and put the book down. Or the book could be held in the left hand to 
replicate in a small degree the way that the Roman toga weighed down the left arm 
and restricted its movement.29 Consider how you will vocalize Antony’s line and 
what actions you will use to accompany the words, bearing in mind that an over-
literal correspondence between word and action might not be the best choice. A 
discerning actor or director might choose to generate dramatic interest by 
deliberately resisting or disrupting the most obvious correspondence between word 
and deed.  That point can be illustrated with the line ‘Something is rotten in the state 
of Denmark’ (1.4.90). How would Hamlet ‘suit the action to the word’ (3.2.17)? 
Perfectly correspondent action might prompt the actor to walk across the stage and to 
stop on the word ‘state’ in order to emphasize that word’s static connotations, but the 
better choice might be the opposite one of starting in a static position and to 
commence walking on the word ‘state’ in order to emphasize the expressed sense 
that the State is rotten. To take another example involving the word ‘state’, it seems 
suitable that Mark Antony’s servant should, like Caesar’s static corpse, lie prostrate 
at the feet of the conspirators when he refers to ‘hazards of this untrod state’ 
                                               
28 See J. R. Mulryne, ‘Speak hands for me: image and action in Julius Caesar’, in 
Shakespeare et le corps à la Renaissance (Société Française Shakespeare Actes du 
congrès 1990) (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991), 101–12.  
29 On the toga, see Jonathan Edmondson and Alison Keith eds, Roman Dress and the 
Fabrics of Roman Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 
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(3.1.136). Clearly there is no single right answer to such performative choices, but 
deeper attention to Shakespeare’s words in their context will expand the choices and 
improve the chances of choosing something more suitable. Before we conjecture a 
suitable action for Antony’s famous opening line, we should bear in mind Harley 
Granville-Barker’s belief that Shakespeare’s verse was his chief means of emotional 
expression and that ‘when it comes to staging the plays, the speaking of the verse 
must be the foundation of all study’.30 This suggests that one gestural option is to be 
guided by the metre of ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’, by which 
I mean its syllabic structure. (Seymour Chatman writes that that ‘[t]he only 
important question for metrics is ‘How many syllables are there?’’)31 We can see 
that Antony’s line is arranged into two distinct syllabic groups: the first six syllables 
followed by the final four. The ‘end’ sound in the first and seventh syllables marks 
the start of each of the two syllabic groups. The striking structural pattern of the first 
six syllables resides in the swelling sequence of one syllable, two syllables and three 
syllables. I am not the first person to notice this,32 and at least one editor has noticed 
that the gradation of the syllabic groups from smallest to largest is suited to the 
expanding sense of the sequence ‘friends’ to ‘Romans’ to ‘countrymen’.33 Antony’s 
intimate style makes one think when he talks of ‘Romans’ that he is referring not to 
                                               
30 Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare (London: Batsford, 1930), 12. 
31 A Theory of Meter (London: Mouton & Co, 1964), 39; quoted in George T. 
Wright, Shakespeare’s Metrical Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
150. 
32 Jean Fuzier, ‘Rhetoric versus Rhetoric: A Study of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, 
Act lll, Scene 2.’ Cahiers Élisabéthains 5 (1974), 25-65, 48. 
33 Daniell, Julius Caesar, 257n. 
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the whole Roman Empire, but to the people of Rome to whom he is directly 
speaking. Thus ‘Friends’ is the smallest and nearest group; ‘Romans’ is a bigger 
group suggestive of the ambit of the whole city; and ‘countrymen’ denotes the 
largest group and the ambit of the entire country. The first three words therefore 
produce ‘a special and subtle case’ of ‘ascending tricolon’.34 What makes it special 
is that Antony achieves a kind of expanding emphasis without any actual ascent. The 
expansion is horizontal, not vertical. The three opening words are ‘on the level’ and 
this is because Antony is ‘appealing to his crowd on a human level’.35 What has not 
been noted before is how this expansive effect corresponds with the expansive sense 
of the word ‘ambition’, which is a key word in Brutus’s complaint and Antony’s 
response, and how the four syllables of the second part of Antony’s line reverse the 
expansive effect of the first six syllables by turning expansion into intimacy. Before 
elaborating this, it should be noted that the spatial sense of Antony’s address might 
have been more obviously apparent to an Elizabethan audience than it is to us, for 
Shakespeare’s playgoers would have been attuned to hearing ‘Rome’ pronounced 
                                               
34 Sam Leith, You Talkin’ to Me: Rhetoric from Aristotle to Obama (London: Profile 
Books, 2011), 49. 
35 Ibid., 50. 
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‘room’,36 hence the pun ‘Now is it Rome indeed, and room enough’ (1.2.155)).37 
One wonders if Thomas Wilson’s advice on opening an oration was echoing in 
Shakespeare’s head: ‘by no meanes better shall the standers by knowe what we say, 
and carie awaie that which they heare, then if at the first we couch together, the 
whole course of our tale in as small roome as we can’.38 It is certainly significant that 
Antony’s soliloquy over the corpse of Caesar in the previous scene had primed the 
playgoers to associate the dead Caesar with spatial confinement rather than 
expansive ambition. Antony had invited the association through his use of the 
rhetorical figure of asyndeton (the contraction of speech through the omission of 
conjunctions): ‘Are all thy conquests, glories, triumphs, spoils, / Shrunk to this little 
measure?’ (3.1.149-150). 
Before deciding on the gesture that will accompany Antony’s first line (and 
let me stress again that there are almost as many valid alternatives as there are 
actors), it is not enough to note significant metrical patterns. It is also necessary to 
appreciate the verse metre in the context of the whole speech, and this requires us to 
relate the syllabic structure to the argument that Antony employs to oppose Brutus’s 
claims. Brutus presents two key justifications for his actions. First, that Caesar was 
                                               
36 Fausto Cercignani’s Shakespeare Works and Elizabethan Pronunciation (Oxford: 
OUP, 1981), 184-5. Shakespeare rhymes ‘Rome’ with ‘doom’ (Luc, 715-17, 1849-
51) and he puns ‘Rome’ and ‘Roam’ (1H6, 3.1.51), so it is possible that ‘room’, 
Rome’ and ‘roam’ were homonyms or that pronunciation of Rome was in flux and 
beginning to acquire its modern sound (see Helge Kökeritz, Shakespeare’s 
Pronunciation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 141-2). 
37 And possibly, also, 3.1.289; 3.2.164-5; 4.3.39. 
38 Wilson, Rhetorique, 100-101. 
	 156	
ambitious and for that reason deserved to die. Second, that he (Brutus) is honourable 
and for that reason deserves to be respected. Antony’s opening line of speech is his 
initial effort to undermine the first of Brutus’s claims. The line swells physically as 
ambition does – one syllable, two syllables, three syllables; and it swells 
conceptually as ambition does – from friends, to Rome, to the whole Country. An 
atmosphere of ambition having been thus established, it is swiftly undone by the two 
short pairs of syllables that express the friendly intimacy of ‘lend me your ears’. The 
spatial contraction is confirmed by Antony’s metonymic use of the small organ of 
the ‘ear’ to represent the hearers’ whole attention and perhaps (synecdochally) their 
whole selves. Let us ask the question again: what gestural action might accompany 
Antony’s line? Is there anything more suitable than to start with one’s hands held 
close to one’s chest; to open them out a little on the monosyllabic ‘friends’; to open 
them wider on the two syllables of ‘Romans’; to open them to their full lateral extent 
on the three syllables of ‘Countrymen’; and, finally, to draw the hands in again to the 
heart with the words ‘lend me your ears’? As the ambit of Antony’s arms and the 
sense of his words swell wider and wider, his initial gesture might seem to suggest 
that he is ambitious and thereby lend support (by reason of Antony’s association 
with Caesar) to Brutus’s argument that Caesar was ambitious, but when Antony’s 
arms are drawn in again to the heart, the sense of ambition is replaced by a sense of 
humility and intimacy. The cumulative gestural effect of the outward expanse of the 
first six syllables and the inward gathering of the last four is to produce the action of 
an embrace.39 The overall effect is that Antony’s opening line preemptively answers 
                                               
39 Even without referring to physical gesture or to the final four syllables, Lynette 
Hunter sees in the first six syllables something ‘like a widening arc embracing the 
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with a subconscious ‘no’ a question that he will posit later in his speech: ‘Was this 
ambition?’ (3.2.98). 
Building on the syllabic subtleties of the opening line, Shakespeare goes on 
to employ the verse metre throughout Antony’s opening passage of his forum speech 
to produce an embodied effect that will confirm the playgoers’ subconscious 
rejection of the charge of ambition. The effect I am referring to derives from 
Shakespeare’s ingenious use of short lines every time the word ‘ambitious’ appears. 
Julius Caesar is ‘a play notable for its experiments with short lines’,40 but 
Shakespeare’s inventiveness with Antony’s ‘ambitious’ lines has hitherto been 
overlooked. Shakespeare’s Antony’s thirty-four lines of speech from ‘Friends, 
Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’ to ‘And I must pause till it come back to 
me’ are mostly of ten syllables in length and many, including the last line, can bear a 
regular iambic stress. Only five of the thirty-four lines are missing a syllable and 
each of those hypometrical lines ends with the word ‘ambitious’.41 In what follows I 
want to explore the potential significance of this fact, but first I need to defend the 
‘fact’ against editors who have suggested that the ‘ambitious’ lines should be filled 
out to ten syllables by stressing the word ‘ambitious’ tetra-syllabically (am-bish-ee-
                                               
audience’ (‘Persuasion’, in Reading Shakespeare’s Dramatic Language: A Guide 
(London: Arden Shakespeare, 2001), 113-129, 125). 
40 Wright, Metrical Art, 109. Carol Marks Sicherman argues that in this play 
‘Shakespeare wrote short lines with deliberate thought’ (‘Short Lines and 
Interpretation: The Case of Julius Caesar’, Shakespeare Quarterly 35(2) (1984), 
180-195, 181.) 
41 For this observation I am indebted to my sometime workshop colleague, the RSC 
actor Keith Osborn. 
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ush).42 I can’t recall an example of an actor adopting that practice and it would 
surely sound highly artificial and pompous if any did. It is possible that in the 
original Elizabethan pronunciation the word was sometimes pronounced with four-
syllables, but Shakespeare’s other plays supply example after example to indicate 
that if ‘ambitious’ is pronounced strictly within the metre it will be pronounced tri-
syllabically.43  In Julius Caesar, the only use of ‘ambitious’ outside the forum scene 
is in Casca’s line  ‘Th’ambitious ocean swell, and rage, and foam’ (1.3.7). This line 
is ambiguous as to syllabic length, but the contraction ‘Th’ambitious’ might imply 
that the line has been deliberately shortened to bring it within the standard 
pentameter. If so, ‘ambitious’ would be tri-syllabic. A further clue to the fact that 
Shakespeare intended to make the ‘ambitious’ lines in the forum scene seem short 
compared to their neighbours is the fact that there are only three over-length 
(‘hypermetrical’) lines in this whole passage of speech and two of these come 
immediately before an ‘ambitious’ line. This alerts us to the fact that something 
unusual is at work in the metre. The first line concluding with the word ‘ambitious’ 
is immediately preceded by a twelve-syllable line; which is the longest line in the 
entire passage. Another ‘ambitious’ line is preceded by an eleven-syllable line. This 
combines with the missing syllable in the ‘ambitious’ lines to exaggerate the 
discomforting sense that something is lacking in those lines. 
Whatever the original pronunciation might have been, it is clear that a 
modern actor should pronounce ‘ambitious’ tri-syllabically. Tri-syllabic 
                                               
42 E.g. Cedric Watts, Julius Caesar (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1992), 118 n.85); 
Daniell, Julius Caesar, 257 n.79). 
43 To cite just three examples of ‘ambitious’ appearing in strongly metrical passages: 
Cor, 4.5.113; 3H6, 2.2.19, 3.3.27. 
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pronunciation produces an under-length (‘hypometrical’) line that engenders an 
embodied sense that is directly contrary to the literal sense of the word ‘ambitious’. 
To be ambitious is to seek a wider and larger ambit of power and influence, but in 
Antony’s speech the lines ending ‘ambitious’ are the most humble lines of all in 
terms of syllabic extent. As a result, those lines ring false. The missing syllable also 
gives the audience space in which to connect their embodied sense of disquiet with 
Brutus’s claim that Caesar was ambitious. The pause gives just enough time to sense 
that Brutus was lying. The doubt is felt limbically before it is thought logically, by 
which I mean that the doubt flows primarily from an embodied sense of lack. This 
turns satisfaction into dissatisfaction. The poetic strictures of metrical verse are in 
some sense artificial, but one cannot be reminded too often that the rhythmic quality 
of poetic metre has a natural appeal almost in spite of the art. Part of its appeal is the 
fact that the two syllables of a metrical ‘foot’ echo the beating of the human heart. 
This is true of all disyllabic metrical feet, but the iambic foot has a special resonance. 
The cardiac cycle produces a number of sounds, but the human ear can detect two 
dominant beats; the so-called ‘lub-dub’ pairing. This sound is comparable to the 
iambic foot of an unstressed syllable followed by a stressed. Antony stokes the 
citizens’ subconscious unease by setting up a natural rhythmic expectation through 
regular iambic pentameter only to snatch it away in the repeated hypometrical 
‘ambitious’ lines. Alongside this subconscious sense he strikes his hearers’ 
conscious sense with express doubts concerning Brutus’s claim: ‘Did this in Caesar 
seem ambitious?’; ‘Ambition should be made of sterner stuff’; ‘Was this ambition?’ 
(3.2.91, 93, 98). For good measure he even reminds them, again repeatedly, that 
Caesar’s ambition is not a fact but something that Brutus ‘says’ and ‘Hath told’ 
(3.2.87; 79). 
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Shakespeare’s excellence as a poet is to a great extent an excellence in 
knowing how to manage the embodied feel of words. Perhaps Shakespeare is 
advertising his own poetic awareness when he has Cassius say to Brutus ‘…what 
should be in that ‘Caesar’? / Why should that name be sounded more than yours? / 
… / Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well. / Weigh them, it is as heavy:…’ 
(1.2.141-145), and yet he might also be presenting Cassius as one who can only 
appreciate words instrumentally; politically rather than poetically. Caesar voiced this 
suspicion when he called Cassius ‘a great observer’ who ‘looks / Quite through the 
deeds of men’ and ‘loves no plays’ (1.2.201-202). If there is a part of Shakespeare in 
Cassius, it is the part of the pragmatic businessman and not the poet’s part. Brutus is 
the only one of the conspirators who makes express reference to ‘business’ – notably 
in reference to the conspirators’ ‘bleeding business’ (3.1.168), which he also terms 
their ‘ventures’ (4.3.222) – but it is Cassius who moved the ‘bargain’ (1.3.120) and 
‘enterprise’ (1.2.297; 1.3.123; 3.1.13,16) of Caesar’s assassination. Eventually the 
private bargain will take Cassius to the tent of Brutus where the pair haggle on the 
theme of hands itching for gold (4.3.10-11). The mercantile scene can be appreciated 
as a potted version of The Merchant of Venice, in which Cassius plays the part of 
Antonio: beginning ‘a-weary of the world’, then bearing his naked breast to a 
dagger, and finally (having failed to transfer gold) announcing ‘I…will give my 
heart’ (4.3.94-103). 
At the assassination, we hear the dispassionate tone of the ‘great observer’ in 
Cassius’s metatheatrical musings: ‘How many ages hence / Shall this our lofty scene 
be acted over / In states unborn and accents yet unknown?’ (3.1.111-113).44 Cassius 
                                               
44 Shakespeare may be alluding to future theatrical performances of Caesar’s fall or 
alluding more generally to political assassinations. See Cedric Watts, ‘Julius Caesar, 
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is the dramaturge of the conspirators’ performance. He is not only a ‘great observer’ 
of the political scene, but also one who assembles others to act as witnesses 
(‘Messala: / Be thou my witness that against my will / …am I compelled’ (5.1.72-
4)). He also has a dramatist’s instinct to know that Brutus should not permit Antony 
to take the stage in Caesar’s funeral. Cassius chooses Brutus to direct and star in the 
conspiracy because he can be relied upon to draw a favourable audience. The fact 
that Brutus ‘sits high in all the people’s hearts’ (1.3.157) was a feature calculated to 
enhance the ‘lofty’ nature of the assassination. Brutus’s chief mistake is that he plays 
the part too well and depends too much on his high status when he demands ‘respect 
to mine honour’ (3.2.15) and rests his credit on it (‘Believe me for mine honour’ 
(3.2.14-15)). As a strategy to enhance the ethos of his rhetoric, it backfires horribly. 
Antony not only casts doubt upon the honour of Brutus, but he also employs every 
aspect of his performance to subvert Brutus’s founding assumption that honour is 
indeed a virtue. What if honour could be characterized as haughtiness? Brutus’s 
confession that he ‘rose’ against Caesar (3.2.20), and the assertion of his status as a 
highborn patrician, would then serve to distance himself from the sympathy of the 
plebeians. In the assassination scene, Brutus and each of his fellow conspirators 
literally ‘rises’ from a kneeling position to stab Caesar.45 Ray Fearon, playing 
Antony in Gregory Doran’s Stratford production (RSC, 2012), accompanied his first 
                                               
III.1.111-113’ in Cookson and Loughrey, ‘Essays’, 48-55, 54. On the continuing 
political relevance of the play, see John Drakakis, ‘Fashion it thus’: Julius Caesar 
and the Politics of Theatrical Representation’, Shakespeare Survey: Shakespeare and 
Politics 44 (1991), 65-74. 
45 John Russell Brown, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Style (London: Heinemann, 1970), 
119. 
	 162	
‘Brutus is an honourable man’ with a suitable upwards gesture that was effective in 
emphasising Brutus’s remoteness and haughtiness. Keith Michell’s Antony (BBC 
1979) made a similar upwards gesture, followed swiftly by a downwards gesture to 
the corpse on the words ‘in Caesar’s funeral’. Shakespeare almost certainly knew 
Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique, but he needed no manual to tell him the strategy of 
judicial rhetoric by which ‘We shall get fauour by speaking of our aduersaries…if 
we report vnto the Iudges that they beare themselues hault.’46 
There is no virtue in altitude, but it is a cultural and rhetorical commonplace 
to regard ‘up’ as good and ‘down’ as bad. As a rule of language it seems inviolable. 
We can no longer hear ‘superior’ as a value-neutral term. Heaven is up, hell is down; 
the highborn are the social betters of the base born; things are looking up when they 
improve and there is a downturn when they worsen. Shakespeare’s greatest 
rhetorical achievement through the course of Mark Antony’s funeral oration is to 
turn this rhetorical and cultural commonplace on its head. Antony is a pragmatist and 
only takes the revolutionary route because Brutus insists so strongly upon the honour 
associated with his high social status. Antony’s tactic in defeating Brutus’s claim to 
honour is not to contradict Brutus, but instead to emphasize honour’s haughty, 
hierarchical aspect and the contrasting merits of a lowly position. We can see this 
technique in operation at every turn of his oration, starting with his rhetorical 
commonplace ‘The good is oft interred’ (3.2.77). The dead are down but Antony 
sees their physically inferior status as a basis for dignity, not disgrace. Antony lays 
the body of Caesar on the floor of the forum, at the level of the common people and 
                                               
46 Wilson, Rhetorique, 102 (‘hault’ means ‘haughty’, compare ‘haught’: R2, 
4.1.254). 
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below the level of the ‘pulpit’ (Shakespeare’s version of the Roman ‘rostra’).47 In 
contrast, Brutus sets himself up. Not for the usual fall, but for the failure of being too 
far exalted above the plebeians. Even before he utters a word, Brutus physically 
distances himself from the people by taking the high ground of the pulpit. Antony 
will succeed if his oration can amplify the perceived distance between the humble 
level of the citizens and the high level of Brutus and the honourable patricians. I do 
not agree with Ernest Schanzer’s suggestion that Brutus’s refusal to lower his speech 
to the level of the plebeians is a ‘compliment to their intelligence’;48 it is rather a 
sign of Brutus’s arrogance. So too is Brutus’s self-referential style, with its oft-
repeated ‘I’, Brutus’, ‘Me’, ‘Myself’ and ‘Mine’.49 
The cue for Brutus’s forum speech, spoken by one of the citizens, contains 
clues to three flaws in Brutus’s rhetoric. The single line ‘The noble Brutus is 
ascended. Silence.’ (3.2.11) confirms that Brutus is known for his high social status, 
that he takes the high ground (assumes superiority) and that he will not allow the 
people free expression. So it proves as his main passage of speech ensues. It begins 
                                               
47 Hodges portrays the pulpit (rostra) as ‘a firmly-built structure of commanding 
height’. It is a platform erected against the centre of the frons and accessed by a 
flight of stairs leading up from the stage. The usual ‘state’ structure (of dias and 
throne) is used to represent Caesar’s chair of State in the Senate (C. Walter Hodges, 
Enter The Whole Army: A Pictorial Study of Shakespearean Staging 1576-1616 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999). 42-48). 
48 Ernest Schanzer, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1963), 48. 
49 Garry Wills, Rome and Rhetoric: Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2011), 54-7. 
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with a repeated demand for silent audience: ‘Be patient till the last’… ‘hear me’ … 
‘be silent, that you may hear’ (3.2.12-14). The last line – ‘I pause for a reply’ 
(3.2.33-4) – pretends to open an opportunity for critical response, but it is 
unconvincing and no citizen feels free to speak. Brutus puts the plebeians firmly in 
their inferior place. He asks ‘Who is here so base, that would be a bondman?...so 
rude, that would not be a Roman?…here so vile, that will not love his country?’ 
(3.2.29-34). Brutus is in no doubt that the commoners are base, vile and rude; he 
only questions the degree of their ignobility. As Brutus asks these questions he 
employs the formal rhetorical ornament of alliteration ‘base / bondman’, ‘rude / 
Roman’ and, more subtly, ‘vile / love’, so that his audience will be in no doubt that 
these are rhetorical questions. As such, they admit no response. Schanzer was 
mistaken to suppose that Brutus was ‘skilful’ when he ‘blocked all further 
questions’.50 Foreclosing questions might seem a good technique for winning minds 
in a logical debate, but it is no way to win hearts in a rhetorical endeavour. Brutus’s 
rhetorical questions are reminiscent of Thomas Wilson’s: ‘what man I pray you, 
being better able to maintaine himself by valiaunt courage, then by living in base 
subjection, would not rather looke to rule like a Lord, then to liue like an 
vnderling…?’51 At first sight, Brutus appears to urge the people to something more 
than base subjection, but in fact he has no intention that they should ‘rule like a 
lord’. By naming their inferior status he keeps them down and persuades them, in 
Wilson’s words, ‘not to seeke anye higher roume’.52 Brutus employs rhetoric not to 
change the social settlement, but to confirm the existing order. The question of the 
                                               
50 Schanzer, Problem Plays, 48.  
51 Wilson, Rhetorique, Preface. 
52 Ibid. 
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rights and wrongs of Caesar’s assassination was a standard one in the rhetorical 
exercise of controversia (debates) and specifically in the exercise of argumentum in 
utramque partem (‘argument on both sides’) in the Elizabethan school curriculum, 
but Brutus attempts to silence even that question and to take it out of the hands of the 
common people. He informs them that the debate has already been carried out, fully 
documented and securely filed in the archives on the Capitoline hill: ‘The question 
of his death is enrolled in the Capitol’ (3.2.37-8). Brutus thus forecloses the school 
exercise of controversia by attempting to replace it with a rhetorical set speech or 
suasorium. Yet the very formality of Brutus’s approach removes the sweetness that 
should give a suasorium its defining persuasive quality. 
Having established a great distance of social status between his highborn 
honour and the citizens’ lowborn baseness, Brutus will have done Antony’s work for 
him if Antony can demonstrate either that elevation is bad or that lowliness is good. 
He does both by all manner of rhetorical means – verbal, gestural and spatial. As 
Antony’s ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’ commenced his assault 
on the argument of Caesar’s ambition, so his line ‘The good is oft interred with their 
bones. / So let it be with Caesar’ (3.2.77-8) begins his revolutionary endeavour to 
show that the virtue of goodness might be found below rather than above. Antony’s 
servant had already signaled his master’s intent when, in the preceding scene, he had 
performed a gestural gradatio by kneeling, then falling down and finally prostrating 
himself before the assassins (3.1.123-5). When Antony contrasts the goodness of the 
dead Caesar with the evil of the living (‘The evil that men do lives after them’ 
(3.2.76)) he is alluding to the living Brutus. This is apparent from Antony’s 
palindromic ‘evil lives’ (evillive), which turns Brutus’s own palindromic pairing of 
‘vile’ and ‘live’ (vilevil) back against him. This correspondence will only be sensed 
on a subconscious level, but it is all the more powerful for that. Shakespeare ‘was a 
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very great psychologist’.53 Having confirmed that Caesar is down at the level of the 
commoners and that Brutus is up, Antony continues to the key point of his rhetorical 
strategy which is to contrast his own status with that of the noble Brutus. Antony 
locates himself in the same lowly position as Caesar, the plebeians and ‘the good’. 
The first line to do this is ‘Here, under leave of Brutus and the rest’ (3.2.82). ‘Here’ 
awakens the hearers’ spatial awareness, so that when Antony announces that he 
speaks ‘under’ leave of Brutus, it will produce the sense that he is positioned down 
with the people. It will also confirm Brutus in the contrasting position of being up 
with the conspirators, both in terms of social status and (to anyone with an awareness 
of the topography of Rome) physically up on one of hills adjacent to the forum: most 
likely the Capitoline or the patricians’ favourite, the Palatine. Antony confirms his 
own lowly position by locating himself ‘in’ Caesar’s funeral (3.2.85), just as he will 
shortly locate his heart ‘in’ Caesar’s coffin (3.2.107). The eleven syllables of the line 
‘My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar’ produce an embodied metrical sense of 
surfeit to match the logical sense of a coffin crowded with one heart too many. So 
far, there is nothing in Antony’s oration that Brutus would have objected to it if he 
had stayed to hear it. Antony even continues, in his next lines, to amplify the high 
honourable status of Brutus and his faction: ‘For Brutus is an honourable man; / So 
are they all, all honourable men’ (3.2.83-84). This elevation of Brutus is done, as we 
now know, so that Antony can locate himself in the contrasting place of being down 
with Caesar and the people. The subsequent line – ‘He was my friend, faithful and 
just to me’ (3.2.86) – in large part fulfills the hope of creating fellowship between 
                                               
53 L. C. Knights, Further Explorations: Essays in Criticism (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1965), 42. 
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Antony, Caesar and the people which Antony had begun to advance with the very 
first word of his speech, ‘Friends’.  
In Chapter Two, we observed how Richard II and King John employed 
structural features of the theatre to upset normal expectations of social status. In 
Richard II, the king descends from his castle wall into the lower court and the next 
time we hear of high walls they are populated with the citizenry of London looking 
down on the deposed king. In King John, the play begins with the king on his throne 
looking down in judgment on two of his subjects, but soon he will be one of two 
kings subjected to the judgment of citizens located on the high walls of Angiers. In 
Julius Caesar, Shakespeare again employs the physical hierarchies of the stage to 
symbolic effect, but whereas the early histories for the most part employed the 
simple medieval semaphore of higher as better and lower as worse, the more mature 
artist of 1599 does something more sophisticated. (He does so not only in Julius 
Caesar, but also in the near-contemporary Hamlet, where the ghost of the king 
descends to the cellarage below the level of the stage.) Through careful coordination 
of staging, word and action in Julius Caesar, and in the forum scene in particular, 
Shakespeare succeeds in turning the traditional rules of the rhetoric manual upside 
down. He performs a hierarchical inversion befitting a Rome in which ‘Graves have 
yawn’d and yielded up their dead’ (2.2.18). Julius Caesar is similar to King John in 
the way it employs physical stage hierarchy to constitute the commons as judge, but 
in Julius Caesar the revolutionary innovation is to place the commons-as-judge 
physically below the level of Brutus, who is – at his own invitation (3.2.16-18) – the 
subject of their judgment. Shakespeare’s decision to place judgment at the ground 
level of the commoners rather than raise the commoners up to the high place of the 
battlements or rooftops was as revolutionary in the monarchical State of early 
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modern England as it was in the republic of Rome. It is revolutionary because it is 
fundamentally democratic.  
The dramatic inversion that Shakespeare achieves in the forum is energized 
by the fall of Caesar. The first three Acts employ the classic tragedian’s trick of 
raising the titular hero to a great height in order that he might fall. It has been 
observed that until the forum scene ‘Caesar is rendered in terms of great height; all 
other men in terms of even subterranean lowness’.54 There is a highly effective 
portrayal of Caesar’s trajectory in the film version of Gregory Doran’s Julius Caesar 
(RSC, 2012). The moment of Caesar’s fatal decision to leave his home to go to the 
senate is marked by his symbolic descent down a flight of stairs. His assassination is 
played out at the foot, not of Pompey’s statue, but of an electric escalator that stands 
static and defunct. Shakespeare’s dramatic prowess is witnessed in the way he 
charges the rise of Caesar with potential energy that is not lost when Caesar dies. 
Shakespeare is able to store up the dramatic energy or ‘Urge’ (see Chapter Two) 
within the stage properties of the coffin, the bloody cloak and the corpse, until it is 
powerfully discharged in Antony’s funeral oration. It is discharged from Antony to 
the common people, in whom the force of Caesar’s spirit becomes a violent 
overflow. Cassius had provoked Brutus to mutiny with talk of Caesar as a colossus 
and complained that ‘we petty men / Walk under his huge legs and peep about / To 
find ourselves dishonourable graves /…we are underlings’ (1.2.135-140). Originally, 
these words might have been spoken between the two large stage pillars that 
                                               
54 Herbert R. Coursen, Jr, ‘The Fall and Decline of Julius Caesar’, Texas Studies in 
Literature and Language 4(2) (1962), 241-251, 242. 
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underpropped the overhanging ‘heavens’.55 There is an almost comic irony here, for 
Cassius, despite being the stage manager of Caesar’s downfall, fails to foresee that if 
they are under the tyrant’s legs they will inevitably find the graves they are looking 
for when they bring the full force of Caesar’s greatness crashing down. Elsewhere, 
Shakespeare posits a clue to the gravity of a great man and the crushing power of 
rhetoric when one of the conspirators conjectures that by enlisting Cicero they might 
cause their less weighty qualities to be ‘buried in his gravity’ (2.1.148). Just as 
‘gravity’ contains a portend of ‘grave’, so does the sequence in that scene of the 
words ‘soil’, ‘grieved’ and ‘buried’. 
The speeches of Brutus and Antony in the forum are quite distinct from their 
mode of speech elsewhere. It is as if the forum oratory was crafted as a self-
contained rhetorical étude and then inserted into the main course of the play.56 It is 
plausible to suppose that Shakespeare is here deliberately showing off his rhetorical 
art. Dorsch opines that ‘If ever Shakespeare wished to show genius at work, surely it 
was in Antony’s oration’.57 Plutarch records that Antony moved the people, but does 
not record what he said. Shakespeare seems to have taken this as a personal 
challenge to produce a piece of exemplary rhetoric. Like a school teacher setting a 
                                               
55 Andrew Gurr, ‘Staging at The Globe’, in Shakespeare’s Globe Rebuilt, R. 
Mulryne and Margaret Shewring eds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 159-168, 164. 
56 Marvin Spevack (ed), Julius Caesar The New Cambridge Shakespeare 
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rhetorical exercise, history set Shakespeare the homework to end all homework – 
nothing less than to write the speech that turned Rome from Republic towards 
Empire. To display his rhetorical étude to best advantage, Shakespeare places it at 
the very centre of the play and at the crux of the dramatic action. 
‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’ is as rhetorically rich as 
one can imagine any phrase to be. It demonstrates Shakespeare’s regard for all five 
of the ‘faculties’ or ‘canons’ into which early modern rhetoricians divided the art of 
rhetoric following the classical model. Thomas Wilson wrote that ‘[a]ny one that 
will largely handle any matter, must fasten his mynde first of all, vppon these fiue 
especiall pointes’.58 The reference to ‘handle’ hints that it is probably not by accident 
that there is one faculty for each digit of the rhetorician’s hand. The first faculty is 
‘Invention’ (‘inventio’), which encompasses the substantial content of a speech and 
comprises the three major categories of artificial proof as Aristotle described them: 
‘logos’ (words of proof), ‘ethos’ (the speaker’s character) and ‘pathos’ (gaining the 
sympathy of the audience);59 The second of the five faculties is ‘Arrangement’ 
(‘dispositio’), which is the ordering of the elements of an oration; then ‘Memory’ 
(‘memoria’), which is the ability to deliver an apparently unscripted speech; next 
‘Delivery’ (‘actio’; Wilson’s ‘utteraunce’) which is the ‘framing of the voyce, 
countenaunce, and gesture after a comely maner’60 and finally ‘Style’ (‘elocutio’) 
which covers all formal and figurative elements of the speech. By moving ‘Style’ 
from the middle to the last place, my sequence differs in this one detail from the 
classical and early modern model for no better reason than to order them Invention-
                                               
58 Wilson, Rhetorique, 5. 
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Arrangment-Memory-Delivery-Style. This produces the initialism I-A-M-D-S and 
therefore enables budding rhetoricians to encourage themselves with this thought: ‘I 
AM DemostheneS’. 
The key elements of the faculty of ‘Invention’ – logos, ethos and pathos – are 
all present in ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’. Logos is inherent 
in the conceptual and syllabic expansion from friends to Romans to countrymen and 
in the logical meaning of each word. Ethos is evoked in the implication that Antony 
exhibits the civic virtues of friendship and patriotism and in the humility of his 
acknowledgement that the common citizen might have something of worth to ‘lend’ 
so great a general. Pathos, which is emotional sympathy or fellow feeling, is 
engendered by the suggestion that he needs the people to lend him attention as a 
client might need a patron to lend money. An imploring facial expression would be 
one effective way to enhance the emotional pathos of the line. Brutus the Stoic relies 
on his ethos as an honourable man, but he omits pathos from his strategy or includes 
it clumsily and unconvincingly. Instead of actually weeping for Caesar, Brutus 
merely documents his emotions with the words: ‘I weep for him’ (3.2.24-5). Brutus 
sheds no tears for Caesar, for his wife or for Cassius. Indeed, as Hapgood notes, his 
first weeping is for his own lost cause.61 Antony, in contrast, uses pathos to full 
effect. The citizens appreciate Antony’s enthymematic logos: ‘Mark ye his words? 
He would not take the crown; / Therefore ’tis certain he was not ambitious’ (3.2.113-
114) but it is equally clear that his pathos has persuaded them. One of them notes 
that his ‘eyes are red as fire with weeping’ (3.2.116), which recalls Thomas Wilson’s 
observation that ‘a weeping eye causeth much moisture, and prouoketh teares’.62 The 
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next line – ‘There’s not a nobler man in Rome than Antony’ (3.2.117) – confirms 
that Antony’s attempt to communicate his ethos has been successful. Compared to 
Antony, Brutus lacks human warmth. He is not ‘void of all sense and common 
feeling of humanity’, but it is only a slight exaggeration to equate Brutus with 
Erasmus’s caricature of the Stoic who ‘sets up a stony semblance of a man’.63 Brutus 
is emotionally detached when he says ‘I pause for a reply’ (3.2.33-34), whereas 
Antony is seemingly overcome with emotion when he utters the corresponding 
words ‘I must pause’ (3.2.108). In keeping with his reliance on the pathetic affect, 
‘Antony employs one of the most distinctive features of Arcadianism: animation’.64 
This is exemplified in the way he animates Caesar’s wounds as ‘dumb mouths’ 
(3.2.218) and imagines Caesar’s blood ‘rushing out of doors’ (3.2.177). In 
performance it would be in keeping with their contrasting styles for Brutus to assume 
statuesque stillness in contrast with a more physically animated Antony.65 The actor 
playing Antony might adopt the advice of the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, which 
was to demonstrate passion by gesticulating with such vigour that the toga falls from 
the shoulder.66  
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The faculty of ‘Arrangement’ is exemplified by Antony’s opening line; not 
merely through the organization of the words within it, but also by the careful 
positioning of the line within Antony’s oration as a whole.  To pick up on just one 
aspect, it is notable that Antony’s first word associates himself with the citizens as 
their ‘friend’ and that a few lines later he associates himself with Caesar in the same 
terms: ‘He was my friend, faithful and just to me’ (3.2.86). The effect of the 
arrangement is to imply a direct association of friendship between the citizens and 
Caesar that Antony will later express in the phrase ‘you all did love him once’ 
(3.2.103). Contrast the poor arrangement of the words in Brutus’s opening line and 
his failure to fit the sentiment of the opening line within the arrangement of his 
speech as a whole. His error within the first line is to move from the political sphere 
of ‘Romans’ to the political sphere of ‘countrymen’ and then to the intimacy of 
‘lovers’. Like talk of ‘love’ on a first date, this is too much too soon. It is a 
politician’s awkward attempt to match the soldier’s (Antony’s) easy reference to 
‘friends’. The flaw is even worse when considered within the arrangement of 
Brutus’s speech as a whole. Having announced at the commencement of his speech 
that the people are his ‘lovers’, he reveals at its conclusion that he ‘slew’ his ‘best 
lover’. It is almost as if he has forgotten his use of the word ‘lover’ in his exordium. 
If he will kill his best lover for the good of Rome, will he not slay his new lovers, the 
citizens of Rome, on much lesser ground? The faculty of ‘Memory’ speaks for itself, 
for Antony’s opening line is amongst the most memorable in all of Shakespeare’s 
works. It holds the mind through the combined grip of its metre and its many 
rhetorical features. The faculty of ‘Delivery’ calls for suitable use of voice, including 
pace and pitch, and also of the silent pause (the aposiopesis or interruptio).67 
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Gesture, movement and the handling of material stuff also contributes to Delivery or 
‘actio’.  Indeed, it is the rhetorician’s notion of actio that eventually gave its name to 
the theatrical profession of acting. 
The faculty of ‘Style’ is abundant in Antony’s opening line. The tricolon of 
the first three words is one stylistic feature, the syllabic gradatio within those words 
is another and both features are amplified by the tri-syllabic nature of the third word. 
The assonance of ‘en’ in the final syllable of ‘Friends’, ‘Romans’ and ‘countrymen’, 
further exploits the ‘rule of three’.68 The overall effect is surreptitious theft of the 
listener’s ‘ear’ while purporting, by means of the ‘lending’ metaphor, to borrow it 
merely. Much more could be said, but perhaps the most obvious stylistic element in 
Antony’s line is the reference to ‘ears’ itself. This exemplifies metonymy (in that 
‘ear’ represents ‘hearing’) but to the extent that it uses a part to represent a whole 
(partem pro toto) it also, as briefly mentioned earlier, has something of synecdoche 
about it. As the pound of flesh represents Antonio’s entire self in The Merchant of 
Venice, so ‘ears’ betrays the fact that Antony is not really seeking to borrow a part of 
his audience but is actually seeking to take them whole. It follows that there is also a 
euphemistic aspect to the phrase ‘lend me your ears’, for what Antony is really 
saying is ‘listen to me’ or even ‘give yourselves to me’.  
Notice the contrast between Brutus’s ill-judged use of the language of love 
with Antony’s skilful arts of persuasion. The word ‘persuade’ should not be taken to 
imply the achievement of winning an argument, but should be understood as the art 
of enhancing speech ‘through sweetness’ (‘per-sweet’). Persuasion and delight are 
inseparable. As Thomas Wilson describes it, the ‘ende of Rhetorique’ is ‘To teach. 
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To delight. And to perswade’.69 Sweetness is the spoonful of sugar that makes the 
medicine of good teaching go down. As Wilson puts it: ‘to delite is needfull, without 
the which weightie matters will not be heard at all, and therefore him cunne I thanke, 
that both can and will ever, mingle sweete among the sower’.70 Like a master 
confectioner, Shakespeare combines word, metre, action and the materiality of stage 
and theatre space in order to sweeten just enough to win hearts. This, rather than to 
win a logical argument, is his aim. No wonder Francis Meres praised ‘mellifluous 
and honey-tongued Shakespeare’ for ‘his Venus and Adonis, his Lucrece, his sugared 
sonnets’.71 The art he had honed in his stanzas transferred perfectly to the stage.  
In As You Like It, Rosalind asks the age-old question ‘can one desire too 
much of a good thing?’ (4.1.113-4) (compare Ham, 4.7.115-6). Shakespeare the poet 
knows, as Shakespeare the rhetorician knows, that when it comes to ‘the taste of 
sweetness’, ‘a little / More than a little is by much too much’ (1H4, 3.2.72–73). Thus 
when occasion called for it, Shakespeare exploited the effects of excess in order that 
‘surfeiting, / The appetite may sicken’ and a sweet thing  become ‘not so sweet now 
as it was before’ (TN,1.1.2-8). Words are likely to be rejected if their sweetness is 
detected, thus Caesar rejects ‘sweet words, / Low-crooked curtsies and base spaniel 
fawning’ (3.1.42-43). Metullus misses the point when, his entreaty having failed, he 
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asks ‘Is there no voice more worthy than my own / To sound more sweetly in great 
Caesar’s ear’? (3.1.49-50). Excess of sweetness is a major reason why Antony’s 
repetition of the word ‘honourable’ turns the idea from sweet to sickly. Antony utters 
it eleven times in the forum scene. This excess, which includes the three-fold 
repetition of ‘Brutus is an honourable man’, turns the sense of Brutus’ honour from 
something that might have started sweet to something unpalatable. Thomas Wilson 
understood the dangers of excessive repetition when he observed that ‘we cannot 
without refreshing, long abide to heare any one thing’.72 By the time Antony adds 
the slight variant: ‘sure he is an honourable man’ (which casually effaces Brutus to 
‘he’),73 the citizens are already sick of the sentiment. The word ‘sure’ is really an 
elliptical question ‘[are you] sure?’ The citizens not only reject Brutus’s rhetorical 
claim to ‘honour’ but they start to doubt the quality of ‘honour’ itself. This doubt 
eventually leads them to entertain the hitherto unthinkable possibility that the 
conspirators ‘were traitors: honourable men’ (3.2.154). When one of the citizens 
says this, Antony knows that he has succeeded in throwing down the high status of 
honour. With high honour discredited (and with it, Brutus), Antony might now 
succeed in his ultimate aim of encouraging the lowly citizens to identify with the 
dignity of Caesar’s laid-low corpse. Only now does Antony descend to the floor of 
the forum. He does not descend as of right, but with tactical humility asks the 
citizens’ permission: ‘Shall I descend? And will you give me leave?’ (3.2.160). 
Antony’s rhetorical action of descending is calculated to provoke in the 
crowd the equal and opposite reaction of rising up.74 The aim of Antony’s rhetoric 
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all along, and of all rhetoric always, is to move others. Michael Mangan suggests 
that Shakespeare’s forum scene is ‘apparently static’, but can actually be considered 
‘the most dynamic scene in the play, the one containing the greatest amount of 
movement’.75 Mangan rightly locates the main movement ‘in the hearts and minds of 
the listeners, the people of Rome’,76 but we have seen how Antony’s gestural 
movements and his physical descent can also operate to enhance the moving impact 
of his rhetorical speech. The opening scene of the play provides the first clue to the 
rhetorical heart of the whole work. The meanest of the playgoers may be mere 
groundlings down in the playhouse yard, but the first scene of Julius Caesar alludes 
to their capacity to move and rise up. When Marullus berates the on-stage citizens 
with ‘You blocks, you stones, you worse than senseless things! / O you hard hearts, 
you cruel men of Rome’ (1.1.36-37), Shakespeare is here employing a commonplace 
metaphor of the populace as a stubborn stone which the politician is called upon to 
move through the power of rhetoric. In his funeral oration, Antony contradicts 
Marullus when he says to the citizens ‘You are not wood, you are not stones, but 
men’ (3.2.143). Actually, Antony knows as well as Marullus that the people are 
stubborn blocks, but he knows much better than Marullus how to move them. This is 
clear when he makes the disingenuous statement ‘were I Brutus, / And Brutus 
Antony, there were an Antony / Would ruffle up your spirits and put a tongue / In 
every wound of Caesar that should move / The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny’ 
(3.2.219-223). Daniell associates this with the passage in Luke’s gospel that 
prophesies that stones will be animated in praise of Christ,77 but the metaphor of 
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stubborn wills being moved through rhetoric to advance the public good was a 
commonplace of classical and renaissance thought. For example, in Horace’s Ars 
Poetica we read that ‘Amphion too, the builder of the Theban wall, was said to give 
the stones motion with the sound of his lyre, and to lead them – whithersoever he 
would, by engaging persuasion.78  
Horace was a staple of grammar school education in early modern England. 
Pupils were required to memorize it and mine it for rhetorical instances.79 In Titus 
Andronicus, Shakespeare makes specific allusion to grammar school study of the 
Odes (4.2.22-4). Perhaps he had also encountered the quoted passage from the Ars 
Poetica. Certainly he was familiar with the myth of Orpheus who, like Amphion, 
had a supernatural ability to stir stones by the music of his lyre (TGV, 3.2.77-9). In 
The Merchant of Venice we are told (by Lorenzo) that ‘the poet / Did feign that 
Orpheus drew trees, stones and floods’ (5.1.80). The poet referred to is probably 
Ovid,80 but it might be Horace. What is beyond doubt is that Shakespeare was fully 
conversant with the allegorical sense that art moves stubborn hearts and minds as 
supernatural music moves stones. It seems equally clear from the depiction of the 
citizens in Julius Caesar, that Shakespeare conceived them to be stones susceptible 
to the moving music of rhetorical speech. Caesar himself, who is likened to a statue 
or ‘colossus’ (1.2.135), is the play’s only true fixture. Caesar takes pride in it: 
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I could be well moved if I were as you: 
If I could pray to move, prayers would move me. 
But I am constant as the northern star, 
Of whose true-fixed and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament. (3.1.58-62) 
 
Caesar’s pride in the fixed and unmoving nature of his will is the pride that 
precipitates his fall. The conspirators conclude that if the statue of his will cannot be 
made to move, then his flesh must be made to bleed. When Antony uses Caesar’s 
corpse and Caesar’s testament as theatrical props to move the people, the metaphor 
is clear. Caesar, whose will was immovable in life, still has power to move others in 
death. Brutus, having inflicted violent force on the great stubborn object that was 
Caesar and Caesar’s will, sets it in motion and cannot stop the motion until it is too 
late. Even Caesar’s ghost, a symbol of Caesar’s animated will, is moved to haunt 
Brutus. It is only with Brutus’s own last breath, and his own last ‘will’, that he can 
say ‘Caesar, now be still. / I killed not thee with half so good a will’ (5.5.51). 
Marvin Spevack notes that ‘The word ‘constant’ and its inflected forms 
‘constancy’ and ‘constantly’ occur more often in Julius Caesar (eight times) than in 
any other work of Shakespeare’s’ and that ‘[i]t is also a frequent and crucial word in 
Plutarch’.81 It is especially striking that Shakespeare gives it to Caesar three times in 
quick succession ‘in his ironic and hubristic insistence on his ‘constant’ position and 
attitude just a few lines before he is struck down’.82 Shakespeare’s theme of Roman 
constancy is partly attributable to the rise of neo-Stoicism in England in the 1590s as 
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evidenced by such publications as DuVair’s Moral Philosophie mentioned earlier 
and Sir John Stradling’s 1595 translation of Justus Lipsius’s Two Bookes of 
Constancie (1584),83 but the emphasis on stubborn standing is also attributable to the 
Elizabethan renaissance of classical rhetoric. In rhetoric, stasis denotes a fixed or 
stubborn truth-claim on which one takes a stand. Stasis is a highly dynamic and 
contested state. It only appears to be unmoving because as one side pushes, so the 
other side pushes back with equal vigour. Hanns Hohmann likens rhetorical stasis to 
‘a stance taken in a fight’ and ‘even to civil strife itself’.84 The civil question 
between Brutus and Antony epitomizes rhetorical stasis. Shakespeare would have 
known that the ‘foundation’ or ‘principall point in euery debated matter’ was ‘called 
of the Rhetoricians the state, or constitution of the cause’.85 The idea of the ‘state’ or 
‘statement’ of the cause at issue in argument goes back to Aristotle.86 In forensic 
rhetoric it became ‘the State legall’.87 The rhetorical state of stasis is also akin to the 
medical state of stasis in which the flow of blood is blocked. When Antony triumphs 
in the forum scene, the blood flows.  The ‘st’ sound is an ancient, indeed a 
prehistoric, example of ‘sound symbolism’?88 It is a perfectly efficient physical 
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expression of the very thing it stands for – which is movement coming to a standstill. 
In the ‘st’ sound, the swift flow of breath is stopped by tongue on tooth. No single 
line more clearly encapsulates the static connotations of the ‘st’ sound than Caesar’s 
‘I am constant as the northern star’ (3.1.60).  The very next line (‘Of whose true-
fixed and resting quality’) contains three ‘st’ sounds, two of which are not apparent 
until the words are spoken. The Proto-Indo-European root *stā-, which gives us 
‘statute’ and ‘statue’, also gives us the key words ‘constancy’ ‘stasis’ and the related 
‘stay’ and ‘stand’. Indeed, Julius Caesar can be appreciated as an extended 
rhetorical exercise of figura etymologica on the Latin verb stare (‘to stand’)89 and on 
the theme of rhetoric’s capacity to move the stones of Roman popular will. 
We have noted that Caesar’s constancy – the fixed nature of his will and his 
unmovable spirit – is confirmed by the statue metaphor. In performance the 
metaphor is in turn confirmed by stage furniture. Marvin Spevack observes that it 
‘has…become customary to have a statue of Caesar on stage’.90 He cites the example 
of a performance at the Festival D’Automne in Paris, 2001, ‘in which Antony’s 
forum speech received visual comments from a bust of Caesar that descended from 
the flies ‘upside down’’ (befitting the upset state of Rome) and in which the ‘small 
corpse of the emperor’ was dramatically contrasted to Antony’s references to ‘great 
                                               
Lewis eds (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 571-589. On sound symbolism generally see, for 
example, David Reid, Sound Symbolism (Edinburgh, T & A Constable Ltd, 1967); 
Roman Jakobson and Linda R Waugh, The Sound Shape of Language (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1979); Leanne Hinton, Johanna Nichols and John J. Ohala 
eds, Sound Symbolism (Cambridge, CUP, 1994). 
89	For another example, see H8, 1.2.84-87.	
90 Spevack, Julius Caesar, 58. 
	 182	
Caesar’.91 It might be small, but Caesar’s corpse has an iconic, statuesque quality on 
stage. As Peter Ure observes, ‘With a short break, Caesar’s corpse is visible on the 
stage for more than five hundred continuous lines: this is a play whose centre is most 
exactly a murdered human body’.92 Michael Vale’s set for Gregory Doran’s 
Stratford production (RSC, 2012) incorporated a towering statue of Caesar which 
uncannily faced away from the audience and thus implied that all the action was 
taking place not only within Caesar’s shadow but also behind his back. It thus had 
the effect of constituting the audience as complicit participants in the play’s secret 
conspiracies and devices.  
When the conspirator Decius Brutus93 urged Caesar to leave home for the 
Senate house, Caesar stated in the space of a few lines: ‘Caesar will not come’; ‘The 
cause is in my will’; ‘I will let you know’; ‘I will stay at home today’ (2.2.68-82). 
Caesar’s stubbornness is reinforced by the static quality of ‘stay’, a word that 
belongs to the Proto-Indo-European *stā- set. ‘Stay’ appears, with ‘stay’d’ and 
‘stays’, nineteen times in the play. Without seeking to stand anything weighty on the 
shaky evidence of word frequency, it may be observed that, with three exceptions 
(TS, RJ, 3H6), nineteen occurrences is not exceeded by any other of Shakespeare’s 
plays, and is exactly the same number as in Shakespeare’s other ‘statue’ play, The 
Winter’s Tale. Caesar’s own will to stay at home contrasts with Antony’s will to 
move the crowd by means of Caesar’s testamentary will. There are twenty-two lines 
of text from the citizens’ first call to hear Caesar’s will: ‘We’ll hear the will. Read it, 
Mark Antony’ (3.2.139) to Antony’s ‘Shall I descend? And will you give me leave?’ 
                                               
91 Spevack, Julius Caesar, 59. 
92 Ure, Casebook, 22. 
93 Historically, Decimus Brutus. 
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(3.2.160). Within those twenty-two lines the word ‘will’ appears twenty times. This 
is a remarkably concentrated and sustained repetition of a key conceptual word. That 
this passage of intense usage culminates in Antony’s descent to the forum floor is 
telling. This physical act purports to acknowledge the popular will and therefore 
performs, however insincerely, a form of democratic devolution to the people. It has 
a parliamentary parallel in the 1540 Statute of Wills; a very different act of will, but 
one that also performed, however reluctantly, a democratic gesture through 
testamentary descent 
More prosaically, the repetition of the word ‘will’ serves to heighten the 
sense of anticipation. It connotes desire, but it also implies a future happening. At the 
middle of Antony’s long list of ‘will’ references we find his line ‘Will you be 
patient? Will you stay awhile?’ (3.2.150).  ‘Stay’ draws attention to the stasis of this 
scene. When a citizen demands ‘We’ll hear the will. Read it, Mark Antony’ 
(3.2.139), Antony stalls. The ‘st’ sound in his next line enhances the sense of stasis: 
‘Have patience, gentle friends. I must not read it’ (3.2.141). With that line Antony 
stokes up the citizens’ anticipation through the rhetorical device of paralepsis 
(praeteritio), which draws attention to a matter by appearing to pass over it. He use 
the device repeatedly in relation to Ceasar’s will; ‘It is not meet you know how 
Caesar loved you’ (3.2.142); ‘’Tis good you know not that you are his heirs’ 
(3.2.146). His audience can by now be in no doubt as to the contents of the will, but 
as yet Antony has not come straight out with it. Instead, as with Caesar’s corpse, he 
keeps the will in plain sight but formally under wraps. The anticipation of revelation 
and release produces a build up of tension like dammed blood that is ready to burst 
forth.94 This is stasis in the medical sense of the word.  Shakespeare subtly associates 
                                               
94 In David Farr’s production at the Swan Theatre (RSC, 2004), Gary Oliver’s 
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Antony’s rhetoric with the issue of blood even from the moment Antony resolves to 
deliver the funeral oration: 
 
Into the market-place. There shall I try 
In my oration how the people take 
The cruel issue of these bloody men (3.1.292-4) 
 
Mark Van Doran suggested that ‘there is as much real blood in ‘Julius Caesar’ as 
there is in stone’.95 There is, though, an intense flow of rhetorical blood, pumped 
along by the beat of Antony’s verse. Antony says ‘I am no orator’ (3.2.210), but the 
irony of this claim is apparent when he lists the rhetorical skills he lacks and in the 
process demonstrates not only a detailed knowledge of the key elements of the 
rhetorician’s art but great practical skill in using them: ‘For I have neither wit, 
[invention] nor words, [style, and logos] nor worth, [ethos] / Action, [gesture] nor 
utterance, [delivery] nor the power of speech, / To stir men’s blood’ (3.2.214-216). 
His speech is calculated to move the standing, static members of the crowd and to 
‘stir’ their blood.96 To achieve this, he repeats the elements of the sound ‘stir’ with 
                                               
Antony tore up the will and dropped it into a bucket of blood (Patricia Elizabeth 
Tatspaugh, ‘Shakespeare Onstage in England, 2004–2005’, Shakespeare Quarterly 
56(4) (2005), 448-478, 466). 
95 Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare (New York: H. Holt, 1939), 185. 
96 See, generally, Gayle Greene, ‘‘The Power of Speech to Stir Men’s Blood’: The 
Language of Tragedy in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar’, Renaissance Drama 2 
(1980), 67-93. 
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increasing intensity until eventually uttering the word ‘stir’ itself so as to strike the 
conscious mind with the subconscious sense that has been welling up:  
 
But ye[ster]day the word of Caesar might  
Have [stood again{st the wor}ld. Now lies he there,] 
And none [so poor to do him rever]ence. 
O ma[sters]! If I were disposed to [stir]  
Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage (3.2.119-123) 
 
Fuzier observes that the final line of this quote contains the palindromic sound 
sequence r-t-m m-t-r, but what he does not notice is that the fulcrum at the centre of 
this balanced line is the ‘st’ sound formed from the end of ‘minds’ and the beginning 
of ‘to’. The line exemplifies the stasis that is produced by the opposition of equal 
forces and nothing could be more fitting, not only to the line but also to this pivotal 
speech and to the theme of the whole play, than that ‘st’ should stand at the middle 
of it. When we think so structurally there is always a risk that we will miss the more 
fluid aspects of Shakespeare’s poetic art, so for balance we should note that as the 
consonants supply the structural staves of the line, so the vowel sounds fill them 
with music. In modern Received Pronunciation the sequence of vowels is: ore – are – 
a – ai – oo – ewe – i – ee – a – aay (or to use the English phonetic alphabet: ɔː – ɑː – 
æ – aɪ – uː – juː – ɪ – iː – æ – eɪ). Of the ten vowel sounds in this sequence only the 
‘a’ sound in ‘and’ is repeated. The variation in the vowels enlivens and energizes the 
structural scheme of the consonants. The secrets of Shakespeare’s rhetorical and 
poetic genius are to be found in countless similar instances. It is as astounding to 
think that they were produced instinctively as to think that they were produced by 
craft.  
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When the purple testament is finally opened, after so much pausing and 
putting it off, the blood begins its inevitable flow. Antony’s repeated ‘st’ sounds 
correspond to the repeated use of the same sound in the scene of Caesar’s 
assassination. Caesar’s last speech had been on the theme of his constancy, the last 
lines being ‘That I was constant Cimber should be banished / And constant do 
remain to keep him so’ (3.1.72-3). After the stage direction ‘They stab Caesar’, the 
‘st’ sounds uttered by the conspirators voice the percussion of their blades. Brutus’s 
(inconsistent) statements ‘Fly not; stand still;’ (3.1.83) and ‘Talk not of standing’ 
(3.1.89) frame Metellus’s ‘Stand fast together, lest…’ (3.1.87). There are numerous 
instances in the lines that follow, including the threefold repetition of ‘stoop’ 
(3.1.105-111). Brutus’s reference to ‘dust’ (3.1.116) is especially noteworthy for the 
hold that dust seems to have had on Shakespeare’s dramatic imagination ([as 
discussed in Chapters Two, Five and Six of Acts of Will]). Julius Caesar and 
Alexander were paired lives in Plutarch, and in Hamlet they are paired in Hamlet’s 
extended discourse on their dust (5.1.193-205), which includes the couplet 
‘Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to clay, / Might stop a hole to keep the wind 
away’ (5.1.202-3). How fitting that dust should end up as a stop. Dust ends with the 
stopping sound ‘st’, and we all of us end in dust.  
Garry Wills suggests that Antony’s descent into the forum mirrors the move 
from ‘head to heart, from mind to will, from scrutiny to action’.97 Through Antony, 
Shakespeare is surely calling on the playgoers to be more than passive spectators. 
They are called to be active participants in the constitution of the play world and in 
the political world beyond the playhouse walls. Likewise in the assassination scene, 
‘an audience may well feel that it is not only witnessing but participating in a kind of 
                                               
97 Wills, Rhetoric, 97-8. 
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ceremony’.98 It is the participation and approval of the witnessing public that 
perfects the performance and gives it the testamentary power to last ‘many ages 
hence’ (3.1.111). The call to the playgoers to assume responsibility as participatory 
witnesses is repeatedly confirmed in the nature of the on-stage action and speech. 
Armed with dramatic gestures and physical props, Antony marshals his rhetorical 
forces to produce a massy, moving press of figures around Caesar’s corpse. The 
release of pressure through mutiny, riot and bloodshed becomes inevitable. We have 
seen how Shakespeare uses special metrical effects in the ‘Friends, Romans, 
countrymen’ speech. We will now see that he employs another quite different 
metrical effect in the speech beginning ‘If you have tears, prepare to shed them now’ 
(3.2.167). Before we consider the metrical evidence it will be informative to note 
that the speech follows Antony’s descent onto the floor of the forum and is 
immediately preceded by five tightly packed lines spoken by the citizens and 
Antony: ‘A ring; stand round’, ‘Stand from the hearse, stand from the body’, ‘Room 
for Antony, most noble Antony’, ‘Nay, press not so upon me; stand far off’, ‘Stand 
back; room; bear back’ (3.2.161-166). We have already noted how the repetition of 
‘stand’ intensifies the rhetorical stasis of the scene and how this generates dramatic 
potential through the sense of anticipated movement. This almost physically palpable 
sense of pressure or dramatic ‘Urge’ is further enhanced by a metrical effect that 
mirrors the thick throng of figures on the floor of the forum. There are twenty-nine 
lines in this speech from the first ‘If you have tears, prepare to shed them now’ to the 
last ‘Here is himself, marred as you see with traitors’ (3.2.195). Of those lines, the 
vast majority are in regular ten-syllable pentameter. There are only four lines that are 
                                               
98 Mark Rose, ‘Conjuring Caesar: Ceremony, History, and Authority in 1599’, 
English Literary Renaissance 19(3) (1989), 291-304, 298. 
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of irregular length and every one of those extends to eleven syllables. (A fifth line is 
a contender to have eleven syllables, but depends for its inclusion on the replacement 
of the Folio’s ‘statue’ with ‘statua’ or ‘statuè’ and for the substitute word to be 
pronounced tri-syllabically.) The four hypermetrical lines are as follows: 
 
You all do know this mantle. I remember 
… 
For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar’s angel.  
Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him. 
… 
Here is himself, marred as you see with traitors. (3.2.168-195) 
 
Three of the four hypermetrical lines contain express reference to the citizens’ 
knowledge, distinctively employed to produce the sense that Antony is calling for 
the commoners to share with him in bearing witness to the truth: ‘you…know’, ‘you 
know’, ‘you see’.  No other line in this section of the speech carries quite this sense 
of unity in perspective between Antony and the citizens;99 no other line carries so 
                                               
99 The remaining line in the group calls for judgment of the gods. If Brutus is 
Caesar’s ‘angel’ up there, perhaps Antony is implying that the commoners are ‘gods’ 
down there. After all, Antony is certainly addressing the plebeians with his 
apostrophe ‘O Masters!’ and also, I would suggest, in his ‘O judgment’ (3.2.105). 
The remainder of that line ‘Thou art fled to brutish beasts’ is clearly an allusion to 
Brutus. A revolutionary, but perfectly suitable gesture for this line, would be to 
gesture down to the people on ‘O judgment!’ (contrary to the instinct to appeal 
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clear a call for collective scrutiny of the evidence on show. Hypermetrical lines 
‘pluck at our metrical attention’,100 here they summon the audience to witness and 
they call for their judgment. It is notable that when a citizen passed judgment on the 
first passage of Antony’s speech, it was done in an eleven-syllable line: ‘Therefore 
’tis certain he was not ambitious’ (3.2.114). As always, ‘the additional syllable at the 
end seems a major element in the line’s structure’.101 The citizen’s ‘ambitious’ line 
supplies the syllable that was missing from each of Antony’s ‘ambitious’ lines in his 
funeral oration. It confirms that Antony was successful in putting across his 
argument on the question of Caesar’s ambition. 
Taken as a whole, then, Antony’s speech has the effect of incorporating 
Antony, Caesar and the citizens as one body. In similar vein elsewhere, Antony, 
speaking to the citizens, equates ‘the dead…myself and you’ (3.2.127). The line 
‘Then I, and you, and all of us fell down’ (3.2.189), is especially effective in this 
regard. The expansion and sudden contraction resembles the conceptual and syllabic 
expansion and collapse of ‘Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears’. Where 
that line produced the sense of an intimate embrace, this line produces a sense of 
emotional collapse. Antony’s descent also produces community in another way, for 
in theatrical terms it represents a move to the level of folk or ‘popular’ drama.102 To 
                                               
upwards for justice from the gods, compare TA, 4.3.11-13) and to gesture upwards to 
Brutus on ‘fled to Brutish beasts’.  
100 Wright, Metrical Art, p.107. Wright adds that the same is true of hypometrical 
lines. 
101 Wright, Metrical Art, p.164. 
102 Daniell (Julius Caesar, 261 n.162) associates the citizen’s call to make ‘Room for 
Antony’ (3.2.164) with the medieval practice of making playing room in the popular 
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use Weimann’s terminology (see Chapter One), ‘Antony moves from locus to 
platea’.103 The play began in the stage space of the ‘platea’ that unites the streets of 
Rome with the streets of London.104 Now, at the moment of Antony’s descent from 
the pulpit, he descends to the street level and to the communal ground that 
Shakespeare has prepared for him. Whereas Brutus is uncomfortable in close 
proximity to the plebs and seemingly could not wait to quit them (hence his ‘Good 
countrymen, let me depart alone’ (3.2.56)), Antony gives the appearance of being 
much more at home in the press of the common people of Rome. 
Now that the dust has settled on the rhetoric and the riot, we can allow 
ourselves to join the playgoers in reflecting on the scene as objective bystanders. The 
black cloth hanging as a curtain from the stage to the playhouse floor confirms that 
                                               
throng. Daniell cites Chambers who quotes lines from the start of a Leicestershire 
Mummers Play: ‘Room, a room! brave gallants, give us room to sport; / For in this 
house we do resort’ (The Medieval Stage, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1903), 2.276). 
103 D. J. Hopkins, City/Stage/Globe: Performance and Space in Shakespeare’s 
London (London: Routledge, 2008), 170. Hopkins conjectures that in early 
performances Antony might have moved as far down as the groundlings in the yard, 
but the association between the stage level and the common street (both share the 
space of the ‘platea’, see Chapter One) would make such an extreme descent 
dramatically unnecessary. On the other hand, some modern productions have placed 
the citizens in the orchestra pit. (John Ripley, Julius Caesar on Stage in England and 
America, 1599-1973 (Cambridge: CUP, 1980), 240). 
104 Hopkins ibid., 164.  
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we are witnessing a tragic drama,105 but as we join the groundlings in pressing up 
against the stage and its deathly drape, we are left puzzling this profound question of 
the play: ‘whose tragedy is it?’ The title of the play, The Tragedy of Julius Caesar, 
states the obvious answer, but all states in the play, especially those relating to the 
person of Caesar, are contestable and moveable. The title, like the title of The 
Merchant of Venice, might be a tease: ‘Which is the merchant here, and which the 
Jew?’ (4.1.170). If this really is the tragedy of Caesar we are bound to ponder the 
nature of his tragic flaw. Brutus claims it was ‘ambition’, but we have seen that 
Brutus’s claim suffers some serious rhetorical opposition. The more plausible 
candidate flaw is that Caesar was excessively stubborn. For a rhetorical poet like 
Shakespeare, whose drama relies upon his art to move, stubbornness must seem a 
chief vice. Shakespeare was also a philosopher of practical reasonableness in the 
Aristotelian mode. He understood, as contemporary lawyers understood, that will 
without flexibility must be opposed as one must oppose law without equity.106 On 
this view, Caesar’s tragic flaw is the same that makes The Merchant of Venice the 
tragedy of Shylock. However rational his justification for stubbornness (for Shylock, 
the chief justification was the rule of law), Caesar’s fault (as Shylock’s) was to take 
hubristic pride in the security of his cause and in his personal immovability. The 
justice of equitable moderation, or practical reasonableness, demanded that Caesar 
                                               
105 ‘The stage is hung with black; and I perceive / The auditors prepared for a 
tragedy’ (Anon, A Warning for Fair Women (c.1590), induction). The stage skirt 
seems to be represented in Johannes De Witt’s famous 1596 drawing of the Swan 
theatre.  
106 Gary Watt, Equity Stirring: The Story of Justice Beyond Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2009).  
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be (re)moved precisely because he set such store by his stubborn constancy and, to 
borrow an apt phrase, his ‘inflexible will’.107 The art of equitable moderation is akin 
to the art of rhetoric, which according to Wilson, calls for the quality of ‘movyng 
pitie, and stirring men to mercie’.108 A marginal gloss in North’s Plutarch praises the 
‘wonderful constancy of Brutus in matters of justice and equity’,109 but Shakespeare 
prefers to set the stoic constancy of Brutus against the wilful constancy of Caesar. 
Antony, the Lupercalian runner, contributes a dramatic urgency throughout the 
course of the play and he moves passions, but he stirs the people to riot and not to 
mercy. He brings no equity to moderate the strict constancy of Caesar or Brutus. We 
must look to the playgoers, performing as witnesses and jury, to supply the 
moderating equity. 
The play can perhaps be thought of as the tragedy of Brutus. Brutus’s last 
stand is predicted in the encounter that brings the forces of Cassius and Brutus to a 




Stand ho. Speak the word along. 
FIRST SOLDIER  
Stand. 
SECOND SOLDIER  
                                               
107 John I. M. Stewart, Character and motive in Shakespeare (London: Longmans, 
Green, 1949), 53. 
108 Wilson, Rhetorique, 133.  
109 North, Plutarch: Brutus, §10. Cited in Spevack, ‘Julius Caesar’, 11. 
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Stand. 
THIRD SOLDIER  
Stand. (4.2.32-36) 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Caesar, Brutus uses the word 
‘stand’ in reference to death in a way that is significant:  ‘That we shall die we know; 
’tis but the time / And drawing days out, that men stand upon’ (3.1.99-100). What 
makes it so significant is that it anticipates Brutus’s own death and the words of 
Antony: ‘This was the noblest Roman of them all: / … / His life was gentle, and the 
elements / So mixed in him that nature might stand up / And say to all the world, 
‘This was a man!’’ (5.5.69-76). The exact phrase ‘stand up’ appears in only one 
other place in the play, and it is Brutus who uses it: ‘We all stand up against the 
spirit of Caesar, / And in the spirit of men there is no blood’ (2.1.166-7). This 
bloodless line exemplifies stasis. The reference to stand and to the lack of blood in 
Caesar’s spirit evoke an unnatural, even statue-like, absence of movement in the 
physical state of the man and in the state of the body politic. The line is naturally 
followed by the flow of ‘Caesar must bleed’ (2.1.170). When that resolution is 
enacted by Caesar’s assassination, stasis momentarily turns to catharsis and even the 
statue ‘all the while ran blood’ (3.2.187), as Calpurnia’s dream had forewarned.  
In Shakespeare’s account, Brutus runs himself through on his own sword. 
North’s Plutarch gives two versions, one in which Brutus holds the sword and one in 
which Strato holds the sword. Shakespeare, in adopting the latter account, omits 
North’s description of Strato as one with whom Brutus ‘came first acquainted by the 
study of rhetoric’.110 He does something better. Through the entire course of the play 
                                               
110 North, Plutarch: Brutus, §32. 
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he depicts a Brutus who is impaled on the point of his own rhetoric. In the forum 
scene, Brutus wounds his own cause with condescending patrician rhetoric and 
Antony deals the deathblow by a sort of congregational rhetoric that properly 
belonged to Brutus. There is, then, a (presumably unintended) mirroring of North’s 
‘double’ account of Brutus’s death: Brutus is impaled on the blade of his own 
rhetoric held both in his own hands and in the hands of another. Shakespeare’s 
Brutus is a student of rhetoric, a stoic and an actor (witness Brutus’s direction to his 
fellow conspirators that they should disguise their intentions and ‘bear it as our 
Roman actors do with…formal constancy’ (2.1.226-7)). All things considered, he 
seems too cold and calculating a character to have the heroism necessary to make 
him the intended tragic subject of this play. Mark Antony has a claim to be the hero 
of the play, but in Julius Caesar his trajectory is in no plausible sense ‘tragic’ 
(contrast his fall in Antony and Cleopatra). 
The most plausible possibility is that Julius Caesar is the tragedy of Rome 
itself. As Jennifer Richards writes: Antony’s rhetorical ‘success represents the 
beginning of the end for the republic’;111 ‘Antony wins, but Rome loses’.112 
Ironically it all starts to go downhill for the Republic following Antony’s descent 
into the forum; that most potent physical gesture of condescension to the people. 
Perhaps it was only ever a shallow showman’s gesture. For all his rhetorical 
sweetness, Mark Antony does not truly seek to replace traditional hierarchy with 
popular will. A wise witness can see this truth hidden in Antony’s words. The 
Antony who predicts that the people, having heard of their legacy under Caesar’s 
                                               
111 Jennifer Richards, Rhetoric The New Critical Idiom (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008), 91. 
112 Ibid., 93. 
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testament, will ‘dying, mention it within their wills, / Bequeathing it as a rich legacy 
/ Unto their issue’ and ‘dip their napkins in his sacred blood’ (3.2.134-8) is, in early 
modern terms, a man who, despite talk of wills and pretension to congregational 
Protestantism, is harking back to hierarchical traditions of dynastic inheritance and 
Roman Catholic hagiography. The success of Antony’s rhetoric is that it captured the 




Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance 




From dust to dust and sealing wax: the materials of testamentary performance 
 
In Chapter Two we considered some of the methods employed in Richard II, King 
John and the prologues of Henry V by which Shakespeare sought to engage the 
hands of the playgoers’ minds to touch the play and to make the play more touching. 
One such technique was to place characters on stage to narrate first-hand witness 
accounts of materials being handled. All witness narratives turn sights into sounds 
and therefore have the merit of appealing to playgoers as spectators and as audience. 
Witness accounts of materials being handled are especially potent because they 
excite the playgoers’ senses of sight and sound and touch at the same time. Having 
been thus engaged to a more complete sensory imagination of the play, the playgoers 
are better able to get a feel for it and to weigh it up and to probe its forms and test its 
substance.  
Richard II contains an important on-stage witness account of materials being 
handled. It is the scene, already considered in Chapter Two, in which the Duke of 
York narrates his account of the moment that the citizens of London threw dust on 
Richard’s head. The fact that the reported ‘handlers’ in that instance were the 
common people of London gathered to witness a great event must have enhanced the 
original London playgoers’ ability to imagine and relate to the physical reality of the 
scene. Sometimes an on-stage witness account describes a more exotic scene and 
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more luxurious materials. An example is Enobarbus’s account of how ‘The city cast 
/ Her people out’ to see Cleopatra and the famous ‘barge she sat in’ (AC, 2.2.223-
224, 2.2.201); the words ‘sat in’ evoke the feel of satin and suit perfectly the 
description of ‘silken tackle’ that ‘Swell with the touches of those flower-soft hands’ 
(AC, 2.2.220). The poetry produces a tactile sense to the mind. 
A little later in this chapter we will consider two extended examples of 
Shakespeare’s method of engaging the sympathy of playgoing witnesses through the 
evidentiary narrative of an on-stage witness. Both accounts present material evidence 
to be assessed by the playgoers and therefore constitute the playgoer as judge. 
Throughout this book I have proposed that it is helpful to think of early modern 
playgoers as witnesses who are involved in a process of probing or testing the will 
that is performed before them on stage. The suggestion that the nature of a play can 
be appreciated by analogy to the process of testing (that is ‘proving’) a testamentary 
will is not so far removed from the idea that a play can be appreciated by analogy to 
legal processes of putting witness testimony to the proof.1 That analogy is 
particularly apposite to plays in which an innocent person (almost invariably a 
                                               
1 A great deal of fine scholarship has engaged with the trope of trial in law. The 
following list is by no means conclusive, but represents a good basis for further 
reading: Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in 
Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (Oxford: OUP, 2007); Subha Mukherji, Law 
and Representation in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); Barbara 
Shapiro, A Culture of Fact; England, 1550–1730 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2000); Luke Wilson, Theaters of Intention: Drama and the Law in Early 
Modern (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2000). 
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woman) has been falsely accused, for example Othello, Much Ado About Nothing, 
The Winter’s Tale.2 One figure that connects the early modern legal world of 
testament and testimony is the judge known as the ‘Ordinary’. These judges were 
clerics in the ecclesiastical courts whose task it was to decide whether or not a will 
passed probate. They acted under authority of the bishop (the bishop’s ordained 
status is said to be the origin of the title ‘Ordinary’) and the seal of approval that they 
sometimes added in witness and probate of a will was the seal of the presiding 
bishop. Swinburne writes that: 
 
this office and charge of executing…testaments and last willes hath been 
imposed vpon the reuerend Bishops: in the sinceritie of whose consciences 
all Christian laws and namely the lawe of this land, hath reposed greater 
confidence then in other lay people, about the performance of deade mens 
willes.3 
 
There is a strong clerical flavour and more than a hint of probation and a red seal at 
the start of Shakespeare’s Henry V. Immediately before the Archbishop of 
Canterbury embarks upon his lengthy formal proof of Henry’s legal title to the 
throne of France, the king warns that if he is incited to go to war many men ‘Shall 
drop their blood in approbation’ (1.2.19) of the legal claim. For our purposes the title 
                                               
2	See Daniela Carpi, ‘A just and open trial’: The Trial Based on Circumstantial 
Evidence in The Winter’s Tale’, in P. Kennan and M. Tempera (eds) International 
Shakespeare. The Comedies (Bologna: Clueb, 2004) 75.	
3 Henry Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise of Testaments and Last Willes (London: John 
Windet, 1590), 206, citing Perkins, De Testamentis, fol. 94. 
	 199	
of Ordinary is convenient to remind us that the ordinary citizens of London attended 
the Elizabethan playhouses with the opportunity to ‘prove’ (‘probe’) and to judge the 
will and testament (and testimony) presented to them. With this in mind, we can now 
turn to our two extended examples of on-stage witness accounts: one from Hamlet, 
the other from Macbeth. Both narrate the same standard early modern sequence of 
working with materials to produce a sealed document: folding of paper, writing and 
sealing. 
In Hamlet, Hamlet reports how he forged a document in the form of an order 
made by the king of Denmark: 
 
HORATIO 
How was this sealed?  
HAMLET 
Why even in that was heaven ordinant: 
I had my father’s signet in my purse – 
Which was the model of that Danish seal – 
Folded the writ up in the form of th’other, 
Subscribed it, gave’t th’impression, placed it safely (Ham, 5.2.47-52) 
 
The word ‘ordinant’ will now put the reader in mind of the seal affixed by the 
clerical Ordinary, and it may be that the word had similar resonance for the first 
playgoers. 





Since his majesty went into the field, I have seen 
her rise from her bed, throw her nightgown upon 
her, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, 
write upon’t, read it, afterwards seal it, and again 
return to bed, yet all this while in a most fast sleep. 
DOCTOR 
…besides her 
walking and other actual performances, what, at any 
time, have you heard her say? 
GENTLEWOMAN 
That, sir, which I will not report after her. 
DOCTOR 
You may to me: and ’tis most meet you should. 
GENTLEWOMAN 
Neither to you, nor any one, having no witness to 
confirm my speech. (MAC, 5.1.4-18)  
 
These accounts of the act of producing a documentary form are accounts of ‘actual 
performances’, as the Macbeth passage expressly confirms. Both narratives also 
describe performances in the theatrical sense of gestured and propertied action. In 
each instance the sequence by which the form is created ends in the impression of 
wax, presumably blood red, and can therefore be said to plot in microcosm the tragic 
trajectory of the entire play in which the sequence appears. The fact that the 
sequence of folding–writing–sealing in both Hamlet and Macbeth appears early in 
the final Act creates a tangible sense of events unfolding that are written in the fates 
and bound for a bloody end. The reader will recall [from Chapter Five of Acts of 
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Will] that Hamlet began with the documentary and performative connotations of an 
invitation to ‘unfold’, and that Hamlet’s own idea of the acting aspect of theatrical 
performance was one which called for the players to show ‘the time his form and 
pressure’ (Ham, 3.2.24). Perhaps there is a pun here on the pressing of a seal on a 
documentary form. 
In the two documentary episodes under consideration, the witness narratives 
of Hamlet and the Gentlewoman are of a special sort. They resemble the legal 
process of ‘attestation’, whereby a witness affirms the veracity of writing, signature 
and seal. In Shakespeare’s day, the law reflected the fact that the national population 
was largely illiterate. Testators did not have to write their wills in person, or sign 
them, or seal them. Following the 1540 Statute of Wills, a devise of land by will was 
required to be in writing, but that was as far as the formalities went during 
Shakespeare’s lifetime.4 Neither did witnesses have to subscribe the will or seal it or 
otherwise attest to it in writing. In cases of doubt, their oral testimony was 
sufficient.5 Writing, signing and sealing by the testator and witnesses were, of 
course, encouraged, and it was expedient for the avoidance of doubt. Shakespeare’s 
                                               
4 E. A. J. Honigmann and S. Brock, Playhouse Wills, 1558–1642 (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1993), 12-13.  
5 All the words of the testator’s will must be expressed in writing or not at all 
(Thomas Brett v. John Rigden (1567) 1 Plowden 340, 345; 75 E.R. 516, 525). Even 
if the testator does not witness the will by signature or seal, and even if the witnesses 
do not, the Ordinary in the ecclesiastical court may do so if satisfied that the writing 
presented is proved to be the testator’s will. The Ordinary therefore acts as a sort of 
witness of last resort (see Alvared Graysbrook, Executor of the Testament of Thomas 
Kene v. Robert Fox (1564) 1 Plow. 275, 280; 75 E.R. 419, 428 (1 January 1564)).  
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own will was subscribed by witnesses and signed by Shakespeare in his own hand. A 
subscribing testator is always, in a sense, acting as witness to their own will. The 
example of Shakespeare’s will makes this clear. It recites a standard form of words: 
‘In witnes Whereof I have hereunto put my Seale hand’. As a gentleman, 
Shakespeare must have owned a signet or seal matrix bearing his arms, but for some 
reason it was not used and the word ‘Seale’ is deleted. The idea of performers acting 
as witnesses to their own wills is a very potent one. It speaks of actors being in a 
sense alienated from their acts. Where this decays into deep alienation from oneself 
it can produce a destructive schism between act and will. This is the case with Lady 
Macbeth in the episode set out above, and something like it (but for very different 
reasons) is true of Hamlet throughout most of Hamlet. Hamlet is not, however, 
alienated from his actions in the episode quoted above. In that episode the sequential 
process of documentary performance (pressed on by the urgency of a deadline) 
engages his will to act in a way that we seldom witness elsewhere in the play. 
Whatever block it is that Hamlet suffers from, it is not writer’s block. Hamlet shows 
us in this scene that a character on stage (and, where appropriate, an actor on stage) 
can engender a sense that he or she is a witness to their own performance. Where 
they do this, it invites the playgoers to witness the performance with them. Playgoers 
cannot help but join with Hamlet and the Gentlewoman and the Doctor in witness to 
the performances described in the two episodes. The playgoers might also relate to 
the on-stage depiction of quotidian rituals of manual work, in this case writing. The 
presence of similar writing sequences in both plays is, in addition to its other 
significations, a sign of a professional writer attesting to the work of his own hands 
by representing his everyday practices on stage.  
Early modern writing called for a fairly standard set of materials. These 
included paper (rarely parchment); scissors to cut the paper; a ruler to fold the paper 
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and to rule lines; an inkstand (‘standish’); an inkwell; ink; feathers (pennae) for 
quills; a penknife (to cut the penna into quill pens); a whetstone to sharpen the knife; 
a dustbox or sandbox or pouncebox from which to sprinkle dust, sand or ‘pounce’;6 a 
candle to see by and to melt the sealing wax; string or ribbon for the seal; a signet 
ring or other seal matrix; and, finally, a chair to sit at, and a desk to stage the whole 
performance.7 When items such as these become properties on stage, they have the 
‘power to puncture dramatic illusion by pointing to alternate social dramas of 
economic production, exchange, and ownership’.8 One of the best examples of this is 
the gage or glove that we considered in Chapter Two. As the son of a glover, the 
glove was an obvious thing for Shakespeare to focus on, but playgoers did not have 
to be glovers to be able to imagine a personal connection to the thing. It was 
common enough as an item of fashionable dress or labouring garb.  
As words move us through their effect on the mind, especially through the 
material connotations that metaphors create, so physical material can have the same 
effect unmediated by words. In earlier chapters we considered John Austin’s notion 
of ‘performative utterances’ (or ‘speech acts’ as he later termed them), but we can 
also speak of ‘performative materials’ or ‘performative properties’. The art of 
rhetoric is most effective when it appreciates the material reality of words and 
                                               
6 Also known as ‘pin-dust’ (typically comprising ground pumice or cuttlefish). It was 
used to prepare the paper by rubbing, and for blotting ink after writing. 
7 See the detailed account in James Daybell, The Material Letter in Early Modern 
England: Manuscript Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing, 1512-
1635 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 30-41. 
8 Jonathan Gil Harris and Natasha Korda eds, Staged Properties in Early Modern 
English Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15. 
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marries this to the moving potential of silent action and material stuff.9 This is real 
rhetoric. Some wordless sights and objects have the quality that Shakespeare calls ‘a 
prone and speechless dialect / Such as move men’ (MM, 1.2.173-4). The word 
‘object’ denotes something that is conceptually ‘thrown against’ the senses, and we 
have seen through the course of this book that some of the most striking and 
significant stage objects are not only thrown conceptually, but are also thrown 
physically (e.g. dust, gloves, warder, skulls). When an object is thrown against 
another thing it will move it, all other things being equal. As Newton’s laws explain 
material encounters in the physical world, so we can talk of dramatic laws through 
which stage properties have a metaphysical power to move people. There is 
something proto-Newtonian in the hope expressed by Claudius that a visit to 
England will move Hamlet to change: ‘Haply the seas and countries different / With 
variable objects shall expel / This something-settled matter in his heart’ (Ham, 
3.1.170-72). Newton’s language of ‘force’ and ‘gravity’ and ‘motion’ would not 
have existed without a rhetorical tradition that understood the matter of the mind to 
be moved by emotional force. Consider, for example, the proto-Newtonian quality of 
Thomas Wilson’s observation that ‘Affections therefore (called Passions) are none 
other thing, but a stirring or forsing of the minde’.10 
Legal documentary performance combines word, act and thing. The word 
‘deed’ is a clue to the speech act by which the legal word is performed and the deed 
is also a documentary thing. It operates not only as a performative utterance, but also 
                                               
9 The connection between thing (res) and word (verba) is a long-standing concern in 
rhetorical studies.  
10 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique (1560) G. H. Mair ed, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909), 130. 
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as a performative property. The seal is the most significant material aspect of a legal 
deed and a clue to this is the fact the word itself derives from the Latin for ‘little 
sign’ (sigillum). The seal is evidence of the wilful participation of the one who 
impresses it.11 When, in King John, Salisbury says ‘we swear / A voluntary zeal’ 
(KJ, 5.2.9-10), Shakespeare is implying a fluid poetic connection between will and 
seal: ‘Voluntary’ corresponds to ‘will’; ‘zeal’ corresponds to ‘seal’. ‘Seal’ and ‘zeal’ 
are expressly identified with each other where The Duke of Austria says ‘Upon thy 
cheek lay I this zealous kiss, / As seal to this indenture of my love’ (KJ, 2.1.19-20) 
(the association is also intimated at 2.1.244, 250). More demanding on the 
imagination, and in that respect more engaging, are the moments were Shakespeare 
connects seal and zeal indirectly through reference to their shared qualities.  If one 
had to choose a word to describe the property of blood (or a blood-red substance) 
which becomes hot, congeals when cool and is used to confirm the performance of 
deeds, ‘seal’ and ‘zeal’ would both be apt. Shakespeare plays with this poetic 
connection – between ‘zeal’ and ‘heat’ and ‘blood’ and ‘voluntary’ and ‘deeds’ and 
‘seal’ – throughout King John. On ‘will’ and ‘heat’ we have the ‘fiery voluntaries’ of 
the English camp (KJ, 2.1.67). On ‘zeal’ and ‘blood’, we have Hubert’s ‘If zealous 
love should go in search of virtue…Whose veins bound richer blood than Lady 
Blanche?’ (KJ, 2.1.428-431); On ‘blood’ and ‘heat’, we have the Bastard’s line ‘the 
rich blood of kings is set on fire!’ (KJ, 2.1.351), and King John’s, ‘France, I am 
burn’d up with inflaming wrath; A rage whose heat hath this condition, / That 
nothing can allay, nothing but blood, / The blood, and dearest-valued blood, of 
                                               
11 Eyre of Kent (S.S.) II.10 (Spigurnel, J.), cited William S. Holdsworth, A History of 
English Law (London: Methuen, 1922-32), III, 417 n.4; Sharington and Pledall v. 
Strotton Court of King’s Bench (1564) 1 Plow. 298, 309; 75 E.R. 454, 470-71. 
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France’ (KJ, 3.1.340-343). On ‘zeal’ and ‘heat’ and ‘blood’ together, we have 
Cardinal Pandulph’s ‘This act so evilly borne shall cool the hearts / Of all his people, 
and freeze up their zeal’ (KJ, 3.3.149-150) (compare R2, 1.1.47, 51). On ‘zeal’ and 
‘heat’ and ‘wax’, we have Queen Elinor’s ‘Lest zeal, now melted by the windy 
breath / Of soft petitions, pity and remorse, / Cool and congeal again to what it was’ 
(KJ, 2.1.477-9). Malone argued that Elinor is referring to zeal as the congealed ice of 
resolution, and Honigmann’s suggestion that Shakespeare might be contrasting the 
heat of English zeal to the iciness of French zeal is not implausible,12 but I agree 
with John Dover Wilson that Shakespeare is here quibbling on ‘zeal’ as a hot 
humour associated with a wax ‘seal’.13 On ‘blood’ and ‘heat’ and ‘wax’ together, we 
have Melun’s ‘Have I not hideous death within my view, / Retaining but a quantity 
of life, / Which bleeds away, even as a form of wax / Resolveth from his figure 
‘gainst the fire?’ (KJ, 5.4.22-25). 
Melun’s words are ‘testamentary’ in the most obvious sense of having ‘death 
within…view’, but they are also testamentary in their connection to the play’s 
central concern with inheritance. The connection to the play’s inheritance theme can 
be inferred into Melun’s phrase ‘‘gainst the fire?’ (5.4.22-25). The phrase is echoed 
in King John’s ‘all my bowels crumble up to dust: / I am a scribbled form, drawn 
with a pen / Upon a parchment, and against this fire / Do I shrink up’ (KJ, 5.7.31-
34). This intensely material reiteration of the material processes of writing, takes us 
directly to what Pettet calls the play’s ‘dominant image, in both the words and the 
stage spectacle’, which is Arthur – the play’s symbol of the true royal succession – 
                                               
12 E. A. J. Honigmann, King John, The Arden Shakespeare, second series (London: 
Methuen, 1954), 47. 
13 John D. Wilson, King John (Cambridge: CUP, 1936), 127. 
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sitting bound against the fire (the brazier of hot coals) in Scene 4.1. Pettet concludes 
that ‘the fire imagery of King John does something, superficially, towards unifying 
the play’ but that ‘it contributes nothing at all to the meaning’.14 I disagree. It seems 
to me that the heat image is essential to the sealing of the testamentary performance 
and is therefore a most meaningful signifier of the play’s intense concern to engage 
the sensory participation of the playgoing witnesses. Their participation becomes 
politically charged when the play invites them to join in passing judgment on the 
willful acts of a king. Hubert, a citizen comrade to the original London playgoers, 
presents the documentary evidence of John’s order to kill Arthur: 
 
HUBERT  
Here is your hand and seal for what I did. 
KING JOHN  
O, when the last account 'twixt heaven and earth 
Is to be made, then shall this hand and seal 
Witness against us to damnation! 
How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds  
Make deeds ill done! Hadst not thou been by, 
A fellow by the hand of nature mark’d, 
Quoted and sign’d to do a deed of shame, 
This murder had not come into my mind (KJ, 4.2.215-224). 
 
                                               
14 E. C. Pettet, ‘Hot Irons and Fever: A Note on some of the Imagery of King John’, 
Essays in Criticism 4(2) (1954), 128-144, 136. 
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John does not deny that the document is his, but he tries to deny responsibility for 
the deed by shifting the blame on to Hubert and to ‘nature’. This is a dramatically 
interesting variation on the legal plea ‘non est factum’ (‘this is not my deed’).15 This 
legal plea asserts that the pleader did not appreciate the import of what it was that he 
or she had signed. A successful plea of non est factum renders the instrument void 
from its inception.16 The plea normally applies to inter vivos instruments (documents 
created during the creator’s lifetime), but even in Shakespeare’s day the plea had a 
counterpart in the law of wills. According to Swinburne, ‘[i]t is the minde and not 
the words which giveth life to the testament’, so a will was void and ‘no testament’ if 
it lacked animum testandi.17 This covered the case of a testator who was found to 
have made his will ‘rashly, unadvisedly’ or otherwise ‘not seriously, nor with a firme 
purpose to make his will’,18 and it covered cases of fraud.19 Shakespeare’s King 
John, likewise Bolingbroke in Richard II, perform acts of trade with the crown (see 
Chapter Two), and it is notable that they both attempt similar pleas of non est factum 
in order to deny responsibility for deeds. In Richard II, there is an episode in which 
Bolingbroke purports to deny responsibility for the deed of killing the rightful king 
in almost exactly the same way that King John does, although in Bolingbroke’s case 
the deed is not written down. When Exton presents Richard’s body. Bolingbroke 
                                               
15 For a more literal rendering of the plea on stage, see Ben Jonson’s Volpone, where 
the Advocate Voltore (‘Vulture’) says ‘it is my hand; / But all that it contains is 
false.’ (5.8). 
16 Stone and Withypolls Case (1587) 1 Leonard 113, 114; 74 E.R. 106. 
17 Swinburne, ‘Testaments’, 261. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Swinburne, ‘Testaments’, 240. 
	 209	
decries Exton’s ‘deed of slander’, to which Exton replies ‘From your own mouth, my 
lord, did I this deed’ (R2,5.6.37). In the same play, Aumerle attempts a plea of non 
est factum in more orthodox form when he repents the deed by which he sealed his 
treason against Bolingbroke, saying: ‘Read not my name there; / My heart is not 
confederate with my hand’ (R2, 5.3.51-52). The denial of deeds is fundamentally 
alienating behaviour. A legal documentary deed is a deed of action (of the hand and 
mind) represented as a physical thing. When the actor playing King John denies his 
own act and the actor Hubert (in the role of executor and executioner) refuses his 
role, the performance as a whole becomes a detached or alien object thrown against 
the playgoers as something to be handled and assessed. With apologies to the 
melancholy Jaques, one person can at any time ‘play many parts’, and here, as John 
turns from testator to witness of his own will, and as Hubert turns from executor to 
judge, so the playgoing witnesses are engaged to all perspectives at once. They 
witness the wills of others in performance and through a process of trial or probation 
they pass judgment on others with a will of their own. 
In Julius Caesar, Brutus did not in express terms seek to deny his deed, but 
Harry Keyishian notes that in the assassination scene in Stuart Burge’s film version 
(Commonwealth United Entertainment, 1970), when the conspirators held their 
‘hands palms-outward, so as not to stain their clothes’, they ‘in some gestural sense 
repudiate their deed even as they praise it’.20 The motif of the ‘bloody deed’ is 
ubiquitous in Shakespeare’s tragedies. In Hamlet, Gertrude says ‘bloody deed is 
this!’ (Ham, 3.4.25) in reference to the accidental execution of Polonius. (That’s 
                                               
20 Harry Keyishian, ‘Storm, Fire, and Blood: Patterns of Imagery in Stuart Burge’s 
Julius Caesar’, in Shakespeare in Performance, Frank Occhiogrosso ed (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 2003), 101. 
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execution of a ‘formality’ if ever there was one). Hamlet immediately echoes her: ‘A 
bloody deed’ (Ham, 3.4.26). The ‘bloody deed’ is frequently employed as a pun or 
trope on a legal deed. As blood marks the violent performance of will, so the red 
mark of wax seals the legal performance of will in testamentary and lifetime 
documents.  Hamlet says that he will ‘speak daggers’ to his mother in the form of 
‘words’, but will not give his words ‘seals’ by actually using a dagger (Ham, 
3.2.386-389). Early modern drama frequently employs physical properties of red on 
white – typically a stain of blood on white flesh or white cloth – to associate 
murderous deeds and executions with the legal execution of documentary deeds. The 
signal contrast between red and white is primal. It may be as close as we get to a 
universal sign of the performance of human life. With regard to the Ndembu people, 
the anthropologist Victor Turner observed that:  
 
when the colors are considered in abstraction from social and ritual contexts, 
Ndembu think of white and black as the supreme antitheses in their scheme 
of reality. Yet...in rite after rite white and red appear in conjunction and black 
is seldom directly expressed…in action contexts red is regularly paired with 
white21 
 
In Shakespeare’s usage, the mark of red on white has ritual and liminal significance. 
It denotes loss of innocence. Witness Hubert’s ‘this hand of mine / Is yet a maiden 
and an innocent hand, / Not painted with the crimson spots of blood’ (KJ, 4.2.251-
253)). Desdemona’s ‘handkerchief / Spotted with strawberries’ (Oth, 3.3.437-438), 
                                               
21 Victor W. Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1967), 74. 
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which was adduced by Iago in evidence of her infidelity, seems to be a similar sign – 
always assuming that the handkerchief was white (in Iqbal Khan’s 2015 RSC 
production it was black, and so was Iago). Violence, death, mourning and 
remembrance of the dead are frequently signalled by the sign of red and white and 
by the prop of a bloodied handkerchief (JC, 3.2.134; R3, 4.4.274-277). Shakespeare 
and other early modern playwrights followed the medieval theatrical tradition of 
using blood symbolically to evoke the performative power of the blood of Christ and 
His saints.22 They were also reviving a tradition, dating back to ancient Greek drama, 
in which the stain of blood was used to represent the violence inherent in the 
performance of will, especially will expressed through the imposition of rigid rules 
and inflexible forms of law. An important early example appears in Sophocles’ 
Antigone.23 Creon, King of Thebes, had decreed that Polyneices (eldest son of 
Oedipus’ incestuous union with his mother Jocasta), who had died in an assault upon 
his native Thebes, must be left unburied in the public street as punishment for his 
treachery. Antigone, a sister of Polyneices, was imprisoned at Creon’s command 
when it emerged that she had secretly performed burial rites for her brother by 
sprinkling earth on his corpse. Antigone’s dungeon cell became her tomb when she 
killed herself by hanging and it was in that state that Haemon, Creon’s son and 
Antigone’s lover, discovered her pale corpse. Impassioned with rage, he assailed 
Creon and in the process killed himself upon his own sword. The line that sets the 
seal on the tragic scene is delivered by a messenger to Haemon’s mother, Eurydice. 
                                               
22 See, generally, John Spalding Gatton, ‘“There must be blood”: mutilation and 
martyrdom on the medieval stage’, in Violence in Drama, J Redmond ed 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 79-91.  
23 Mark Griffith ed, Sophocles: Antigone (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).  
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Through the messenger’s report (an ancient precedent for the theatrical technique of 
using on-stage witness narrative), we learn that when Haemon (the ‘man of blood’) 
took Antigone in a final embrace, ‘he spurted a quick stream of bloody drops onto 
her white cheek’ (1238-1239). This sealed the violent performance of Creon’s will 
and law. Red blood on a white cheek was an established sign of ritual mourning. 
(Euripides’ The Suppliant Women, records that the Argive mothers were directed to 
mourn their dead sons with the words: ‘Bloody the white fingernail along the cheek, 
and stain the skin!’).24 The blood on Antigone’s white cheek was also a sign of her 
lost innocence, and as such it set a tragic seal on her will to marry Haemon.25 
The climactic crypt scene in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet is in some 
salient respects similar to the climactic dungeon scene in Sophocles’ Antigone. 
When Romeo finds Juliet in the crypt, he associates her facial appearance with the 
sign of red and white, observing that ‘Beauty’s ensign yet / Is crimson in thy lips and 
in thy cheeks, / And death’s pale flag is not advanced there’ (RJ, 5.3.94-96). 
Believing Juliet to be dead, Romeo kills himself, as Haemon did, by an act that is at 
once deliberate and unintended. Shakespeare has Romeo express his performance in 
the legal terminology of a deed that has been sealed and thereby finalised or 
‘engrossed’, but he does so with typically poetic disregard for legal technical 
distinctions between doctrinal categories. He blends the sense of contractual act and 
testamentary consequence: 
                                               
24 F. W. Jones trans, Euripides: The Suppliant Women, in The Complete Greek 
Tragedies, Volume 4, D. Grene and R. A. Lattimore eds (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), 139. 
25 L. J. Bennett and W. B. Tyrrell, ‘What is Antigone Wearing?’, The Classical 
World 85(2) (1991), 107-109. 
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                                …Eyes, look your last; 
Arms, take your last embrace, and lips, O you 
The doors of breath, seal with a righteous kiss 
A dateless bargain to engrossing death. (5.3.112-115) 
 
Shakespeare returned to a similar set of thoughts in Henry V, where the Duke of 
Exeter narrates the report of a touching encounter between the dying Duke of York 
and the body of his comrade, the Duke of Suffolk. He tells how York kissed ‘the 
gashes / That bloodily did yawn upon his face’ (4.6.13-14), and: 
 
 So did he turn, and over Suffolk’s neck 
 He threw his wounded arm and kissed his lips, 
 And so, espoused to death, with blood he sealed 
 A testament of noble-ending love. (4.6.24-27) 
 
In Henry V, Shakespeare describes written evidence of the treachery of the Earl of 
Cambridge, Lord Scroop and Sir Thomas Grey in terms that seem to allude to the 
legal idea of the deed ‘engrossed’. Henry considers the written evidence to be truth 
‘as gross / As black on white’ (2.2.103-4). In the next Act of the same play, allusion 
to legal documentation acquires something of a testamentary sense through the use 
of the word ‘attest’. Henry challenges his troops to ‘attest / That those whom you 
called fathers did beget you. / Be copy now to men of grosser blood’ (3.1.22-24). 
‘Copy’ and ‘gross’ both refer to deeds in their final, and thus finest, form.  
In Julius Caesar, when Antony speaks of ‘a parchment, with the seal of 
Caesar’ (3.2.129) and later produces ‘the will, and under Caesar’s seal’ (3.2.233), 
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there can be little doubt that he is holding a white parchment sealed with red wax. If 
the parallel sign of blood on Caesar’s white toga and corpse does not confirm it, then 
it is confirmed by Antony’s prophesy that if the plebeians were to read the will, they 
would ‘go and kiss dead Caesar’s wounds, / and dip their napkins in his sacred 
blood’ (3.2.133-4). The motif of the napkin dipped in blood was not exclusive to 
tragedy. In Shakespeare’s intensely testamentary comedy As You Like It, we have the 
curious incident of Orlando being delayed by a violent encounter with a lioness. He 
sends a bloodied handkerchief as proof of his valour and as an evidentiary 
explanation for his tardiness. A Warning for Fair Women, an anonymous domestic 
tragedy contemporary with both Julius Caesar and As You Like It, seems to have 
inspired elements of Shakespeare’s plays or to have been inspired by them. In A 
Warning, the murderer Browne kills his lover’s husband and dips his ‘hankerchief in 
his bloud’ in order to ‘send it as a token’ to her (v. 1385-86).26 Browne makes 
express what is only implied in Shakespeare’s plays – that the stained handkerchief 
represents bloody performance: ‘Upon this bloody Handkercher the thing, / As I did 
promise and have now performed’ (1412-13). Subha Mukherji observes that ‘in its 
statement of promise and performance, this gesture enacts a perverse marriage 
sequence’.27 (As such, it reminds us of the inverted nuptials witnessed in the death 
tryst of Haemon and Antigone.) The resonance between A Warning and Julius 
Caesar is loudest where both plays refer to the speaking tongues of bloody wounds. 
In Julius Caesar, ‘sweet Caesar’s wounds’ are ‘poor poor dumb mouths’ (3.2.218) 
and Antony wishes that his oratory could ‘put a tongue / In every wound of Caesar’ 
                                               
26 Charles Dale Cannon, A Warning for Fair Women: A Critical Edition (The Hague 
and Paris: Mouton, 1975). 
27 Law and Representation in Early Modern England (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 120. 
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(3.2.221-2). In A Warning, Browne reports that ‘In ev’ry wound there is a bloudy 
tongue, / Which will speake… / By a whole Jury I shall be accusde’ (1995-99). 
There is something more here than the mere evident sight of blood on white flesh. 
There is also the testimonial sound of speech. The playgoers are presented with a 
signal object as a thing to be seen, but also as a thing to be heard. A true case of 
hearing the evident.28  
 As the mark of red on white is a stage property that signals tragedy, so the 
‘ring’ is a stage property that signals comedy. The distinction is not strict, of course 
(we have already noted the bloody handkerchief in As You Like It, and the sealed 
bond in The Merchant of Venice is a tragic element in the context of a play that is 
formally comedic), but as a general rule the bloody mark is a tragic sign and the ring 
is a comedic symbol. In Chapter Three [of Acts of Will], we considered how the ring 
operates in comedy to symbolize the folly of willing submission to bonds (bands) 
and the folly of repeating errors in a never-ending circle of ‘here we are all over 
again’. I will only add here that the placement of the ring conceit within the plot of 
the comedic action is strikingly consistent across Shakespeare’s plays. Where a 
comedy contains confusion and tricks with rings, the relevant scenes nearly always 
come towards the end of the play. As such they speak of comedy’s cyclical errors – 
its errors without end. They also put a seal on the ‘testamentary performance’ 
(including the ‘deed’ or ‘action’ of the play) as a signet ring does. Examples of 
concluding or late scenes involving ring games and ring conceits include the 
following: Comedy of Errors (4.2-4.4, 5.1); Two Gentlemen of Verona (4.4, 5.4); 
The Merchant of Venice (5.1: in this play, ‘ring’ is the very last word); The Merry 
                                               
28	On judgment by sight and sound, see the discussion in Chapter Five [of Acts of 
Will].	
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Wives of Windsor (5.5); All’s Well That Ends Well (5.3). Twelfth Night, or What You 
Will is the exception in which the ring game comes early in the play (1.5, 2.2, 3.1), 
but that comedy is sealed in the most poignant re-joining of twin brother and sister as 
if re-joining a signet ring to the counterpart of the wax seal. It is, I think, the most 
touching ending to any of Shakespeare’s comedies, even before one conjectures that 
it might imagine the reunion of Shakespeare’s own daughter Judith to the twin 
brother she had lost. With such an ending, it is little wonder that Shakespeare broke 
with his pattern and pushed the folly of the ring game to the beginning of the play. 
In As You Like It we have no actual ring game, but the repeated reference to 
spring as a ‘pretty ring time’ in the stanzas of a song comes in Scene 5.3, which is 
exactly where we would expect it. Coming at the end of the play, the ring sets a seal 
on the comedy by focusing, not upon the mark made by the ring (as the fatal finality 
of a tragedy must), but by focusing upon the never-ending nature of the circle itself. 
In comedy, errors go on, but so does life. The ring in All’s Well That Ends Well has a 
distinctively testamentary quality, but not in any morbid sense. The ring is 
testamentary in the sense that it had been ‘Conferr’d by testament to th’ sequent 
issue’ (AWW, 5.3.196) down six generations. It is also testamentary in the fact that it 
performs an evidentiary function in the trial of Diana’s virtue. Presented with the 
evidence of the ring, her accuser blushes red on his white cheeks (the comedic 
equivalent of Juliet’s or Antigone’s tragic ‘blush’). The ring becomes the chief 
witness in this scene because Parolles, who was summoned as a witness to give oral 
evidence in the matter, cannot be relied upon on; he is ‘So bad an instrument’ (AWW, 
5.3.201). There is a joke for the lawyers in this, for parol (oral) evidence is the exact 
opposite of the documentary evidence that an ‘instrument’ supplies. 
Like the classical pairing of the mask of tragedy with the mask of comedy, 
the blood red wax of tragedy and the ring of comedy are two sides of the same 
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dramatic performance. We noted earlier that when Shakespeare was writing, the seal 
was usually created by pressing a signet ring or other matrix into the hot wax (Ham, 
5.2.47-52). Taking this as our metaphor, we can say that the signet ring of comedy 
leaves its impression on the bloody wax of tragedy and that it succeeds as comedy 
because it has touched the tragic but come away untainted. Aristotle used the image 
of wax and signet to explain the unity of body and soul. He argued that the body is 
not of the same substance as the soul, but that body and soul are imprinted with the 
same identity: ‘Hence we need not ask whether the soul and body are one, any more 
than we need to ask this about the wax and the seal or, in general, about the matter 
and the thing of which it is the matter’.29  The signet made of gold imparts its form to 
the wax, but does not impart its golden substance. Extending the allegory in the 
direction of Christian theology, we might say that during the life of a person the 
golden signet of the soul is pressed into constant contact with the wax of the earthly 
body, so that the waxen flesh bears the seal or identity of the soul. At death, the wax 
is melted and the same golden signet makes a new and more perfect impression on 
the new and more perfect wax of the eternal body.30 
As we perform our lives in flesh, so we perform ourselves in dress, including 
the material form of clothes. Parolles is considered to be an unreliable instrument 
because his soul ‘is his clothes’ (2.5.43-44), but even such stuff as clothes can bear 
the sincere imprint of our identity. The actor who played the courtly Parolles would 
very likely have been wearing the clothes that a dead gentleman or nobleman had 
left to the company or which had been sold to the company by a beneficiary of the 
                                               
29 Aristotle, Peri psyches (‘on the soul’), III.432b.  
30	1 Corinthians 15:52 ‘…the dead shall be raised up incorruptible, and we shall be 
changed’ (Geneva Bible, 1599).	
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deceased man’s testament.31 When Richard Burbage, playing Hamlet, pondered the 
material remains that the human soul leaves behind at death, did he pause to 
contemplate that his costume was (we can conjecture) a material remnant of another 
man’s life? 
Talking of material remnants brings us back to the glove or gage. We have 
noted that it is a sign of the hand’s action in executing documents and performing all 
sorts of acts of will in the worlds of theatre and law. The glove also has a prior 
material connection to legal performance in the fact that gloves were made of the 
same stuff – animal skin – as the most important legal deeds. Skin is simultaneously 
the very definition of superficial and the very definition of a materially significant 
remnant of life. Shakespeare, whose father was amongst many other things a glove-
maker and seller of skins, grew up in Stratford surrounded by material connections 
between hand and deed. Hamlet has just been discussing legal formalities at the 
graveside when he asks ‘Is not parchment made of sheepskins?’, we should not be 
surprised that Horatio’s response is very precise: ‘Ay, my lord, and of calves’ skins 
too’ (Ham, 5.1.107-108). 
We will stay in Stratford-upon-Avon. It seems the proper place to conclude 
this study of testamentary will as we mark the four hundredth anniversary of 
Shakespeare’s last will and testament. When most people think of Shakespeare’s 
will, one thing comes immediately to mind. It is a thing that I have preferred to leave 
until last, as he seemingly did. I am referring of course to the solitary provision by 
                                               
31 Peter Stallybrass, ‘Worn Worlds: Clothes and Identity on the Renaissance Stage’, 
in Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture, Margreta de Grazia and Maureen 
Quilligan and Peter Stallybrass eds (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 289-320. 
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which Shakespeare made a bequest in favour of his wife (without actually 
mentioning Anne’s name). The provision, added between the lines towards the end 
of his will, simply reads: ‘Itm, I gyve vnto my wief my second best bed wth the 
furniture’. That bed has generated much entertaining speculation on the nature of 
Shakespeare’s relationship to Anne.32 I will let them lie in it. My only suggestion is 
that Shakespeare was probably content to think that Anne would be looked after by 
their daughter Susanna and her husband Dr John Hall. If we have learned anything 
from our study of performance and will, it is that formal appearances are never the 
end of the matter. With legal forms, we must be especially careful to read between 
the lines, and beyond the lines. As Hamlet points out: ‘They are sheep and calves 
which seek out assurance’ in legal documents (Ham, 5.1.109-10). What he is saying 
is that to put one’s hope in legal forms is to follow the flock. The legal suitor is on 
this view someone who pursues the sight of the form without questioning what lies 
behind it or where it might lead. I like to think that Shakespeare is mocking legalistic 
habits of unthinking formalism and all routine forms of behaviour that are devoid of 
imaginative acts of will. 
  Another interlineal addition to Shakespeare’s will was an item describing 
gifts of money to Shakespeare’s ‘fellows’ in the London theatre: John Heminges, 
Richard Burbage and Henry Condell. The money was given for the express purpose 
of purchasing rings to remember Shakespeare by. We now know that Heminges and 
Condell went a good deal further, for it is in large part down to their efforts that we 
                                               
32 For a measured view see E. A. J. Honigmann, ‘Shakespeare’s Will and 
Testamentary Traditions’, in Shakespeare and Cultural Traditions, Tetsuo Kishi, 
Roger Pringle and Stanley Wells eds (Newark: University of Delaware, 1994), 127–
37.  
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have the First Folio edition of Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & 
Tragedies.33 
Shakespeare’s son Hamnet, who had predeceased his father by almost twenty 
years, was nowhere expressly referred to in his father’s will. It would have been 
most strange if he had been. There is nevertheless a sense in which the absent 
Hamnet is present in the will. Park Honan observes that the weak point of 
Shakespeare’s own estate was ‘its terrible lack of a male heir’,34 and the wording of 
the will, even allowing that it was a variation on a standard form, seems to strain to 
make up for that lack. It provides no less than seven times that the estate should pass 
by entail to ‘heires Males of the bodie’ of Shakespeare’s daughters and their issue 
(on ‘entail’, see Chapter Three [of Acts of Will]). Hamnet is an absent presence in the 
will. Shakespeare explores something like this sense of absent presence in a passage 
in King John, written around the time of Hamnet’s death. Constance speaks 
movingly of a parent’s grief at the loss of a son:  
 
Grief fills the room up of my absent child, 
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me, 
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words, 
Remembers me of all his gracious parts, 
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form (KJ, 3.3.93-97) 
 
Perhaps these words reflect some of Shakespeare’s thoughts on the loss of his son. 
That is what I hear, and I make no apology for taking the romantic view. John Dover 
                                               
33 London: Printed by Isaac Jaggard and Edward Blount, 1623. 
34 Park Honan, Shakespeare: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 233. 
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Wilson was of a very different opinion. For him this description of grief seemed 
‘conventional and frigid’.35 There can be no argument on matters of taste, but there 
may be some middle ground to be found in the fact that Shakespeare would surely 
not have intended the grief in this passage to be appreciated by the playgoers as a 
representation of his own grief. It is poetry intended to be performed on stage (and 
by the time of the First Folio, if not before, intended to be read on the page). As 
such, the passage demonstrates Shakespeare’s poetic capacity to animate material 
stuff (even the mundane ‘room’, ‘bed’ and ‘garments’) so as to make them humanly 
touching. This is poetry with testamentary power, for as it gives life to inanimate 
things it connects the world of the living to the world after death. It is with this 
power that Shakespeare still fills up the house.
                                               
35 John Dover Wilson ed, King John (Cambridge: CUP, 1936), vii. 
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Dress, Law and Naked Truth: A Cultural Study of Fashion and Form 




Shakespeare on Proof and Fabricated Truth 
 
[B]lessed he who has a skin and tissues, so it be a living one, and the heart-
pulse everywhere discernable through it.1 
The imaginary English editor of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus observes that the 
imaginary philosopher Teufelsdröckh ‘though a Sanscullotist, is no Adamite’.2 
Commenting on this, Michael Carter explains that Teufelsdröckh (and, by 
implication, Carlyle) ‘will have nothing to do with the notion that if we were to strip 
off our outer casings truth, equality and justice would blossom’, for he knows ‘that 
social being is “clothed-being”’.3 It is true that Carlyle wrote that man ‘is by nature a 
Naked Animal; and only in certain circumstances, by purpose and device, masks 
himself in Clothes’, but that observation was made in the context of comparing 
                                               
1 Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present (London: Chapman & Hall, 1843), Book II, 
chapter 17. 
2 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus: The Life and Opinions of Herr Teufelsdröckh 
(1833–4) (Boston: James Munroe and Co, 1836), Book I, chapter 9. 
3 Michael Carter, Fashion Classics from Carlyle to Barthes (Oxford and New York: 
Berg, 2003), 5. 
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human zoological nature to the biological nature of plant and animal life.4 His point 
was only that the human is somewhat under-covered in its zoological nature 
compared to the almost complete covering that one sees on birds and most land-
dwelling mammals. Sartor Resartus, Carter further elaborates, ‘was never a 
renunciation of clothes, or even a criticism of elaborate costume. It was a manifesto 
for authenticity’.5 
In this chapter, we will examine early modern suspicion of superficialities 
and the corresponding early modern appreciation that the truths on which civil life 
relies may be fabricated things. The very phrase ‘naked truth’ was a poetic fiction 
coined in the early modern period by the Scottish poet Alexander Montgomerie,6 a 
favourite of King James VI of Scotland (James I of England). This chapter will 
reveal that ‘truth’, for purposes of legal proof, is as much a fabricated or ‘coined’ 
fiction as the contemporary poetic concept of ‘naked truth’. 
Lorna Hutson has located The Invention of Suspicion7 in the early modern 
period, and she finds significant clues to a culture of suspicion in the creative, 
including theatrical, culture of England at that time. The focus of this chapter is 
specifically upon suspicion of dress in early modern England and the relation that 
this had to the trial of truth in society at large and in courts of law in particular. 
Significant indicators of that cultural connection are to be found within 
                                               
4 Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, Book I, chapter 1. 
5 Carter, Fashion Classics, 11. 
6 ‘The Cherrie and the Slae’ (ca.1585) (Edinburgh: Robert Waldegrave, 1597), stanza 
82. (Stanza 81 commences with a call to test a truth by confrontation ‘face for face’.) 
7 Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and 
Renaissance Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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contemporary polemic (e.g. Phillip Stubbs complained in his Anatomy of Abuses in 
England that the ‘confuse mingle mangle of apparell’ had produced ‘general 
disorder’)8 and within literary and dramatic works, not least in the works of William 
Shakespeare (the son of a Warwickshire glove-maker and sometime lodger with a 
London wig-maker).9 Of course, suspicion, indeed cynicism, regarding proof and 
truth in courts of law was no new phenomenon. In Plato’s Phaedrus, the character of 
Socrates makes an observation that must have rung as true in Shakespeare’s day as it 
did in ancient Greece, as it does today: 
[H]e who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they 
say, with truth in considering things which are just or good . . . For in the 
courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that 
which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist 
in speech must fix his attention upon probability.10 
In the early modern period, general suspicion of an individual’s capacity to perform 
a false public persona was widespread, for this was the age in which the modern 
individual was beginning to emerge from the cocoon of collective social identity that 
had prevailed in the societies, guilds and feudal categories of the Middle Ages. 
Suspicion of evident forms was acute in the English law court, especially in relation 
to contractual and other documentary formalities in a world of increased monetary 
                                               
8 Phillip Stubbs, Anatomy of Abuses in England (London: Richard Jones, 1583), sig. 
C2v. 
9 Charles Nicholl, The Lodger: Shakespeare on Silver Street (London: Allen Lane, 
2007). 
10 Plato in Twelve Volumes (trans. Harold N. Fowler), Vol. 9 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1925), 272d–e. 
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lending and mercantile trade, but it was nowhere more acute than in relation to 
individuals’ physical appearance in an England gripped by suspicion of covert 
Roman Catholicism (including concealed Jesuit spies) and even of witches in 
disguise. The rising popularity of the ‘masque’ form of entertainment at the English 
court throughout the early modern period can be seen as an attempt by the ruling 
class to reassert respect for superficialities in the face of their diminishing 
reliability.11 
At the end of the sixteenth century, sumptuary laws were still on the statute 
books and dress was in theory supposed to be a trusty indicator of social role and 
social standing, but in practice the sumptuary laws were hardly enforced and dress 
was considered to be an increasingly unreliable indicator of social role, social rank 
and individual identity. There was great suspicion of dressing out-of-status, and that 
concern was particularly strong in relation to martial dress. In Shakespeare’s Henry 
V when the herald from the King of France declared ‘You know me by my habit’ 
(3.6.87), he was declaring what was certainly true in London in the days of the 
historical Henry V but which had become much less certain in 1599 when 
Shakespeare first staged his play. Dress continued to operate in early modern 
England ‘as a form of material memory’ that ‘incorporated the wearer into a system 
                                               
11 Jennifer Chibnall, ‘“To That Secure Fix’d State”: The Function of the Caroline 
Masque Form’, in David Lindley (ed.), The Court Masque (Manchester: MUP, 
1984), 78–93, 80–1; Robert I. Lublin, ‘“Whosoever Loves Not Picture, Is Injurious 
to Truth”: Costumes and the Stuart Masque’, in Cynthia Kuhn and Cindy Carlson 
(eds), Styling Texts: Dress and Fashion in Literature (Youngstown, NY: Cambria, 
2007), chapter 4. 
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of obligations’,12 but respect for dress prescriptions were in decline. As the force of 
collective dress codes was on the wane, so the freedom and responsibly to fashion 
oneself appropriately was on the rise. Jurists understood this. William Dugdale wrote 
of the contemporary lawyer that ‘even as his Apparell doth show him to be, even so 
shall he be esteemed’.13 This same responsibility is expressed in the advice Polonius 
gave his son Laertes in Shakespeare’s Hamlet: 
Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy, 
But not expressed in fancy; rich, not gaudy: 
For the apparel oft proclaims the man, 
. . .  
This above all: to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. (1.3.73–5, 81–3) 
The irony is that the theatre was a prime forum for the performance of falsehood. 
Indeed, the growing popularity of theatre served to heighten general mistrust of dress 
as an indicator of social status, not least because actors sometimes wore garments 
handed down from their noble patrons.14 (Although it has been observed that ‘when 
characters in Shakespeare’s plays change their clothes, and hence their status, they 
                                               
12 Peter Stallybrass and Ann Rosalind Jones, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials 
of Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 22. 
13 William Dugdale, Origines Juridicales (London: F and T Warren, 1666), fo. 197. 
14 Peter Stallybrass, ‘Worn Worlds: Clothes and Identity on the Renaissance Stage’, 
in Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan and Peter Stallybrass (eds), Subject and 
Object in Renaissance Culture (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 289–320. 
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never of their own (represented) volition disguise up the social scale’.15) Meanwhile, 
courtiers were accused of dressing like actors.16 In the martial context, a significant 
contributor to the culture of mistrust was the fact that, although early Tudor militia 
regulations had communicated the debt of service ‘inherent in the king’s coat’ and 
had defined the ways in which it ‘covered men’s legal status’,17 the modern idea of 
military uniform did not yet exist.18 It was therefore expedient for vainglorious 
individuals to employ dress to make an outward but empty show of valour. It is with 
such doubts in mind that in Shakespeare’s Henry V the Duke of Orleans and the 
Constable of France take opposing sides in a mock trial of the Dauphin’s valour. 
Orleans argues that the Dauphin’s valorous virtue is obvious, to which the Constable 
contradicts that ‘never anybody saw it but his lackey. ‘Tis a hooded valour’ (3.7.80–
1). On the eve of The Battle of Agincourt, Henry, disguised at this point as a 
common soldier, prays that God will ‘steel’ his soldiers’ hearts (4.1.245). Earlier he 
had directly summoned his soldiers to ‘[d]isguise fair nature with hard-favoured 
                                               
15 Susan Baker, (1992) 43.3 ‘Personating Persons: Rethinking Shakespearean 
Disguises’ Shakespeare Quarterly 303–16, 313. 
16 Thomas Nashe railed against ‘England, the players’ stage of gorgeous attire, the ape 
of all nations’ superfluities’. (Christ’s Teares Over Jerusalem [1593] [London: 
Longman, 1815], 135.) 
17 Vimala C. Pasupathi, ‘Coats and Conduct: The Materials of Military Obligation in 
Shakespeare’s Henry Plays’ (2012) 109.3 Modern Philology 326–51, 366. 
18 In the Middle Ages, sumptuary laws had been passed in an attempt to prevent 
wealthy lords from kitting out private armies of retainers in their livery: Jane 
Ashelford, The Art of Dress: Clothes and Society, 1500–1914 (London: National 
Trust, 1999), 289. 
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rage’ (3.1.8), just as their fathers had proved themselves in war and thereby been 
made ‘war-proof’ (3.1.18). Such language indicates the widespread contemporary 
suspicion that fair and feint nature was all too often concealed in martial disguise, 
not only at war, where one might find a ‘counterfeit cowardly knave’ (5.1.51), but 
more especially in the counterfeit valorous dress adopted in peaceful civil life. 
Certain false or misleading indicators of martial prowess, such as the doublet 
(originally the comfortable second or ‘double’ layer worn under a breastplate) and 
slashed cloth were even items of general fashion at this time, and not just for men. 
The problem of false representation of martial valour was exacerbated by the fact 
that real soldiers, if we can read a contemporary complaint into Shakespeare’s line, 
had savage manners and dressed in ‘diffused attire’ (5.2.61). 
One of the recurring themes of Shakespeare’s plays is that even the 
ceremonial vestments of kings are no sure proof of true kingship. The premise of 
Shakespeare’s Henry V is that the King of France rules under a false title; that his 
title is founded on mere ‘shows of truth’ (1.2.74). At the start of the play, King 
Henry invites his counsellor, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to outline Henry’s true 
title to France, and in doing so the king warns the archbishop to speak truthfully – 
not to ‘fashion’, ‘colour’ or ‘suit’ falsely (1.2.15–19). Having been reassured as to 
his own true title to France, Henry sends the Duke of Exeter to France, where he 
demands that the French king should ‘divest’ himself and ‘lay apart . . . / all wide-
stretched honours that pertain / By custom and the ordinance of times / Unto the 
crown of France’ (2.4.82, 86–8). The metaphor represents the royal title of the 
French king as a stretched-out layer of ‘costumary’ title with which he has been 
falsely invested. The dress dimension of Shakespeare’s notion of kingship is 
confirmed later in the play when King Henry, reflecting on the nature of a king, 
observes that ‘his ceremonies / laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man.’ 
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(4.1.96) and wonders to himself if a king’s ceremony is anything other than ‘place, 
degree and form / Creating awe and fear in other men?’ (4.1.200–1). All of which 
recalls the moment when he became king of England and donned the ‘new and 
gorgeous garment majesty’ (2 Henry IV 5.2.45).19 In Shakespeare’s King Lear we 
see how naked a king may become when he divests himself of his invested 
authority.20 
What does it mean to ‘prove’ a title? What qualifies as ‘proof’? The word 
‘proof’ is nowadays used to indicate material that withstands physical trial (we talk 
of ‘bulletproof’ and ‘waterproof’ clothing) and to indicate material evidence that 
withstands legal trial. When Shakespeare was writing, proof as a quality of clothing 
and adjudicatory proof as a quality of legal evidence were associated by a shared 
suspicion of appearances and a shared desire to employ processes of probation 
(processes of ‘probing’) to discover hidden things. The witch trials that were 
pervasive in the Old World and the New World throughout this period are terrible 
testimony to the force of this concern, for they were focused to a large extent upon 
the skin of alleged witches. One preferred mode of proof was to ‘prick’ or ‘to probe’ 
                                               
19 We might say that ‘kingship itself is a disguise, a role, an action that a man might 
play’: David Scott Kastan, ‘“The King Hath Many Marching in His Coats”: Or, 
What Did You Do in the War, Daddy?’, in Ivo Kamps (ed.), Shakespeare Left and 
Right (New York: Routledge, 1991), 241–58, 252. Compare the passing of the royal 
robes to the biblical King David, Israel (1 Sam. 18.4). 
20 In the 2007 Royal Shakespeare Company production, directed by Trevor Nunn, Sir 
Ian McKellen in the title role made the point by baring himself completely below 
the waist. 
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the suspect’s skin at the site of so-called devil’s marks.21 What makes this relevant to 
us today is that an awareness of Shakespeare’s (and other early modern) insights into 
proof can serve to cultivate a critical appreciation of the fabricated nature of modern 
legal notions of truth. 
In Othello, we find what is surely the most famous of Shakespeare’s 
references to proof. It occurs when Othello challenges Iago to provide 
incontrovertible evidence of Desdemona’s marital infidelity: ‘Be sure of it: give me 
the ocular proof . . . / Make me to see’t, or at the least so prove it / That the probation 
bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on, or woe upon thy life!’ (3.3.398, 403–5). 
Othello demands proof through direct physical witness of Desdemona’s betrayal (so-
called ocular proof). This is the sort of proof that we have when someone is caught 
‘in the act’ or, which is the next-best thing, caught ‘red-handed’. When someone is 
caught red-handed, the staining of the skin with blood is deemed to obviate the need 
to probe any deeper to find the truth of the offence. This idea of the marked hand as 
(literally) ‘manifest’ proof goes back to antiquity; Cicero, for example, refers to 
facinus manifesto compertum (‘clear and manifest crime’) in his Defence of Aulus 
Cluentius Habitus.22 As it happens, Othello will settle for a lesser standard of 
material evidence of Desdemona’s infidelity, provided it admits of no relevant doubt 
                                               
21 Heikki Pihlajamäki, ‘“Swimming the Witch, Pricking for the Devil’s Mark”: 
Ordeals in the Early Modern Witchcraft Trials’ The Journal of Legal History 21.2 
(2000), 35–58. See, further, Orna Alyagon Darr, Marks of an Absolute Witch: 
Evidentiary Dilemmas in Early Modern England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). Darr 
describes other skin-focused practises, including ‘scratching’. 
22 Pro A. Cluentio Habito XIV.41. Michael Grant (trans.), Cicero: Murder Trials, 
rev. edn (London: Penguin, 1990), 121, 145. 
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(what he calls ‘probation’ that will ‘bear no hinge or loop’). When we understand 
what is meant when Othello refers to ‘probation’ without ‘hinge’ or ‘loop’, we will 
have fashioned a key to unlocking the significance of the idea of proof, not only in 
the works of Shakespeare but also in the world of law. 
In the notes to his 2001 Arden edition of Othello, E. A. J. Honigmann relies 
on the Oxford English Dictionary entries for ‘hinge’ and ‘hang’ to support the view 
that Othello is referring to something that swings or pivots, so that Othello is 
demanding proof so secure ‘that doubts will not move it’.23 As an explanation, this is 
insufficiently precise. In the 1958 Arden edition of the play, M. R. Ridley had 
observed that Othello’s metaphor of ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is very unusual in 
Shakespeare’s works, and that ‘we have therefore to start from scratch’ in discerning 
its meaning. Ridley continues: ‘it is not easy to see what the force of the figure is’, 
observing that it is not like Shakespeare ‘to combine in one picture incongruous 
specific concrete details’, and, significantly: 
This may all seem to be making a fuss about nothing, since the ‘general 
sense’ is clear; but with an artist of Shakespeare’s vivid pictorial imagination 
we should never, I think, be easily satisfied with ‘general sense’ and a 
consequently woolly apprehension when he himself is being concretely 
specific.24 
It is submitted that the hitherto mysterious signification of Shakespeare’s supposedly 
mixed metaphor of ‘probation’, ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is to be found in the technical 
                                               
23 William Shakespeare, Othello (E. A. J. Honigmann ed.) (London: Arden 
Shakespeare, 2001), 232. 
24 William Shakespeare, Othello (M. R. Ridley ed.) (London: Arden Shakespeare, 
1965), 115. 
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terminology of military dress. ‘Probation’ is an allusion to the process by which 
medieval and early modern armourers tested or ‘proved’ their finished work for 
weaknesses, a process which required the armour to be, quite literally, ‘probed’ by a 
range of weaponry. The ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ in Othello’s quote refer to the weak 
points in a suit of armour – these are, as Othello puts it, the main sites of ‘doubt’. No 
suit of armour could function without the loops or buckles by which it was strapped 
together, and in certain places sections of armour were joined by metal hinges. As 
Charles Ffoulkes writes: 
It is almost superfluous to mention the straps which join the various portions 
of the suit. These are always placed, where possible, in positions where they 
are protected from injury; as, for example, on the jambs they are on the inside 
of the leg, next to the horse when the wearer is mounted, and the hinge of the 
jamb being of metal is on the outside.25 (emphasis added) 
Thus Othello’s image of ‘probation’, ‘hinge’ and ‘loop’ is not an inconsistent mix of 
metaphors, but a single extended metaphor, and one that he, as a military general, 
would naturally employ. The metaphor also fits perfectly well with Othello’s express 
concern to establish adjudicatory ‘proof’. Armour that passed the process of 
probation (the process of being proved) was said to qualify as ‘proof’. This 
sequential process is paralleled in an earlier part of Othello’s narrative, where he 
says: ‘I’ll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; /And on the proof, there is no 
more but this: / Away at once with love or jealousy’ (3.3.213–15). 
In the medieval and early modern periods an armourer’s proof found 
distinctively physical expression in the very surface of his work. The armourer 
would shoot arrows and crossbow bolts to establish the thickness of his armour and 
                                               
25 Charles Ffoulkes, The Armourer and His Craft (London: Methuen, 1912), 54–5. 
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the resulting ‘proof marks’ would be left on display (and sometimes decorated) 
deliberately to demonstrate the impenetrable quality of the metal.26 
As early as the end of the fifteenth century, firearms were in frequent use and 
several pieces of armour from this period ‘show a proof mark: a bullet “bruise” in 
some inconspicuous place, by which the armourer had proved that the plate could 
withstand the shot of handguns’.27 The armourer’s practice of probation and proof 
continued to be current and widespread in Shakespeare’s lifetime.28 Proof was 
frequently made by bullet or crossbow bolt, but it could also be made by the stroke 
of a sword. Ffoulkes observes that ‘as late as the seventeenth century we have 
evidence that armour was proved by the “estramaçon” or sword blow’,29 noting that 
armour was graded as ‘full proof’ (à toute épreuve) or ‘half proof’ (à demi épreuve) 
according to its resistance to different types of weapon. Such gradation of proof is 
highly reminiscent of those theories of legal proof (which had prevailed in the Civil 
Law of mainland continental Europe since the early medieval period), that 
distinguished ‘full proof’ (plena probatio) from ‘half proof’ (semiplena probatio).30 
Thus the language for describing the quality of legal proof established by degrees of 
ocular and other evidence developed in a culture in which remarkably similar 
                                               
26 Ibid., 55. 
27 Stephen Slater, The Illustrated Book of Heraldry (London: Hermes House, 2006), 
21. 
28 Harold Arthur Dillon, ‘A Letter of Sir Henry Lee, 1590, on the Trial of Iron for 
Armour’ (1888) 51 Archaeologia 167–72. 
29 Ffoulkes, The Armourer and His Craft, 62. 
30 See James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before 
Pascal (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 15–23. 
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language was taken to indicate the quality of material proof as evidenced by the 
marks which armourers inflicted upon the surface of their work. A similarly close 
cultural relationship existed between legal and material proof in England, which 
should not surprise us when we consider that trial by battle had been a normal 
method of disposing of legal disputes in England after the Norman Conquest, and 
that it survived as an occasional novelty (but latterly without actual combat) until it 
was finally abolished in 1819.31 
We can be confident that it is a military and metallic metaphor of proof that 
Othello is applying to the evidence of Desdemona’s infidelity when he refers to 
probation without a ‘hinge’ or ‘loop’ of doubt. Elsewhere in Othello we find 
frequent clues to the fact that Othello (and, by extension, Shakespeare) has in mind 
an idea of proof that measures the quality of external evidence by its thickness, as if 
it were clothing, armour or some other thing that covers the unclothed state that is 
optimistically imagined to be the ‘naked truth’. When Roderigo makes a pass at 
Cassio with his sword, the undercoat to Cassio’s armour protects him from injury. 
Presumably Cassio had been struck between the joints of his armour. If so, he seems, 
like Othello, to conceive the joint as a site of doubt. Thus he emphasizes Roderigo’s 
inability to know if he (Cassio) is protected beneath his metal outside: ‘That thrust 
had been mine enemy indeed, / But that my coat is better than thou know’st: / I will 
make proof of thine’ (5.1.24–6). Early in the play, when Othello’s own probity is 
called into doubt, the weakness of the evidence against him is directly compared to 
the thinness of clothing: ‘To vouch this is no proof, / Without more wider and more 
overt test / Than these thin habits and poor likelihoods / Of modern seeming do 
                                               
31 Stat 59 Geo III c46. See James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 
(Boston: Little, Brown, & Co, 1898), 7–46. 
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prefer against him’ (1.3.118–21). It is fitting, then, that when Iago presents Othello 
with the final damning piece of ‘evidence’ to establish Desdemona’s supposed 
infidelity, it takes the form of a thin piece of cloth. Desdemona’s strawberry-spotted 
handkerchief (Othello’s first gift to her) is the thin material which, added to the rest, 
will, as if it were armour, at last attain the thickness of sufficient ‘proof’. As Iago 
puts it: ‘this may help to thicken other proofs / That do demonstrate thinly’ (3.3.473–
4). Significantly, and tragically, we know that this fabricated ‘proof’ did not provide 
an authentic account of Desdemona’s conduct, even though it was taken to be a 
sufficient show of truth.32 
As we noted earlier, when Shakespeare was writing and staging his plays, 
fashionable dress had a distinctly military feel. The fact that the doublet was worn by 
Queen Elizabeth at once confirmed and confused its military pretensions. The 
culture of suspicion or doubt concerning external martial appearances coincided with 
a concern to discover the quality of a person’s inner metal. Central to this concern 
was a renaissance of Plato’s metaphorical categorization of citizens in his mythical 
Republic according to different types of metal.33 A version of Plato’s idea was 
reprised by Barnaby Rich (the same who supplied the immediate narrative source for 
Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night) in his 1578 work, Allarme to England.34 In another 
publication of 1578, Walter Darell’s treatise Concerning Manners and Behaviours, 
we find the earliest reference in the English language to inner ‘metal’ or ‘mettle’ as a 
                                               
32 On forging, fabrication and the weaving of lies in Othello see, further, Catherine 
Bates, ‘Weaving and Writing in Othello’ (1993) 46 Shakespeare Survey 51-60. 
33 Plato, The Republic III.4 (trans. D. Lee), 2nd edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974). 
34 Barnaby Rich, Allarme to England foreshewing what perilles are procured, where 
the people liue without regarde of martiall lawe (London: Henrie Middleton, 1578). 
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quality of character that is resistant to a probe (and which would therefore qualify as 
‘proof’ of character). Darell’s complaint is that he sees too many gloriously adorned 
courtiers who ‘like tender mylkesops that can beare no brunt: or that, / beside a 
glorious outside, haue not mettall inough in / them to abide a flea byting’. 35 
Shakespeare’s late drama, Cymbeline (1610), treats a number of the motifs that 
concern us here, including false proof of female infidelity, cross-dressing and 
disguise. In its final act we find a speech of Posthumus Leonatus which precisely 
echoes Walter Darell’s concern to expose the deceit inherent in the fashion for 
glorious garb: 
Let me make men know 
More valour in me than my habits show. 
Gods, put the strength o’th’Leonati in me! 
To shame the guise o’th’world, I will begin 
The fashion, less without and more within. (5.1.29–33) 
Sir John Falstaff is a Shakespearean archetype of the fashion for false outward show 
of martial valour. In The First Part of Henry IV, when Falstaff claims he is ‘no 
coward’ (2.2.48), Prince Henry’s short response is most meaningful when we 
appreciate that outward appearance and inner character are connected by material 
considerations of probation and metallurgy. Henry simply says: ‘We’ll leave that to 
the proof’ (2.2.49). Later in the play, Falstaff employs the language of false form 
(‘counterfeit’) to describe the action of faking his death on the battlefield in order to 
save his life: ‘to counterfeit dying, when a man thereby liveth, is to be no counterfeit, 
but the true and perfect image of life indeed. The better part of valour is discretion.’ 
                                               
35 Walter Darell, ‘Concerning Manners and Behaviours’, in A Short Discourse of the 
Life of Servingmen (London: Ralphe Newberrie, 1578), 56. 
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(5.3.116–17). Another Shakespearean exemplar of the type is the character of Sir 
Andrew Aguecheek in Twelfth Night. Sir Toby Belch advises Sir Andrew, ahead of 
his encounter with Cesario (the disguised Viola), to set up an outward show of 
martial prowess as a false proof of the inner metal which in truth he lacks: 
[S]o soon as ever thou see’st him, draw, and as thou draw’st swear horrible, 
for it comes to pass oft that a terrible oath, with a swaggering accent sharply 
twanged off, gives manhood more approbation than ever proof itself would 
have earned him. (3.4.132–5) 
Yet another example is Parolles, a follower of Bertram in All’s Well That Ends Well. 
In one scene, Bertram defends Parolles as a soldier of ‘very valiant approof’, but 
Lafeu does not trust the outward appearance of the man: ‘there can be no kernel in 
this light nut. The soul of this man is his clothes. Trust him not in matter of heavy 
consequence’ (2.5.33–4). The name ‘Parolles’ would have amused the lawyers and 
landed gentry in Shakespeare’s audience, for they will have been aware that title to 
land could be proved by formal deed or by non-documentary (parole) evidence.36 
The typical non-documentary evidence was word of mouth supported by public 
performance of transfer known as livery of seisin.37 The joke is that the form and 
deeds of Parolles, the liveried follower of Bertram, present contrary evidence for the 
state of his character. It is significant, therefore, that at the end of the play Parolles is 
called by the king to act as a witness in the trial of Bertram’s character. 
                                               
36 It was generally said that a person is not permitted to ‘create an uncertain estate in 
land by parol’ (quoted in Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the 
Laws of England [1628], III.299). 
37 Samuel E. Thorne, ‘Livery of Seisin’, in Essays in English Legal History (London: 
The Hambledon Press, 1985), 31–50. 
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For all the orthodox associations that are made between men and martial 
metal, it is the women in Shakespeare’s plays who supply some of the most 
interesting studies in the probation of appearances and the proof of inner matter. This 
is in part because of the layering inherent in the fact that the women in 
Shakespeare’s plays were originally young male actors dressed in female garb. It is 
also, in related part, because Queen Elizabeth portrayed herself as a palimpsest of 
military man concealing woman’s flesh concealing a man’s heart. The ‘Virgin 
Queen’ invited public probation to the point of her inner metal, most famously at 
Tilbury Docks when she addressed the troops assembled to repel the Spanish 
Armada of 1588: ‘I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have 
the heart and stomach of a king, and a king of England too.’38 In Twelfth Night, when 
Viola asks, in reference to Sir Andrew Aguecheek, ‘what manner of man is he?’, 
Fabian’s (mocking) reply cuts straight to the point of form and substance; of clothing 
and proof: ‘Nothing of that wonderful promise, to read him by his form, as you are 
like to find him in the proof of his valour.’ (3.4.199–200). In her reply, Viola admits 
that she is not martially inclined but is one who would ‘rather go with sir priest than 
sir knight’; adding, crucially, ‘I care not who knows so much of my mettle’ 
(3.4.203–4). 
Shakespeare explores in numerous places women’s potential to demonstrate 
proof of inner metal. In Hamlet, it is demonstrated negatively where the Prince 
                                               
38 ‘Queen Elizabeth’s Armada Speech to the Troops at Tilbury’ (9 August 1588), in 
Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller and Mary Beth Rose (eds), Elizabeth I: Collected 
Works (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 326. See Carla Spivack, ‘The 
Woman Will Be Out: A New Look at the Law in Hamlet’  (2008) 20 Yale J L & 
Human 31–60, 46. 
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complains that his mother should have a heart that is penetrable and human rather 
than of impenetrable proof metal: ‘let me wring your heart, for so I shall, / If it be 
made of penetrable stuff, / If damnèd custom have not brazed it so / That it is proof 
and bulwark against sense’ (3.4.40–3). In Julius Caesar, it is demonstrated positively 
where Brutus’s wife, Portia, employs the yielding frailty of her flesh to demonstrate 
the fortitude of her character; piercing the surface of her skin to prove herself and to 
leave a proof mark in the form of a scar: 
Tell me your counsels, I will not disclose ‘em. 
I have made strong proof of my constancy, 
Giving myself a voluntary wound 
Here in the thigh: can I bear that with patience 
And not my husband’s secrets? (2.1.310–14) 
Even today, men and women seek to prove their mettle by their mode of dress. The 
painful and permanent marking of tattoo is an especially potent form of wound or 
mark by which to prove individual character and social allegiance. Prisoners and 
gang members are frequently marked out this way. Prison officers are also marked 
out by distinctive dress. Like the members of many other uniformed services, prison 
officers must pass through a probationary period as part of their ritual initiation into 
the uniformed corp. Probation is an intriguing liminal state in which the probationer 
has been set apart from the general polis but has not yet been fully admitted to the 
role of its protector. The probationary process can be observed in most uniformed 
professions, perhaps most notably in the military, where servicemen and women are 
often admitted to their corps by the appropriation of coloured headdresses – red 
berets, green berets and so forth. When police cadets in New York City pass their 
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probation, they change from probationary grey uniforms to the standard blue.39 
Similar probationary processes existed in the ancient world; indeed the word 
‘probation’ alludes to the requirement that a man be shown to be of good quality 
(probatus) before admission as a legionary in the Roman Army. We still ‘decorate’ 
soldiers who prove their martial metal in time of war, by awarding them a piece of 
metal (a medal) to be worn on their uniformed chest where once upon a time they 
would have borne an armoured breastplate. 
As Shakespeare’s Othello establishes the connection between proof of an 
accusation and proof of armour, so Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night, or What You Will 
connects these concerns to early modern preoccupation with documentary proof and 
procedural proof in courts of law. It has been said of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night 
that the ‘plot is a pretext’ and the ‘theme of the play is disguise’.40 Disguise is 
introduced as an important theme at the very outset of the play. In the second scene, 
when the freshly shipwrecked Viola conceals herself in the clothing and outward 
form of her brother Sebastian, whom she fears has died in the wreck, she invites the 
ship’s captain to assist in her concealment and she employs the language of disguise 
to express her confidence in the captain’s character: ‘I will believe thou hast a mind 
that suits / With this thy fair and outward character  . . . / Conceal me what I am, and 
be my aid / For such disguise as haply shall become / The form of my intent’ 
(1.3.52–3, 55–7) (emphases added). The theme of disguise makes a brief appearance 
even as early as the short opening scene of the play, where we are told that the lady 
Olivia will not entertain the suit of Orsino, Duke of Illyria, but instead, in mourning 
                                               
39 See, generally, Nathan Joseph and Nicholas Alex, ‘The Uniform: A Sociological 
Perspective’ (1972) 77.4 American Journal of Sociology 719–30. 
40 Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary (London: Methuen, 1965), 207. 
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for her recently deceased brother, ‘like a cloistress . . . will veilèd walk’ (1.1.29). 
Later in the play, the lady Olivia also declines to entertain the suit of her steward 
Malvolio, who is tricked into proving his affection for his mistress by appearing 
before her in cross-gartered yellow stockings. The lady Olivia, is, in turn, spurned by 
the disguised Viola (masquerading as the gentleman Cesario). When Olivia falls for 
Viola’s seeming masculinity, Viola muses: ‘Fortune forbid my outside have not 
charm’d her! . . . / Disguise, I see, thou art a wickedness, / Wherein the pregnant 
enemy does much’ (2.2.13, 22–3). The central theme of the play is disguise, but the 
theme of disguise can also be read as a theme of proof. Consider the scene in which 
Viola, disguised in her brother Sebastian’s outward form, is mistaken for him by 
Sebastian’s rescuer, Antonio. Viola naturally translates the language of dress and 
disguise into the language of proof: 
Prove true, imagination, O, prove true, 
That I, dear brother, be now ta’en for you! 
 . . . even such and so 
In favour was my brother, and he went 
Still in this fashion, colour, ornament, 
For him I imitate. O, if it prove, 
Tempests are kind and salt waves fresh in love. (3.4.296–7, 301–5) 
When Sebastian is finally reunited with his twin Viola (she disguised as the man 
Cesario), he probes the apparition of himself with a salvo of questions: ‘Do I stand 
there? . . . what kin are you to me? / What countryman? What name? What 
parentage?’ (5.1.211, 215–16). In early modern England, this quick-fire form of 
interrogation was a standard method for proving (‘probing’ or ‘testing’) facts in the 
context of legal and ecclesiastical inquisition. In the religious context, the orthodoxy 
of an adherent’s faith was proved through catechism, and in the Court of Chancery, 
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which was originally an ecclesiastical court, the concern of the court was to 
interrogate the conscience of the party, to which end it employed a method of serial 
questioning which seems to have been inspired by the methodology of religious 
catechism.41 W. J. Jones notes that the Court of Chancery asked such questions as: 
‘do you not know or have you not credibly heard or are you not fully persuaded in 
your conscience that it was the true intent, will and meaning of the said Nicholas 
Bristowe, deceased, that  . . . ?’.42 Elsewhere in Twelfth Night, Shakespeare makes 
express reference to proof by catechism and to proof by constant question. On both 
occasions the process of proof appears, as we would now expect, in the context of a 
related concern to probe through the external coverings of dress. 
The first instance appears in the witty interchange between Olivia and her 
licensed fool, Feste, in which, through diverse probations, he attempts to persuade 
his mistress to cast off her mourning veil. It begins with Feste’s aside in which, 
making an apostrophe to ‘Wit’, he asserts that ‘[t]hose wits, that think they have 
thee, do very oft prove fools’ (1.5.25–6). The relevant passage deserves to be quoted 
at length for the way in which it shows how Feste employs processes of testing or 
probation (including syllogism and catechism) to demonstrate the unreliability of 
external appearances presented in the form of clothes. The text of the passage is a 
tapestry in which themes of probation and proof are interwoven with textile 
references to the fool’s official garb (the motley), to sartorial processes of patching 
                                               
41 Oliver W. Holmes, ‘Early English Equity’ (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Review 162–74, 
162 n.1. Citing Rot Parl 84; 3 Hen V pt 2 46, No23. 
42 William J. Jones, The Elizabethan Court of Chancery (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967), 238; cited in Dennis R. Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of 
Chancery in Early Modern England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 84. 
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and mending and to the maxim cucullus non facit monachum (‘a hood does not a 
monk make’). The stimulus for the scene is Olivia’s request that her servants should 
take away the ‘fool’: 
FESTE 
 . . . bid the dishonest man mend himself. If he mend, he is no longer 
dishonest; if he cannot, let the botcher mend him. Anything that’s mended is 
but patched: virtue that transgresses is but patched with sin, and sin that 
amends is but patched with virtue. If that this simple syllogism will serve, so. 
If it will not, what remedy? As there is no true cuckold but calamity, so 
beauty’s a flower. The lady bade take away the fool: therefore, I say again, 
take her away. 
OLIVIA 
Sir, I bade them take away you. 
FESTE 
Misprision in the highest degree! Lady, cucullus non facit monachum: that’s 
as much to say as I wear not motley in my brain. Good madonna, give me 
leave to prove you a fool. 
OLIVIA 
Can you do it? 
FESTE 
Dexteriously, good madonna. 
OLIVIA 
Make your proof. 
FESTE 
I must catechize you for it, madonna. Good my mouse of virtue, answer me. 
OLIVIA 
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Well, sir, for want of other idleness, I’ll bide your proof. 
FESTE 
Good madonna, why mourn’st thou? 
OLIVIA 
Good fool, for my brother’s death. 
FESTE 
I think his soul is in hell, madonna. 
OLIVIA 
I know his soul is in heaven, fool. 
FESTE 
The more fool, madonna, to mourn for your brother’s 
soul being in heaven. Take away the fool, gentlemen. 
OLIVIA 
What think you of this fool, Malvolio? Doth he not mend? (1.5.33–55) 
The themes of this passage anticipate the scene later in the play in which Malvolio, 
who has been ‘misprisioned’ (arrested) and wrongfully imprisoned on a charge of 
madness, is visited by Feste disguised as a priest. On that occasion, Malvolio 
submits to probation by interrogation, saying ‘I am no more mad than you are. Make 
the trial of it in any constant question’ (4.2.34–5). What we see in the scene between 
the lady Olivia and the fool Feste is the fool’s attempt to prick a hole in the formality 
of his lady’s mourning as represented in the form of her veil. He does so by means of 
logical (syllogistic) probation and by catechism-like interrogation. Today we might 
describe his efforts by means of another sartorial metaphor used in legal contexts: 
‘picking holes’ in an argument. 
Of the classical rhetorical proofs that will still persuade a court today, one of 
the most significant is the commonplace proof. Judges will accept without trial or 
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probation that ‘apples fall down’, that ‘rain makes wet’ and that ‘night follows day’. 
They are said to take ‘judicial notice’ of such things. They hold, as the drafters of the 
United States Declaration of Independence once held, that certain truths are ‘self-
evident’. Shakespeare places an example of commonplace proof in the mouth of the 
provincial judge, Justice Shallow, in The Second Part of Henry IV: ‘Certain, ‘tis 
certain, very sure, very sure: death is certain to all, all shall die . . . ’ (3.2.26–7). 
Another example appears in Twelfth Night where, demonstrating yet another aspect 
of the play’s central concern with proof, Viola observes ‘‘tis a vulgar proof / That 
very oft we pity enemies’ (3.1.104–5). 
There is, though, a wide range of facts that the law will not accept as proof 
unless they are established by a certain documentary form or by a process of trial. 
The law will not always accept the factual evidence – the evident outer appearance 
of proof – but will sometimes demand that a claim be clothed or armoured in a 
certain pre-approved form or will demand that unfamiliar facts be proven, like 
unfamiliar armour, by process of trial. Take the fact of an oral promise. If I orally 
promise to make a gift to you, the promise is not enforceable against me in the 
absence of an actual transfer of the subject matter of the gift.43 The same is true of a 
voluntary promise to enter a bargain. If the other party makes no promise to give or 
do something in exchange, my promise is considered to be a ‘bare’ promise. Writing 
in 1530, Christopher St German put it this way: 
What is a nude contract, or naked promise, and whether any action may lie 
thereon 
                                               
43 It is said that there is no equity to perfect an imperfect gift (Milroy v. Lord [1862] 4 
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Student:  . . . a nude contract is, when a man maketh a bargain, or a sale of 
his goods or lands without any recompence appointed for it: as if I say to 
another, I sell thee all my land, or else my goods, and nothing is assigned that 
the other shall give or pay for it . . . no action lieth in those cases, though they 
be not performed . . . for it is secret in his own conscience whether he 
intended for to be bound or nay. And of the intent inward in the heart, man’s 
law cannot judge, and that is one of the causes why the law of God is 
necessary, that is to say, to judge inward things.44 
The discovery of inner truth under outward signs is, of course, a perennial theme, 
and the human need of divine assistance in that process of discovery figured 
especially prominently in the theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). As Lorna 
Hutson has observed, the passage from St German, just quoted, expresses a ‘Thomist 
commonplace’.45 
St German rationalizes the problem posed by a bare promise (nudum pactum) 
as a problem of proof. The reason the law will not enforce the promise is because the 
law has no means to probe inner conscience. What the law requires, therefore, is that 
intent should be clothed by some outward form that will withstand the law’s 
probation and thereby qualify as sufficient proof. Even today in English law, a 
unilateral voluntary promise (i.e. a promise not made in exchange for a benefit 
promised by the other party) is not binding on the promisor, whereas the same 
promise made in the documentary form of a deed is regarded as a binding 
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45 Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion, 55. 
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covenant.46 It is significant that legal suspicion of mere words and legal insistence 
upon proper documentary form reached a peak (though by no means its only peak) at 
precisely the time that Shakespeare was writing and first staging Twelfth Night. The 
first known performance of Twelfth Night occurred on 2 February 1602 in the Hall of 
the Middle Temple (one of the ‘Inns of Court’), and the important litigation in 
Slade’s Case, which had been running since 1596, finally concluded in November 
1602.47 The essential question in Slade’s Case was whether an action for debt had to 
be pursued by an exceedingly formal writ of debt in the Court of Common Pleas, or 
whether a claim in debt might be expedited by the less formal action of indebitatus 
assumpsit in the court of King’s Bench under which the plaintiff would put it to a 
jury that the debtor’s oral promise to pay amounted to a binding assumption of 
liability. The case concerned basic questions about the enforceability of contracts, 
and it therefore became famous beyond the walls of the lawyers’ world.48 The 
uncertainty caused by the case as it progressed through various courts had an impact 
on commercial practice. The legal historian David Ibbetson notes that ‘[t]he records 
of the King’s Bench for 1600 show a significant shift away from the use of 
assumpsit in place of debt’.49 Eventually the judges decided that debt could be 
pursued on assumpsit as an alternative to the old form of action in debt, and thereby 
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opened the way to a modern flexible law of contract. The following extract from the 
report of the final judgment emphasizes that one of the major sticking points in 
Slade’s Case was the question of proof: 
And as to the Objection which hath been made, that it shall be mischievous to 
the Defendant . . . forasmuch as he might pay it in secret: To that it was 
answered, That it shall be accounted his folly that he took not sufficient 
witnesses to prove the paiment he made.50 
Twelfth Night was written during the period in which (as Professor Ibbetson notes) 
there was a ‘significant shift away from assumpsit’, so we should expect to find that 
if the play alludes to Slade’s Case, it will do so by casting doubt upon words 
unsupported by formal documentation. We do indeed find such doubts expressed in 
the play, notably when Feste laments that ‘words are grown so false, I am loath to 
prove reason with them’ (3.1.17–18). For the lawyers in Middle Temple Hall who 
constituted the first known audience for the play, there could hardly have been an 
issue of greater topical interest than that of doubtful words. The documentary 
evidence for the first performance on 2 February 1602 is an entry in the diary of 
John Manningham, a student barrister at the Middle Temple. It is notable that 
Manningham fixes upon the significance of a counterfeit document: 
A good practice in it to make the steward believe his lady-widow was in love 
with him, by counterfeiting a letter as from his lady, in general term telling 
him what she liked best in him and prescribing his gesture in smiling, his 
apparel, etc. and then, when he came to practice, making him believe they 
took him for mad. 
                                               
50 Slade’s Case (1602) 4 Co Rep 91 at 92b, 95a.  
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As we have seen, there was a side to the debate in Slade’s Case that was resistant to 
the avoidance of the old documentary formalities and that emphasized the 
unreliability of mere spoken words. Here the student lawyer picks up on the fact that 
Shakespeare was playing on the equally unreliable nature of documentary evidence. 
In the scene where Malvolio scrutinizes the counterfeit letter and satisfies himself as 
to its meaning and import, he concluded that his interpretation of the document was 
‘evident to any formal capacity’, before admitting, a little later, that his interpretation 
does not stand up to ‘probation’ (2.5.90, 98). How deep must have been the 
resonance of these lines with Shakespeare’s audience of lawyers, who, when they 
weren’t feasting and watching plays, would have been mooting the points of Slade’s 
Case. The dress aspects of the play would also have appealed to them. Student 
barristers were infamous for their obsession with fashionable dress. An Act for the 
Reformacyon of Excesse in Apparayle (1533),51 which was the last statute to lay 
down sumptuary laws in the reign of Henry VIII, had been relatively indulgent to 
students of the Inns of Court or Chancery. It allowed them to wear doublets and 
partlets of satin, damask and camlet or jackets of camlet, if received as gifts. They 
were not permitted to wear crimson, purple, scarlet or blue, but they could wear 
marten and black rabbit fur.52 Apparently the Inns of Court indulged the students 
within the licence of the law, provided that their apparel indicated ‘no lightness or 
wantonness in the wearer’.53 That licence must have been stretched to snapping point 
                                               
51 Statute 24 Hen VIII c13. 
52 Maria Hayward, Rich Apparel: Clothing and Law in Henry VIII’s England 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 38. 
53 John H. Baker, ‘History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar’ (1975) 9 Costume 
15–21, 16. 
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by the time of the vainglorious fashions of the 1580s, for in the period 1580 to 1600, 
the various Inns of Court introduced strict orders concerning the wearing of gowns.54 
No doubt the rules were followed as a matter of form, but they did nothing to 
suppress the students’ passion for fashion. Sir Thomas Overbury complained that 
student barristers were more concerned with their luxurious clothes than with their 
legal cases.55 
In civil (non-criminal) cases, including cases of contract law, the required 
standard of proof is proof established ‘on the balance of probabilities’, which is 
sometimes called proof that is ‘more likely than not’ or proof based on a likelihood 
of at least 51 per cent. In criminal matters, the defendant is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty and the defendant should be acquitted unless the jury is ‘sure that the 
defendant is guilty’.56 The traditional formulation of being ‘sure’ is that the jury is 
satisfied of the defendant’s guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (variously expressed as 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ and ‘beyond all 
reasonable doubt’). Recall Othello’s willingness to waive his demand for positive 
                                               
54 These sumptuary regulations might represent an effort ‘to represent in visual terms 
the polity of the Protestant State’ (Paul Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in 
Early Modern England: Justice and Political Power, 1558–1660 [Cambridge: CUP, 
2004], 161). 
55 Sir Thomas Overbury, His Wife (1614) (London: Robert Allot, 1628), sigs K4r–K5r; 
quoted in Emma Rhatigan, ‘“The Sinful History of Mine Own Youth”: John Donne 
Preaches at Lincoln’s Inn’, in Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring and Sarah 
Knight (eds), The Intellectual and Cultural World of the Early Modern Inns of Court 
(Manchester: MUP, 2011), 90–106, 91. 
56 R v. Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 2563. 
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‘ocular proof’ in favour of a lesser degree of proof that will, in a negative sense, ‘at 
least’ be proof against doubt. Consider how close that formulation is to the legal 
standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. Neither formulation is concerned to 
establish fundamental truth. Each formulation is concerned only to remove evident 
doubt. 
There is a lively academic debate concerning the nature of the early modern 
origins of the concept of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’.57 To that debate we can 
now add a new and material layer. Barbara Shapiro has convincingly argued that the 
process of proof beyond reasonable doubt aimed to establish practical satisfaction or 
moral comfort as inquirers found it increasingly hard to discover the absolute truth of 
facts within the complexities of the early modern world.58 We can now see how 
closely this parallels early modern notions of proving armour. Armour was never 
required to be absolutely impenetrable. It would be nonsensical to suppose that 
armour could be made to resist all the weapons of the age in all contexts of conflict, 
and in fact armour died out precisely because attempts to make it proof against 
increasingly sophisticated weapons eventually required such a thickness of metal 
                                               
57 See, for example, Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘The beyond Reasonable Doubt Doctrine: 
“Moral Comfort” or Standard of Proof?’ (2008) 2.2 Law and Humanities 149–73; 
James Q. Whitman, ‘Response to Shapiro’ (2008) 2.2 Law and Humanities 175–89. 
58 Barbara J. Shapiro: A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2000); Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century 
England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, 
Law, and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); ‘Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt’ and ‘Probable Cause’: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-
American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
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that soldiers were no longer able to bear it. Armour was never required to be 
positively invulnerable to any possible assault; it was merely required to offer 
sufficient practical protection and comfort against reasonably likely attack. Proof of 
armour was not proof as an absolute truth; it was merely proof to the point of 
practical satisfaction. The same was true, and is true, of legal proof. To sum up, we 
can say that the concept of satisfactory legal proof in early modern England was 
formulated in the context of a wider cultural appreciation of proof as a material 
quality of clothing and of armour in particular. With this in mind, the conclusion we 
reach is this: that legal proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof with holes in it, but 
with holes too small to allow the inquirer to probe to a deeper reality and too small, 
therefore, to admit injury. When such reliable outward proof is established, the law 
is then content to presume that it has probed to the point of a person’s inner mettle 
and to the point of truth. An eighteenth-century preacher once said in a sermon 
addressed to judges that righteousness is necessary, but outward judgment is 
‘perhaps more useful’. He described private righteousness as a silver-embroidered 
vest and public judgment as a gold-fringed robe.59 It is said that the law requires, not 
only that justice must be done but also that it should be seen to be done. One 
wonders, though, whether the law might not be content for justice to be seen to be 
done according to its processes regardless of whether it is actually done in fact. 
When Pontius Pilate asked, ‘what is truth?’ in the course of the most 
significant show trial in history,60 he no doubt appreciated that the purpose of legal 
                                               
59 Bunker Gay, The Accomplished Judge; or, A Compleat Dress for Magistrates (a 
sermon preached at Keene, at the first opening of the Inferior Court, in the county 
of Cheshire, 8 October 1771) (Portsmouth, New-Hampshire: D. Fowle, 1773), 16.  
60 Jn 18.38. 
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trial is not to discover truth but rather to cover the case in such a way that public 
onlookers will be satisfied. An argument of the present book is that legal processes 
of trial, right up until the present day, are still concerned to cover cases with a 
satisfactory semblance of truth. To express the point in terms of clothing, we can say 
that legal processes of trial do not seek to discover or uncover layers of lies that 
might be obscuring naked truth, but rather that they endeavour to cover each case in 
a way that will deflect doubt. Something similar has been observed by ethnographers 
investigating local conceptions of what counts as being socially unclean. They have 
found that ‘purity is not simply about following rules but also about the strategic 
capacity to project a virtuous public image. In other words, one must appear to 
follow the rules’.61 The dominant metaphor for truth – the discovery metaphor – is 
misleading. The truths that most concern us for the purposes of civil life are not 
discovered from hidden depths, but fabricated before our eyes. Agamben sees this 
dynamic at work in the legal context: ‘The ultimate aim of law is the production of a 
res judicata, in which the sentence becomes the substitute for the true and the just.’62 
Scott was right when he said that we ‘weave’ when we ‘practice to deceive’,63 but it 
is also the case that we establish forms of truth through processes of fashioning and 
fabrication. 
                                               
61 Adeline Masquelier, ‘Introduction’, in Adeline Masquelier (ed.), Dirt, Undress and 
Difference: Critical Perspectives on the Body’s Surface (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 1–33, 11. 
62 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (1999) (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen) 
(New York: Zone Books, 2002), 18. 
63 Sir Walter Scott , Marmion (1808) 6.17.532–3. 
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To some extent I am agreeing with Warwick and Cavallaro where they 
observe that ‘fashion’s penchant for obfuscating the very distinction between 
deception and truthfulness’ renders ‘the boundary between “telling lies” and “telling 
truth” . . . precarious and uncertain’64 and where they argue that truth may reside in 
‘superficial phenomena’.65 However, where Warwick and Cavallaro posit the latter 
possibility to the exclusion of the existence of absolute truth, I would argue that it is 
entirely compatible with the possibility of absolute truth. Indeed, fabricated truth 
may be regarded as a counterfeit of, or pragmatic approximation to, absolute truth. 
Satisfactory proof established by evidence for the practical purposes of civil life is 
one thing; absolute truth may be quite another thing. Even scientific method, 
properly-so-called, does not aim to discover underlying truth. It is merely concerned 
to prove (i.e. to ‘probe’ or test) working hypotheses.66 A scientific theory is never 
‘true’. It can, at best, have the status of being ‘not disproved’. Likewise, when a 
judge makes a finding of fact on disputed evidence in a legal case, the effect is to 
create a fact where previously there had been merely conflicting theories. The judge 
in this sense makes a reality in legal terms that is satisfactory for legal purposes. 
Science operates in the same way. It identifies scientific ‘facts’ in terms that are 
satisfactory for scientific purposes. Indeed, the ‘fic’ in ‘scientific’ is a clue to the fact 
                                               
64 Alexandra Warwick and Dani Cavallaro, Fashioning the Frame: Boundaries, Dress 
and the Body (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998), xviii. 
65 Ibid., 133. 
66 For Francis Bacon, ‘penetration’ was a preferred metaphor for the ‘discovery’ of 
knowledge about nature (see, for example, Francis Bacon, Novum Organum 
[London: John Bill, 1620], Aphorism XVIII). The metaphor has proved 
controversial with some feminists because Bacon personifies nature as a female. 
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that scientific proofs comprise knowledge (scientia) that is fashioned (facere). The 
word ‘fact’ is also an etymological clue to the fact. 
When Warwick and Cavallaro assert that ‘dress, by encouraging us to make 
and remake ourselves over and again, renders the very idea of essence quite 
absurd’,67 they are making a statement which, in its absolutism, is essentialist in 
itself. In any case, the fact that there is variety in the nature of particular forms of 
dress does nothing to indicate that there is no essence to dress. It may be that for 
certain practical purposes we do not need to identify an essential truth, but this does 
not mean that there isn’t one. No matter how we dress, the essential fact is that we do 
dress. Warwick and Cavallaro make a similar mistake when, having observed that 
the language of dress may assist us to question such metaphysical categories as true 
and false, they go on to claim that it also has the potential to subvert all such ‘binary 
mythologies’.68 Actually, talking dress confirms such truths as the truth that we all, 
for some reason, go dressed in public. Talking dress therefore confirms the binary 
distinction between dress and non-dress. If any myth is threatened by the timeless 
cultural category of dress, and such cognate categories as law, it is the postmodern 
conceit that there are no such categories anymore. Warwick and Cavallaro 
eventually seem to admit as much, when they confess that ‘[a]s a moulding agency, 
dress may seal the body’s subjection to invincible collective mythologies’.69 They 
also acknowledge, likewise, that the social subject’s ‘vestimentary envelope will 
inexorably carry traces of its primordial fantasies of self-realization and pre-
linguistic expression, which challenge the requirements of the adult domain of laws 
                                               
67 Warwick and Cavallaro, Fashioning the Frame, 116. 
68 Ibid., xxiii.  
69 Ibid., 5.  
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and institutions’.70 Warwick and Cavallaro are right to suggest that dress allows for 
‘playful experimentation’ with categorical boundaries, but it is an error to think that 
this playfulness is a threat to the essential existence of those boundaries. On the 
contrary, playing with a boundary is a mode of making it; just as lawyers’ practice of 
playing with laws contributes to their creation. 
There is a painting hanging in the main criminal courtroom of the Palais de 
Justice in the town of Montpellier in the South of France which seems to me sum up 
the fact that lawyers conceive of truth as a fabricated thing. Arrayed within a series 
of paintings in classical style depicting various virtues of legal process, it depicts the 
naked female figure of Veritas;71 except this figure of truth is concealing much of 
her nakedness by means of a book held in one hand and a drape of cloth held in the 
other. Her right breast is exposed, as is the entire contour of her right side – foot, leg, 
hip and torso – but she is essentially ‘decent’, as the law requires. The Montpellier 
image of Veritas can be read as an acknowledgement of law’s cultural affinity with 
the layer of cloth and a confession that the true nature of legal trial is not to discover 
naked truth, but to produce a certain satisfactory proof in the form of textile and text. 
The covering, not the content, is the heart of the matter in the worlds of dress and 
law alike. In short, law prefers fabricated truth to the naked variety. 
Occasionally the law has gone out of its way to cover up the naked female 
figure of Justice. The huge statues standing in the Great Hall of the Robert F. 
Kennedy Department of Justice Building in Washington, DC – the female figure 
                                               
70 Ibid., 41.  
71 The painting, dating to around 1878, is by the Montpellier-born artist Ernest Michel. 
I am grateful to Professor Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin and to Ms Dominique Santonja 
of La Cour d’Appel de Montpellier for assistance in identifying the artist. 
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Spirit of Justice (which has one breast exposed) and the bare-chested male figure 
Majesty of Law72 – were for a time concealed behind curtains, allegedly on the 
orders of the former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft.73 One wonders what he 
would make of the statue Verity by Damien Hirst, which was unveiled on the pier of 
the English seaside town of Illfracombe on 17 October 2012. Standing more than 20 
metres tall and weighing more than 25 tonnes, the naked pregnant female figure is an 
allegory for truth and justice. She holds the Sword of Justice erect in her left hand 
and with her other hand she holds the skewed Scales of Justice behind her back. She 
stands on a plinth of books, so there is some contact with text, but there is no textile 
in sight. Far from being covered up, even her skin is peeled away along the entire 
front of her right-hand side above the knee. Her skull, the tissue of her breast, her 
muscle fibres and her unborn child are all displayed in detail. This is how truth might 
appear if stripped of the curtain of censorship and the artifice of law. The fact is, 
though, that the arts of law are not as free as other arts. We cannot throw off the 
artificial fabrication of truth, and nor should we wish to. Fabrications are the nearest 
thing we have to satisfactory truth for the purposes of law, order and civil life. Still, 
it will be no bad thing if we dare to doubt the evidence of our eyes and to probe 
continually the proofs that are placed before them. As Professor Teufelsdröckh 
                                               
72 1933–6, C. Paul Jennewein (sculptor). 
73 Dan Eggen, ‘Sculpted Bodies and a Strip Act at Justice Dept’, Washington Post, 25 
June 2005. 
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informed us: ‘The beginning of all Wisdom is to look fixedly on Clothes, or even 






                                               
74 Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, Book I, chapter 10. On transparency and judgement, see 
Thomas Docherty, Confessions: The Philosophy of Transparency (Wish List) 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012). 
	 259	
“The Law of Dramatic Properties in The Merchant of Venice” 
Chapter Fifteen 
in 
Paul Raffield and Gary Watt (eds), Shakespeare and the Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 
 
‘The Merchant of Venice is a fairy tale. There is no more reality in Shylock’s bond 
and the Lord of Belmont’s will than in Jack and the Beanstalk’.1 The opening words 
of Granville-Barker’s commentary on The Merchant of Venice serve as a warning to 
lawyers who might be tempted to mine the play for technical references to law. Yet 
the play is not mere fairy-tale. There is a tangible reality to the dramatic properties or 
‘props’ which appear in the play—including rings, bonds, seals and scales—and 
these same props were significant in the law of Shakespeare’s England. There may 
be no more reality in the world of law than in the world of the play, but there is at 
least a real connection between those worlds. Props make the bridge. This chapter 
will examine props which have one foot on the shore of the play and one foot on the 
shore of law. It will be shown that despite the different ways in which they perform, 
the props are constant to one thing on both shores. This constant, which we might 
call a law of dramatic properties, is the use of a part to signify the whole: partem pro 
toto. This ‘law’ of props is, of course, a subset of the rhetorical trope synecdoche, 
just as synecdoche is a subset of metonymy, and as such it must be significant that 
synecdoche occupies the very heart, or more properly the very head, of English law. 
In the law of England there is nothing higher than ‘the Crown’. The Crown is 
                                               
1 H Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare (London, BT Batsford Ltd, 1958) vol 
I, 335. 
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synecdoche for the monarch in Parliament, and the monarch in Parliament is 
representative of the people. It is hardly surprising, then, that the crown as prop 
forms a well-trodden bridge between the worlds of stage and law in Shakespeare’s 
plays.2 In The Merchant of Venice we will discover bridges less travelled. 
A PLAY FRAMED BY PROPS 
At the start of Shakespeare’s The Life of King Henry V, the chorus invites the 
audience to imagine that the small stage and the small band of actors and the small 
span of the play can convey the full time and space and properties of France:  
 
                                               
2 When the ‘crown’ prop takes centre stage in Shakespeare’s plays and is expressly 
referred to as being part of the present scene, it is surprising how rarely it symbolises 
the attainment or maintenance of royal authority. It does occasionally, of course 
(Henry VI Part 1, 4.1.1–2; Henry VIII, 4.1.42; Titus Andronicus, 1.1.18), but 
sometimes with unease (King John, 5.1.3; Richard II, 4.1.176–98), and once jovially 
(Pericles, 2.3.12: the dominant view is that George Wilkins wrote most of the first two 
Acts of this play; see FD Hoeniger (ed), The Arden Pericles (London, Methuen, 1963) 
ln–lvi). When the crown prop is at its most central to the stage action it is usually 
employed to represent the loss of royal authority (eg Richard III, 5.3.365–6; Henry IV 
Part 2, 4.2.195–280; Henry VI Part 3, 4.3.50; Hamlet, 3.2.112–11; Antony and 
Cleopatra, 5.2.316, 358–9) or to mock pretension to royal power (Henry VI Part 3, 
1.4.95–6). References throughout this chapter are to the new ‘RSC edition’: J Bate and 
E Rasmussen (eds), William Shakespeare: Complete Works (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 
2007), unless otherwise stated. 
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Into a thousand parts divide one man  / … Turning th’ accomplishment of many 
years / into an hourglass. (Prologue 24–31) 
 
Parallel language (right down to the duplication of ‘hourglass’) is employed with 
parallel purpose at the very beginning of The Merchant of Venice. Salerio, imagining 
himself in Antonio’s place, muses: 
 
I should not see the sandy hour-glass run, / But I should think of shallows 
and of flats, / And see my wealthy Andrew, docked in sand, / Vailing her 
high-top lower than her ribs / To kiss her burial; (1.1.26–30)3 
 
Salerio’s musings imply an invitation to the audience to join him in imagining that a 
great matter, a shipwreck, may be figured in a small thing, here the sand in an 
hourglass. They also introduce the significant metaphoric and allegorical use of the 
wrecked ship to indicate Antonio’s wrecked body (the wooden ‘ribs’ of the ship’s 
hull presage the ribs from which Shylock threatens to take the pound of flesh). As 
The Merchant of Venice begins with the warning that a small thing can portend the 
ruin of a man, so the play ends with the same warning. The final lines are Gratiano’s: 
‘while I live I’ll fear no other thing / So sore as keeping safe Nerissa’s ring’. 
(5.1.324) The final word is a prop, and its physicality serves to bring the play full 
circle. It may be that Gratiano and Bassanio have learned their lesson (we doubt that 
they have), but clearly Antonio, who claims in the opening lines of the play that he 
‘will learn’, has learned nothing. Having put his flesh to hazard at the outset, at the 
end he hazards his soul: ‘I dare be bound again, / My soul upon the forfeit’. 
                                               
3 The wealthy Andrew referred to here is reputed to refer to the Spanish ship the San 
Andrés, captured during the English expedition to Cadiz in 1596. 
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(5.1.265–6) Ring-like, the Belmont circle of friends are bound within the confines of 
their closed world (from which, crucially, Shylock is shut out). There are other 
significant rings in the play, including the ring that Shylock received from his wife 
Leah which Jessica is alleged to have taken and sold (the text says that Shylock 
received it when he was ‘a bachelor’ (3.2.80), inviting comparison with the ring that 
Portia gives to Bassanio). There is also the signet ring which we can assume that 
Antonio pressed into the blood-red wax of the bond. In such auspicious company, 
Nerissa’s ring might seem a surprising choice on which to end, but the musings of 
the common man Gratiano upon the ring of his commonplace wife bring home the 
message to the common man in the audience, that he should take care of what he 
values in life and not risk losing it. Read in this way, the final line sounds more like 
the moral at the end of a fairy-tale than the ‘obscene pun’ 4 that can be read into it. 
Yet it is Portia’s ring, the one she gave to Bassanio, that signifies most. 
 
PORTIA’S RING 
Portia’s ring exemplifies the principle partem pro toto. Bassanio says of the ring, 
‘[t]here’s more depends on this than on the value’ (4.1.443),5 and it turns out that a 
very great deal is conveyed by this one small prop. Portia’s ring is nothing less than 
the symbolic representation of her whole person and of all of her property too. Portia 
                                               
4 Karen Newman, ‘Portia’s Ring: Unruly Women and Structures of Exchange in The 
Merchant of Venice’ (1987) 38(1) Shakespeare Quarterly 19, 32. It cannot be denied 
that Gratiano favours a sexually suggestive strand of synecdoche, as when he threatens 
to “mar the young clerk’s pen” (5.1.249). 
5 This line might also be a ‘metatheatrical joke’, given that the ‘gold’ ring prop was 
probably made of copper or other cheap metal (see C Ronan, ‘Anatomizing 
Shakespeare’s Jewelry’ (2006) 23(2) Discoveries (online)). 
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expresses as much when she declares to Bassanio: ‘This house, these servants and 
this same myself / Are yours, my lord. I give them with this ring’ (3.2.173–4). 
As a gesture of largesse the declaration seems plain enough, but ‘there’s 
more depends on this’. For one thing, Portia is usurping her father’s patrimonial 
authority over her. The whole point of the casket test was to convey Portia in the 
form of the portrait prop in the leaden casket, but here Portia purports to convey 
herself in the form of another prop; and, crucially, Portia’s choice of prop is more 
figurative and therefore more totemic. The transfer of the portrait obviously 
symbolises the transfer of the whole, but a portrait is just too obvious. It lacks the 
figurative dimension that one associates with a genuine instance of synecdoche. A 
miniature picture of the whole leaves very little to the imagination as compared to an 
abstract prop that symbolises the whole, so the portrait lacks the dramatic force of 
partem pro toto. It does not obey the law of dramatic properties, and, compared to 
the ring, it suffers for it. The conveyance of Portia’s ring is the truly powerful 
conveyance in terms of its representational power and its place in the plot. Portia 
complains in her first scene that her will has been ‘curbed by the will of [her] dead 
father’. (1.2.16–17) This subjection to her father’s will provides the dramatic tension 
for the first part of her story. Later, immediately the casket test is concluded, she 
takes matters into her own hand by voluntarily conveying herself by the ring. We 
will see that by the transfer of this prop she pays formal lip-service to the legal world 
of men while in substance subverting it; and this provides dramatic tension for the 
second part of her story.  
	 264	
The name Portia has a number of candidate etymologies. One derives from 
the Latin porcus meaning ‘pig’,6 which confirms a stark opposition to the Jew 
Shylock, whom she brings to ruin. Another alludes to the lex Porcia, a name given to 
a number of pre-Christian Roman laws which forbade scourging of Roman citizens 
and placed significant restrictions on the capital punishment of Roman citizens; 
because the lex Porcia was a law of mercy, it evokes Portia’s rhetoric of mercy and 
her legalistic intervention to spare the flesh of the citizen Antonio.7 However, the 
most obvious significations for the name Portia, and the most pertinent for present 
purposes, are not etymological at all. They are the senses ‘portion’ and ‘porter’ 
which are evoked by the very sound of her name. These senses are pertinent because 
Portia is a whole transported as a part or ‘portion’ of the whole. The word-play 
culminates in the fact that Portia is represented as a ‘portrait’, and there may even be 
an oblique reference to the financial ‘marriage portion’ that a wife brought to an 
Elizabethan marriage by way of dowry.8 But Portia is not merely the transported 
‘portion’; she is also the ‘porter’ who carries and conveys herself with great purpose 
through the play. Her name captures her conflicting characteristics of independent 
self-determination and vulnerable subjection. When, in her opening line, Portia 
                                               
6 The name Portia is said to derive from the Roman clan, the Porcii, who were breeders 
of pigs (Newman, n 4 above, at 23 n17). 
7 However, just as the lex Porcia showed no mercy to non-citizens (including, 
significantly, Jesus of Nazareth), so too the ‘lex Portia’ extended no mercy to the non-
citizen Shylock. In this respect the Jew Shylock is more Christ-like than the Christian 
Antonio. 
8 L Engle, ‘“Thrift is Blessing”: Exchange and Explanation in The Merchant of Venice’ 
(1986) 37(1) Shakespeare Quarterly 20, 33. 
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confides in Nerissa that her ‘little body is aweary of this great world’ (1.2.1) she 
objectifies herself and alienates herself from the body, the small frame, that she 
carries and is conveyed by others. Crucially, though, she is aware that her weariness 
is attributable to the fact that she is a portion bound to be conveyed in the merchant 
world of men. We recall that Antonio, in his opening lines, felt the same weariness, 
but, unlike Portia, lacked awareness to see its source: ‘In sooth, I know not why I am 
so sad. / It wearies me, … / And such a want-wit sadness makes of me / That I have 
much ado to know myself’. (1.1.1–7) It takes his friends to point out that his 
weariness (like Portia’s) is caused by the work of great forces upon his small frame. 
Salerio informs Antonio that his ‘mind is tossing on the ocean’ bound up with his 
‘argosies with portly sail’. (1.1.8–9) To which Salanio adds, ‘had I such venture 
forth, / The better part of my affections would / Be with my hopes abroad’. (1.1.15–
17) From the perspective of transporting portions and the principle partem pro toto, 
phrases like ‘portly sail’ and ‘better part’ suggest new significance.  
 But now to the law.  
Portia’s line, ‘[t]his house, these servants and this same myself / Are yours, my lord. 
I give them with this ring’ (3.2.173–4) appears in a passage containing the terms ‘in 
gross’ and ‘converted’, both of which carry technical significance in the law of 
property,9 so we should not be surprised to find that the line itself contains legal 
                                               
9 Where a property right exists ‘in gross’ it exists independent of any need to show 
that it is derived from a greater title. Portia gives herself ‘in gross’ in the sense that 
she gives herself as an independent whole. ‘Converted’ carries a similar meaning in 
law to that which it carries in religion. It denotes a fundamental change of substance 
even though the outer form remains unaltered. According to the ‘doctrine of 
conversion’, ‘equity will in certain circumstances regard personal property as real 
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allusion. Indeed, it is from a legal perspective that Portia’s giving of the ring 
achieves its real power and its supremacy over her father’s capricious casket test. 
When Shakespeare was writing, the public giving of a ring was a well-known 
method of transferring title to freehold land. It was a symbolic method, a piece of 
legal theatre, but its effect was real. It is, of course, physically impossible to transfer 
legal title to land or even to transport the land itself (even if all the soil were moved, 
the physical space that is the land would remain), so a ritual was devised (known as 
‘livery of seisin’) by which title to land could be transferred by the public, symbolic 
delivery of a physical part: partem pro toto. Frequently the part was a sod or turf cut 
from the land with a knife (as one might cut a pound of flesh) or a twig was cut from 
a tree growing on the land. As William West puts it in Symboleography, published 
shortly before Shakespeare wrote The Merchant of Venice:10 
 
we may well define Liverie of seisin to be a Ceremonie in our law, used in 
the conveying of lands or tenements … The usuall maner of deliverie of 
seisin of houses, lands, tenements is, that the feoffor and feoffee if they be 
present … do come to the house or place whereof seisin is to be delivered: 
And there in the presence of Sundry good witnesses openly reade, or cause to 
be read, the deed of feoffement, and letter of Atturney thereof, or to declare 
the verie effect thereof before them in English: Which being so done, the 
                                               
property’: G Watt, Trusts and Equity (3rd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 
545; Fletcher v Ashburner (1779) 1 Bro CC 497, per Sir Thomas Sewell MR at 499. 
The audience is prompted to imagine a similar alchemical transformation when Portia 
hands over the ring. 
10 See n 35 below. 
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feoffor or his Atturney must take a clot of earth, or a bough, or a twig of a 
tree thereupon growing, or the ring or hasp of the doore of the house, and 
deliver the same with the said deed unto the feoffee or his Atturney, saying: I 
deliver these unto you in name of possession and seisin of all the landes and 
tenements contained in this deed to have and to hold according to the forme 
and effect of the same deede. If the feoffment be without deed (as it may well 
be) then at the time of the deliverie of seisin, must bee expressed the very 
estate which the feoffee must have thereby.11 (emphasis added) 
 
In the first part of his Institutes, Sir Edward Coke says that the feoffor may go on the 
land and take ‘the ring of the doore or turfe or twigge of the land and deliver the 
same upon the land to the feofee in name of seisin of the land’;12 citing Bracton’s 
phrase ‘per ostium et per haspam vel per anulum’.13 Portia’s words, spoken on the 
soil of her Belmont estate, are clearly reminiscent of the livery ceremony, but the 
                                               
11 W West, Symboleographie, which May be Termed, the Art, or Description, of 
Instruments and Presidents (revised edn, London, Richard Tottle, 1592) Part I, Book 
II, 251. 
12 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1628) 
59, 60.  
13 ‘[B]y the door, the hasp, or the ring of the house’: Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae li 2 ca18 s 12. 
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authors of The Law of Property in Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Drama14 seem 
confident that ‘Shakespeare does not refer to [livery of seisin] at all’15 and another 
author is equally confident that Shakespeare ‘never mentions the subject’.16 It is true 
that the words ‘livery of seisin’ do not appear in Shakespeare’s works, but Portia’s 
reference is express enough, and at least one other author thinks so.17 But will a 
finger ring suffice or must it be the ring of the door to the house? Holdsworth 
recorded that ‘a sod from the churchyard will do, or a knife without any sod, or a 
                                               
14 PS Clarkson and CT Warren, The Law of Property in Shakespeare and the 
Elizabethan Drama (New York, Gordian Press, 1968). This is the corrected reprint of 
the 1st edn (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1942). 
15Ibid 113 
16 Arthur Underhill, ‘Law’ in S Lee and CT Onions (eds), Shakespeare’s England: an 
Account of the Life and Manners of his Age (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916) 381 at 
404. 
17 AG Harmon, Eternal Bonds, True Contracts: Law and Nature in Shakespeare’s 
Problem Plays (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004): ‘The significance 
of the contractual token, the ring, is more than symbolic in these terms. It becomes a 
requirement to the contract’s solemnization. Similar to English land transactions of 
Medieval and Renaissance times’ (at 92); ‘it entailed the delivery of a clod of earth, a 
twig, a hasp of the door or—most significantly, for my purposes—its ring, which 
symbolized the whole of the land conveyed’ (at 12). 
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glove, or indeed any small thing that lies handy’.18 The fact that a knife or glove will 
suffice indicates that the token of transfer needs no direct connection to the land. The 
knife is merely a prop to symbolise the cutting of land and the glove is nothing more 
than a token (unless it is meant to symbolise the ‘handing over’ of the land). Could a 
gold ring perform in a similar way? Apparently it could. In his book The Seisin of the 
Freehold, Joshua Williams observes that ‘[i]t was not … necessary that the article 
delivered should be anything concerning the land … the delivery of a parchment 
deed or of a gold ring in the name of seisin, was quite sufficient for the purpose’. 19 
As authority for this observation Williams cites a case decided towards the end of 
Shakespeare’s lifetime.20 In fact, the case he cites makes no reference to a gold ring. 
It does, however, mention that a piece of gold or silver will suffice (which seems 
highly appropriate given how closely gold is physically bound up with land),21 and it 
is plausible to suppose that a gold ring, being gold in a readily available and easily 
                                               
18 WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London, Methuen, 1923) (rewritten 3rd 
edn of vols II–III) 86, cited in SE Thorne, ‘Livery of Seisin’ in Essays in English Legal 
History (London, The Hambledon Press, 1985) 31–50. 
19 Joshua Williams, Esq, ‘The Seisin of the Freehold’ in Twelve Lectures Delivered in 
Gray’s Inn Hall (London, H Sweet, 1878) 99. 
20 Thoroughgood’s Case (1611/12) 9 Coke’s Rep 136b, 137b, in the Court of Wards 
(also reported at 77 Eng Rep 925).  
21 See Carolyn Sale, ‘“The King is a Thing”: The King’s Prerogative and the Treasure 
of the Realm in Plowden’s Report of the “Case of Mines” and Shakespeare’s Hamlet’ 
in Paul Raffield and Gary Watt (eds) Shakespeare and the Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 137-57. 
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retainable form, was sometimes used. Portia’s giving of her estate by the ring now 
makes perfect sense. If it is an allusion to any legal rite, it is an allusion to livery of 
seisin. Certainly it makes more sense, in terms of legal symbolism, than to regard it 
as a simple betrothal ring. Leaving aside the fact that the ring was passed from the 
woman to the man, a betrothal ring would not have been intended to pass legal title 
to real estate; and a wedding ring, which did entail a moral (though not a legal) 
transfer of property (the Tudor ceremony contained the words ‘With thys ring I thee 
wed: Thys golde and siluer I thee geue: with my body I thee wurship: and withal my 
worldly goodes I thee endoew’),22 was of course not passed until the marriage 
ceremony itself. The play makes it clear that Portia’s transfer of the ring precedes her 
marriage.23  
 Nor should we doubt that livery of seisin was a common public spectacle in 
England during Shakespeare’s lifetime. Its popularity had decreased somewhat after 
the Statute of Uses (1535) permitted conveyance by deed in certain situations, but 
formal documentary conveyance was not a requirement until the Statute of Frauds 
(1677).24 It must still have commanded popular recognition and respect in 1583, 
because public delivery of a twig and turf was the very method chosen by the 
colonists at St John’s Harbor to perform the first English settlement of the New 
World.25 And it must still have been well known in 1616 when Ben Jonson 
                                               
22 Prayerbook of Edward VI. 
23 3.2.310. 
24 Even then, livery could be used alongside the deed. Livery of seisin was finally 
abolished in 1926, by the Law of Property Act 1925, s 51(1). 
25 Sir Humphrey Gilbert ‘had delivered unto him (after the custom of England) a rod 
[small twig] and a turf of the same soil’: Richard Hakluyt, The Principall Nauigations, 
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mentioned it in The Devil is an Ass,26 and in 1623 when The Devil’s Law Case, John 
Webster’s play of merchants and lawyers, was first published. In that play the 
merchant Romelio has the line ‘Keep your possession, you have the door by th’ ring; 
/ That’s livery and seisin in England’. (1.2.117–18) Thus Webster makes express 
what Shakespeare implies. Of course, Webster does not get the expression quite 
right. The law is ‘livery of seisin’ not ‘livery and seisin’, but Webster was in good 
company in this respect. Edmund Spenser made the same mistake in Book VI of The 
Faerie Queene,27 published around the time Shakespeare was writing The Merchant 
of Venice.  
The case for livery of seisin is clearly made out, but we should not forget that 
the transfer of Portia’s ring was not merely, or primarily, a stage rendition of legal 
theatre, it was also the passing of a prop intended to denote the figurative passing of 
Portia’s whole person, partem pro toto. As Bassanio says: ‘when this ring / Parts 
from this finger, then parts life from hence’. (3.2.186–7) Yet Portia’s words are not 
as generous as at first they seem: 
 
Myself, and what is mine, to you and yours 
                                               
Voiages and Discoueries of the English Nation (Hakluyt Society Publications, 
Glasgow, 1904 (1598–1600)) vol VIII, 53–4; cited by P Seed, ‘Taking Possession and 
Reading Texts: Establishing the Authority of Overseas Empires’ in Stanley N Katz et 
al (eds), Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development (5th edn) (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2001) 19, 20–1.  
26 Fitz-Dottrell says ‘get the Feoffment drawn, with a Letter of Atturney, / For Livery 
and Seisin’ (4.5.16–17). 
27 (1596) Book VI, iv, 37. 
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Is now converted. But now I was the lord 
Of this fair mansion, master of my servants, 
Queen o’er myself, and even now, but now, 
This house, these servants and this same myself 
Are yours, my lord. I give them with this ring, 
Which when you part from, lose, or give away, 
Let it presage the ruin of your love 
And be my vantage to exclaim on you. (3.2.169–77) 
 
Portia confirms that, up until this moment, she has been ‘lord’, ‘master’, ‘Queen o’er 
myself’. Despite formal subjection to her father’s will, she lacks no confidence in her 
own authority and independence. It is fitting, then, that the outward giving of herself 
by the ring turns out to be in substance a taking of Bassanio by the ring. The 
dynamic is one of taking by giving.28 Shakespeare allows Portia the advantage of 
dramatic foresight to anticipate the loss of the ring and she anticipates her 
entitlement to berate her lover in that event. The result is a subversion of the outward 
show of gift and with it a subversion of the legal world of men (a subversion which 
will shortly be perfected in her courtroom performance as the lawyer ‘Balthasar’). 
The moment Bassanio accepts Portia’s ‘gift’ of her ring, he is bound to her; 
                                               
28 The same dynamic operates when Shylock lends money without interest. It is a 
shame that Antonio did not follow the example of ‘Father Abraham’ of the Old 
Testament. Abraham (and Shylock, it can be assumed) understood the danger of 
accepting a gift from a member of a foreign tribe (see Genesis 23:13–16, discussed in 
G Watt, ‘Breed of Metal and Pound of Flesh: Faith and Risk in Metaphors of Usury’ 
(2007) 2 Polemos 95, 112). 
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paralleling the way in which Antonio’s ‘gift’ (the loan) to Bassanio binds Bassanio 
to Antonio, and Shylock’s ‘gift’ (the waiver of interest) in favour of Antonio binds 
Antonio to Shylock. Portia’s ring on Bassanio’s finger, no less than Antonio’s signet 
ring with which he sealed the bond, forms a link in the chain of enthralment that runs 
through the play.  
THE SCALES 
When Bassanio says ‘beauty [is] purchased by the weight’ (3.2.90–1), he perfects the 
equation of Portia and wealth, and, further emphasising the play’s broad theme of 
‘human as commodity’, his words can be read as an allusion to the Roman ceremony 
of mancipatio, by which property (including slaves) was purchased by striking a 
weight of copper (aes) against a set of scales held by the libripens in the presence of 
five adult witnesses (cives).29 The copper weight symbolised the purchase price, but 
apparently was not actually handed over, being purely symbolic of the real payment 
to follow. This is where mancipatio differed from traditio. Traditio— which is the 
etymological origin of two central and conflicting themes in The Merchant of 
Venice: ‘trade’ and ‘tradition’—involved an actual handing over of the ‘prop’, the 
symbol of conveyance (hence Bracton identified livery of seisin as a direct 
descendant of the Roman traditio).30 When Shylock appears in the courtroom 
carrying a knife and a set of scales he is no doubt a parody of the iconic goddess 
Justitia (she with sword and scales), but now we can also see in his props a symbol 
of Roman slavery (the scales) and of English land transfer (the knife). It is doubtful 
                                               
29 WW Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1928) 121. 
30 Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae li 2 ca 18. 
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that Shakespeare had the latter signification in mind, but allusion to mancipatio of 
slaves is hinted at in Shylock’s line ‘You have among you many a purchased slave, / 
Which, like your asses and your dogs and mules, / You use in abject and in slavish 
parts, / Because you bought them’ (4.1.91–4). It is tempting to suppose that ‘asses’ 
was chosen because Shakespeare sub-consciously recalled the ‘aes’ from the 
mancipatio ceremony. More plausibly, we can find a joke in the line: Shylock is 
alluding to the fact that the so-called ‘free’ citizens of Venice, Antonio and Portia 
included, not only trade in slaves but also trade themselves as if they were slaves. 
THE POUND OF FLESH 
Shylock’s security is, as he tells Antonio, ‘an equal pound / Of your fair flesh, to be 
cut off and taken / In what part of your body pleaseth me’. (1.3.141–3) The pound is, 
as Shylock says, only a part of the whole, but we know as well as he that the part 
represents the whole. This becomes clearer when Shylock chooses for the allotted 
part the flesh nearest Antonio’s heart. The pound is Antonio, partem pro toto. The 
choice of the word ‘pound’ emphasises the synecdoche: it tells us that Antonio is 
figuratively ‘made of money’; Antonio admits as much when he exclaims ‘my purse, 
my person’ (1.1.140). Of course Antonio’s person, and presumably his purse, are 
both visible on stage, but his pound of flesh never is. It perhaps follows that the 
pound of flesh cannot qualify as a prop stricto sensu, but in some ways its 
invisibility, through corporeal occlusion, serves actually to enhance its dramatic 
power. An object is created in the imagination by outlining an empty space in the 
mind into which that object, and that object only, can fit. Thus, absence can create a 
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stronger sense of presence than presence itself. The rhetorical device of ellipsis 
operates in the same way.31  
We have already observed that from the very start of the play, Antonio’s 
body is paralleled with the physical form of his absent ships. In this way 
Shakespeare captures the imagination of the audience from the outset through the 
drama of anticipation: either Antonio’s ships must ‘appear’ or his pound of flesh 
must. When we hear the rumour that Antonio’s ships are wrecked off-stage, our 
expectation is heightened that we will soon see Antonio’s body wrecked on stage. 
Antonio’s discomfiting associates, Salerio and Solanio, develop the rumour at the 
end of Act 2 scene 8, and in the very next scene the casket game resumes at 
Belmont. This juxtaposition of the ‘shipwreck’ scene with the quest to reveal 
Portia’s hidden portrait heightens the expectation that Antonio’s hidden pound of 
flesh will shortly make an appearance on stage. Two short scenes later, Portia’s 
portrait is at last discovered and Antonio’s letter reaches Belmont with the news that 
Antonio’s ships have all been wrecked. So the moment Shakespeare sates our 
appetite to see the hidden part that represents Portia’s all (the portrait in the casket), 
he intensifies our appetite to see the hidden pound of flesh that represents Antonio’s 
all. Bassanio’s language reveals that his imagination has already foreseen the worse: 
‘Here is a letter, lady, / The paper as the body of my friend, / And every word in it a 
                                               
31 A pound of animal flesh can be employed as a prop in the play. An example appears 
in the opening scenes of the 2004 film production starring Al Pacino as Shylock, where 
he is shown purchasing a weight of animal flesh at market. The use of flesh as a prop 
can assist in the imaginative process of substantiating Antonio’s pound of flesh, but 
the risk is that the prop will usurp the imaginary space reserved for Antonio’s pound 
of flesh and thereby defeat its dramatic object. 
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gaping wound, / Issuing life-blood’. (3.2.268–71) Obedient to the law of dramatic 
properties in the play, Bassanio is blatant in using the letter prop partem pro toto as 
synecdoche to embody Antonio’s utter ruin.  
 It is not only Antonio’s friends who see Antonio embodied in his ships.32 
Antonio makes the link himself. The letter read out in Belmont reports that his ‘ships 
have all miscarried’ (3.2.322) and that word ‘miscarried’ he later applies to his own 
body: ‘I once did lend my body for thy wealth; / Which, but for him that had your 
husband’s ring, / Had quite miscarried’. (5.1.263–5) The purse, the letter and the 
pound of flesh are parts which represent Antonio’s whole in accordance with the 
dramatic law of partem pro toto, but the ship might be said to function as a more 
mundane form of metonymy. At first sight there is no synecdoche, no part 
representing a whole, but this is where the law comes in again. 
 Shakespeare borrowed the ‘pound of flesh’ bond, as he borrowed so much of 
the plot of The Merchant of Venice, from a medieval Italian tale in Ser Giovanni’s, Il 
Pecorone;33 hence the undeniable fairy-tale qualities of the play. Just as the Italian 
tale was drawing on folk-memory of the flesh-bond in early Roman law,34 so 
                                               
32 See above. 
33 The Pecorone of Ser Giovanni (WG Waters (trans, London, Lawrence and Bullen, 
1897). 
34 The Twelve Tables provided for creditors to take shares in the corpse of an insolvent 
debtor: ‘tertiis nundinis partes secanto: si plus minusque secuerunt, se fraude esto’ 
(‘on the third market day let them cut the shares. If they have cut too much or too little, 
be it free from blame’, RW Lee (trans)). Lee makes the point that the last words 
‘anticipate and avoid’ Portia’s unreasonable assertion that Shylock would have to die 
if he took so much as a hair’s weight too much of Antonio’s flesh (4.1.330–8). See 
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Shakespeare drew upon the nature of legal bonds ancient and modern. It would be a 
mistake to attempt an exact identification of the Antonio-Shylock bond with any 
particular form of legal bond, but it has similarities with several that were current at 
the time the play was written. First published in 1590, William West’s 
Symbolæography appeared as a corrected second imprint in 1592, 35 around six years 
before Shakespeare finalised the text of The Merchant of Venice.36 West’s book was, 
amongst other things, a handbook on forms of legal instruments, and it describes 
several forms of bond. Some are reminiscent of Antonio and Shylock’s transaction 
before the notary, especially a form of bond known as ‘Statute Merchant’: 
 
A Statute is a Bond of Record sealed, testifying the Debtor to ow unto the 
Creditor a certaine summe of mony, And the same Bond is knowledged 
before such persons & in such manner as is appointed by Statutes in that 
behalfe made. And thereof bin such bonds termed Statutes, & they be of two 
                                               
RW Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (4th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1956) 
428. 
35 West, Symboleography, n 11 above. 
36 Henslowe’s Diary refers to ‘the venesyon comodey’ performed on 25 August 1594, 
which may have been an early version of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. Even 
so, we can be fairly sure that certain elements were not added until 1596 (see eg, the 
reference to the ship The Andrew, discussed in n 3 above) and it is reasonable to 
assume that the play was corrected right up until it was submitted for printing on 22 
July 1598 (it is entered in the Stationer’s Register on that date: Arber’s Transcript, vol 
iii, 122). Of course, the play might even have received further minor amendment prior 
to its actual print publication in 1600.  
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sorts, that is to say, Statutes Marchant, and Statutes Staple. A Statute 
Merchant is a Bond knowledged before one of the Clerkes of the Statutes 
Merchant and Maior or chiefe Warden of the Citie of London, or two 
Marchants of the said City for that purpose assigned, or before the Maior, 
chief Warden or Maister of other cities or good towns, or other sufficient 
men for that purpose appointed, And sealed with the Seale of the debtor … 
The execution upon Statutes Merchant is first to take the bodie of the debtor 
if he be lay & can be found, if otherwise, then upon his lands and goods.37 
  
There are also parallels between the Antonio-Shylock bond and an Elizabethan 
maritime bond; parallels which have hitherto escaped scrutiny. The bond is known as 
the ‘bottomry bond’.38 The essence of the bottomry bond is that the owner of a ship 
borrows money in some emergency and grants the keel or bottom of his ship as 
security for the loan. If the bottom is lost, so is the ship. If the ship is lost, so is the 
loan. The great risk taken by the lender is offset by exemption from the normal rules 
against usurious rates of interest. The bottomry bond and the ‘pound of flesh’ bond 
are in no technical sense the same (for one thing, the Antonio-Shylock bond was 
interest-free), but they have striking features in common. Both operate partem pro 
toto and in both cases the lender derives no material benefit from possession of the 
security: a lender with a bottomry bond does not want the bottom of a wrecked ship, 
and neither is there benefit to Shylock in Antonio’s flesh (1.3.155–9)—apart, 
                                               
37 West, Symboleography, n 11 above, Part I, Book II, 151. 
38 The bottomry bond is no longer used in practice, but in theory it remains a part of 
the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. The Supreme Court Act 1981, s 20(2)(r) refers 
to ‘any claim arising out of bottomry’.  
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perhaps, as bait for fish (3.1.37). Another point in common is that the borrower in 
both cases retains possession of the security (the boat and the pound of flesh 
respectively) even after the bond is sealed.39 Parallels between the fictional bond and 
the bottomry bond are made possible because Shakespeare had the idea (he did not 
derive it from Il Pecorone) of employing Antonio’s ships as metonymy for 
Antonio’s body. There is no evidence to suggest that Shakespeare had actually heard 
of the bottomry bond, but we do know that the bodemerij bond was widely used in 
Holland in the 1590s,40 by which time it was already very well established there,41 so 
                                               
39 In other words, the security takes the form of hypothec rather than pledge. 
40 J I Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585–1740 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1989) 76–7. Israel notes that the interest on bottomry loans for voyages to Russia in 
the 1590s was around 15 per cent (citing Simon Hart, Geschrift en getal (Dordrecht: 
Historische Vereniging Holland, 1976) 299–300). He refers to one loan made in 1598 
(the year The Merchant of Venice went to press) that was at 44 per cent interest (GA 
Amsterdam NA 80, fs 134–5). For recent commentary, see W Fritschy, ‘Holland’s 
Public Debt and Amsterdam’s Capital Market 1585–1609’ in C Sanz Ayán and BJ 
García García (eds), Banca, crédito y capital. La Monarquía Hispánica y los antiguos 
Países Bajos (1505–1700) (Madrid, Fundacion Carlos de Amberes, 2006) 39–59. 
41 Bottomry is listed in the Amsterdam archives many years before modern-style 
insurance is mentioned. JP Vergouwen notes that ‘In the ... Amsterdam Ordonnantie 
(mid-15th century), bottomry, or an early form of bottomry, is mentioned. Insurance 
is not mentioned in any way’. (De Geschiedenis Der Makelaardij in AssurantiënHier 
te Lande Tot 1813 (Zuid-Hollandsche Uitgevers Mij. 's-Gravenhage, 1945) 13 n 2). 
The same author makes a similar observation in relation to an Amsterdam ordinance 
of 26 January 1579 (Municipal Archives of Amsterdam, By-laws, Book C, f 
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it must have come to the attention of London merchants by the time Shakespeare 
wrote the play. The bond is recognised in an English court report in 1614 (though 
not by name),42 and it must have been very well known to English merchants by 
1622, when Malynes wrote his seminal text on merchant law, Consuetudo vel Lex 
Mercatoria. By then it had been Anglicised as ‘Bottommarie’ and had enjoyed an 
extensive commercial history. Malynes records that it had already been associated 
with widely varying interest rates: 
 
The name Bottommarie is derived by the Hollanders from the Keele or 
Bottome of a ship ... The money so taken up by the master of the ship, is 
                                               
191). Vergouwen states, at 29, that ‘in the quite elaborate list of brokers’ fees, as 
determined by the Amsterdam by-law of 26th January 1579, bottomry is listed, but 
insurance is not’. Another author has found an ordinance issued by the Heeren van de 
Gerechte (municipal authorities) dated 28 October 1578 which states that a broker will 
not lend on bottomry to shippers (masters/captains) ‘whom they know to be broke and 
to have spent too much, or of whom they have such suspicions’ (‘De maekelaers (art 
4) zullen geene schippers, die sij weten berooyt ende de beurs ten achteren geteert te 
hebben, ofte daervan wij sulx vermoeden hebben, helpen aan eenige bodemerij’, from 
Th Stuart, De Amsterdamsche Makelaardij (Amsterdam, 1879). He states that the 
ordinance is to be found in the Keurboek (Municipal Archives of Amsterdam, By-
laws) Book F, f 160, of 28 October 1578. For finding and translating these sources, I 
am most grateful to Sabine Go, a graduate student of the Vrije Universiteit, 
Amsterdam. 
42 Bridgeman’s Case (1614) Hob 11, and 1 Roll Abr 350 [(C)], pi 2; 80 Eng Rep 162. 
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commonly done upon great necessitie … the use payed for the same is verie 
great, at 30, 40, and 50 pro cent. without consideration of time.43 
 
The notion of taking the ship itself as security was not a new one; it goes at least as 
far back as the Romans.44 What was new was the language of taking the keel or 
bottom of the boat and by the time Blackstone comes to define bottomry in his Laws 
of England, he makes express the fact that the keel or bottom of the ship is offered 
‘partem pro toto’.45 When Antonio boasts that his ‘ventures are not in one bottome 
trusted’ (1.1.43) the word ‘bottome’ was certainly being used as standard 
Elizabethan vernacular for boat (indeed the whole phrase ‘in one bottom’ is later 
used by a number of Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists, and by Malynes himself, 
to indicate dangerously undiversified risk), but Shakespeare might also have had the 
bottomry bond in mind. Even if he did not, it is highly likely that merchants in his 
audience did. 
At the end of the courtroom scene in Act 4, Shylock finds himself in the 
position in which he had imagined Antonio. By taking Antonio’s pound of flesh he 
would have killed Antonio, partem pro toto. Now with the threat that his house will 
be taken from him, Shylock anticipates that his life will pass with his house, partem 
pro toto: ‘You take my house when you do take the prop / That doth sustain my 
house. You take my life / When you do take the means by which I live’. (4.1.382–4) 
In Tudor England, the props were the wooden foundations upon which the whole 
                                               
43 Gerard Malynes, Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria (London, Adam Islip, 1622) 171. 
44 Dig 22, 2 Code, iv; Dig 45.I.122.I. 
45 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69) Book II, 
cap xxx. 
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house was built; so just as Antonio’s life was built upon the wooden bottoms (the 
‘ribs’) of his ships, so Shylock’s life was built upon the wooden foundations of his 
house; in both cases partem pro toto, in accordance with the law of dramatic 
properties. 
In summary, we can see that the bridge between the play and the law is built 
out of ‘properties’ or ‘props’ in multiple senses of the word. The ‘dramatic 
properties’ (props) have the dramatic property (quality) of synecdoche, which is to 
say that they obey the dramatic law of partem pro totem, and by this property they 
link the play to the law of property that governs such things as rings and ships. 
Finally, the whole world of the play from Shylock’s house to Antonio’s ships, even 
the stage itself, is built upon wooden props.  
 
ACT 6 OF THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 
It is all too easy for lawyers to treat Act 4 scene I of the play as if it were the whole 
play. Andrews’ book falls into this trap.46 Taking a wider view, Weisberg stresses 
the need for lawyers in particular to rediscover the significance of Act 5,47 and 
Kornstein invites us to imagine an Act 6.48 Just as the play begins and proceeds with 
                                               
46 ME Andrews, Law Versus Equity in The Merchant of Venice (Boulder, University 
of Colorado Press, 1965). 
47 Richard Weisberg, Poethics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992) 94–104. 
48 Daniel J Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers?: Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1994) ch 4. In his ‘Act VI’ he posits an appeal by Shylock 
to a modern court. 
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an invitation to imagine the progress of Antonio’s ships off-stage, so it concludes in 
a way which forces us to contemplate the action off-stage after the play’s conclusion. 
The imagination is compelled to this by the total and profound absence of Shylock 
from Act 5. So if we accept the invitation to imagine Act 6, what do we find? We 
find that the most significant action of Act 6 is Shylock’s forced conversion to 
Christianity, in accordance with the cruel condition that Antonio set upon the 
commutation of Shylock’s capital sentence. (4.1.393–4) The forced conversion is 
significant in many ways, mostly because it contains a chill echo of the Venetian 
inquisitions49 and the first Jewish ghetto (with the terrible significance which that 
now carries for the modern reader), but also because it obeys the law of dramatic 
properties that runs through the play, the law of partem pro toto.  
The conversion of Shylock would have entailed two of the most significant 
public rituals in Elizabethan England: Baptism at the font, followed by the Eucharist. 
If we assume that Shylock did indeed submit to the sentence of conversion he would, 
in receiving the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, have received what Sir 
Francis Bacon called the ‘seals to the covenant’.50 Thus, Shylock’s faith in the 
resilience of the wax seal on Antonio’s bond (4.1.141) comes back to haunt him in 
the form of a truly inviolable seal. In his book, The Stage Life of Props, Andrew 
Sofer, calls the Eucharist wafer the ‘ur-prop of post-classical Western drama’.51 It is 
certainly a candidate for that label, and in the course of this chapter we have 
                                               
49 See B Pullan, The Jews of Europe and the Inquisition of Venice 1550–1670 (London, 
IB Tauris, 1997) 264 (reprinted edn of the 1st edn, 1983). 
50 The Advancement of Learning (1605) cap XXV.  
51 A Sofer, The Stage Life of Props (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2003) 
31. 
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discovered why. The Eucharist wafer is the embodiment of synecdoche as it is the 
embodiment of Christ. 1577 saw the publication of Christoph Rasperger’s Roman 
Catholic pamphlet, Ducentae Paucorum,52 which comprises an annotated catalogue 
of Protestant interpretations of Christ’s words ‘this is my body’. One interpretation is 
listed as ‘corpus scilicet accipiendum esse pro pane et corpore simul, partem pro 
toto’ (‘the body is of course accepted to be in essence bread and flesh at the same 
time; a part for the whole’).53 Antonio is not convincingly Christ-like at heart, but he 
is figured to represent or parody aspects of the New Testament account as 
Shakespeare’s audience would have understood it, including taking on another’s 
debts to the point of laying down his life at the hands of a Jewish adversary and an 
‘Italian’ judge. It follows that when Shylock is forced to eat the Eucharist wafer, and 
is therefore eating the body of Christ (figuratively or really depending upon one’s 
theology), he is also eating Antonio’s flesh insofar as Antonio was intended to 
portray Christ. The audience watching Act 6 will see Shylock acquire the pound of 
flesh at last, and with it the desolation of Antonio’s life: partem pro toto. Antonio is 
sad at the start of the play, and Shylock takes his sadness at its conclusion. This is no 
‘fairy-tale’ ending.
                                               
52 Ducentae paucorum istorum, et quidem clarissimorum, Christi verborum: Hoc est 
Corpus meum. 
53 Cap VI interpretatio lxxix. 
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